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Introduion
T   of three chapters. Although they are fairly independent,
they share a common research approach. All chapters apply microeconomic the-
ory to analyze economic or political questions. Chapters  and  are contributions
to tax theory. Chapter  mixes normative and positive analysis. It centers around
the question how taxes in the financial sector affect economic outcomes. Chap-
ter  takes a mostly normative perspective. It addresses the question how taxes
should be set in order to deal with pollution and inequality. Chapter  is differ-
ent; it is a positive analysis of voting behavior in a political economy model with
small parties. More precisely, it ask why a rational voter might want to vote for
a party that has no chance to enter parliament.
Chapter  e first chapter of this thesis is based on joint work with Felix Bier-
brauer (Aigner and Bierbrauer, ). e chapter addresses the question how
taxes in the financial sector affect the real economy. It presents a general equi-
librium model with financial intermediation. Banks hire workers and use real
inputs to transform risky loans into savings deposits with fixed returns. House-
holds offer labor, save their earnings, and consume. Firms take out loans to run
their business and produce consumption goods. e government collects taxes to
cover a public budget. e insights of the model are relevant to both the theory
of taxing financial intermediation and the respective policy discussion.
e first set of results concerns the tax burden. When the government needs
to collect a fixed amount of tax revenues, and equilibrium profits of banks are
positive, then one can shi the tax burden from households to banks (and vice
versa) by appropriately tweaking tax rates. Tax systems which favor the banks
induce a small financial sector and distort labor supply downwards. Tax systems
which favor the households induce a large financial sector and heavily tax profits.
e second set of results concerns the value added tax (VAT). Traditionally,
financial services are exempt from the VAT. Various authors consider this an im-
perfection of the tax system and have proposed reforms to include the financial

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sector into the VAT scheme. emodel presented in Chapter  is suited to analyze
the general equilibrium effects of these reforms. In part it confirms the claimed
reform effects. Yet, it also questions the necessity of these reforms and shows
that simple intuitions based on partial equilibrium analyses can be misleading
from time to time.
Chapter  e second chapter of the thesis is a slightly extended version of a
paper which is currently in press (Aigner, forthcoming). e chapter asks how
equity concerns affect the optimal level of environmental taxation. e short an-
swer is that higher levels of desired redistribution call for lower levels of green
taxes. at is not the whole story, though. I show that the relation of optimal
environmental taxes and redistribution depends on the available labor tax instru-
ments. When first-best instruments – which allow for distortion-free redistri-
bution – are available, more redistribution actually requires higher green taxes.
e discussion clarifies a crucial difference between optimality rules and optimal
levels in the theory of Pigouvian taxation.
e link between redistribution and environmental taxation originates from
the marginal cost of public funds. ese cost measure how individuals’ well-
being is affected when they have to pay taxes. When redistribution is distortive,
marginal cost of public funds are high and grow with increasing redistribution.
High marginal cost of public funds come with a low optimal environmental tax
level: e tax designer trades off the social harm from pollution against addi-
tional revenues from taxing pollution. e higher the marginal cost of public
fund are, the more valuable are revenues from environmental taxation. us a
smaller amount suffices to cover damages from pollution.
Chapter  e third chapter of the thesis is a slightly modified version of a joint
paper withMahias Lang (Aigner and Lang, ). It is motivated by an empirical
puzzle. In quite a few past elections, small parties gained a significant fraction of
votes but failed the election threshold and so were not able to enter parliament.
Polls before the election oen suggested such an outcome. us voters knew to
a certain degree that their vote would be wasted – in the sense that it would not
count toward representation in parliament.
We offer an explanation that rationalizes such a voting behavior. e voters in
our model are interested only in the policy outcome, which is decided in parlia-
ment. Nevertheless, they have a strategic incentive to vote for a party that does
not enter parliament. e reason is that voters are forward-looking. Voting for
the small party at the current election serves as a signal and fosters the party’s
chances to enter parliament in the next election. Voter trade off influence today
against a future benefit. Effectively, they invest their vote.

irty-plus years ago, when I was a graduate student in
economics, only the least ambitious of my classmates sought
careers in the financial world. Even then, investment banks paid
more than teaching or public service – but not that much more,
and anyway, everyone knew that banking was, well, boring.
Paul Krugman, April 
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Taxing Wall Street:
e Case of Boring Banking
. I
Financial intermediation accounts for a significant fraction of GDP. Its tax treat-
ment has considerable effects on fiscal revenues and economic efficiency. e
revenue aspect in particular has become a salient issue on the global policy agenda
since the  financial crisis has burdened public budgets and dramatically in-
creased public debt levels. Various EU countries, like the UK or Germany, have
implemented or announced new kinds of ‘bank taxes’. e introduction of a fi-
nancial transactions tax is currently being debated in the EU.
e financial crisis has also reinforced academic interest in excessive behavior,
moral hazard, and other market failures associated with the modern financial sys-
tem. Recent tax theory explores the scope for corrective taxes (for an overview,
see Keen, ). Yet, the literature struggles with a more basic question. Most of
the more than  countries in the world that have a value added tax fully or par-
tially exempt the financial sector (Zee, ). But why should financial companies
For data on financial sector size, see, e.g., Huizinga () or Lockwood (). ey report
values in the range of % to % of GDP for a range of developed countries. For a descriptive
list of new taxes on financial institutions, see Keen (, Box ). For figures on fiscal exposure
and dept level development, see International Montary Fund (, p. ). For a discussion of
the financial transaction tax, see Bierbrauer ().

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be treated differently than regular businesses? Traditionally, the answer would
be that the nature of financial intermediation and the prevalence of margin-based
pricing makes taxing those services technically difficult. By now, however, the
literature provides various ways to overcome these obstacles. In the European
Union, the VAT treatment of financial services has been on the policy agenda
since the mid-. (e.g., de la Feria and Lockwood, ; Huizinga, ; Poddar
and English, )
In this chapter, we propose a model in which the financial sector provides a
simple form of credit intermediation. Market failures like excessive risk-taking
are absent. ere are individual risks, but aggregate returns are deterministic.
Banks face neither liquidity nor solvency risks. In other words, banking is boring.
But because our model is basic, it is able to address a basic question: What are the
effects of taxation in the financial sector? Given the state of the political debate
and the academic literature, on would expect this question to be answered. But,
citing Keen (, p. ), “one striking aspect of these policy developments and of
the wider debate … is that they have been almost entirely unguided by the public
finance literature on the topic – because there is hardly any.”
e contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we perform a classical inci-
dence analysis and check to what extent it is possible to let the financial sector
bear the burden of funding the public budget. Second, we reconsider the pro-
posals made to reform the VAT treatment of financial transactions and determine
their effects on real economic outcomes.
For our analysis we develop a framework with the following features. . We
have a complete general equilibrium model, based on primitives such as endow-
ments and technologies. . Banks have a technology to transform risk. ey act
as intermediaries between depositors seeking safe returns and businesses issuing
risky bonds. Intermediation is costly and requires the input of real resources. .
Banks may or may not realize profits in equilibrium, depending on assumption
on the intermediation technology. . Fiscal authorities use linear taxes to create
revenue towards a public budget. Due to the general equilibrium nature of the
model, the framework allows us to determine how taxes change the equilibrium
allocation and how they influence welfare.
A first set of results addresses classical Ramsey-style questions: Suppose the
state faces an exogenous revenue requirement to fund public expenditures. Which
tax systems yield the desired revenues? Who carries the tax burden? e answers
to these questions depend on the intermediation technology.
When financial intermediation is a constant return to scale technology, equi-
librium profits are zero. en banks cannot carry any tax burden, but pass on all
taxes to households. So any increase in public expenditures comes at the expense

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of households. Under some mild elasticity assumptions, it does not maer which
taxes are used; all tax systems that raise the same revenues induce the same bur-
den on households. In a sense, the ‘overall’ tax level is relevant but the tax base
choice is not. (Proposition .)
When marginal returns to financial intermediation diminish, banks make pos-
itive profits in equilibrium. Different tax systems now have different distribu-
tional consequences. Holding revenues constant, the tax designer faces a trade
off between burdening the households and burdening the banks. In this situation,
making banks beer off implies greater use of distortive tax instruments and in-
duces lower financial activity. Making households beer off, on the other hand,
increases economic output and financial activity. (Proposition .)
We contribute to an existing theoretical literature on the optimal VAT treatment
of financial transactions. Auerbach and Gordon () decompose the price of a
consumption good into the cost of producing the good and the transactions cost of
acquiring it. ey find that a VAT including these transaction costs is equivalent
to a tax on labor income and conclude that financial services should be taxed
under to VAT. Grubert and Mackie () obtain a different conclusion. Based on
a view that financial services “provide the funds used to purchase fully taxable
consumption goods” they find that “[as] non-consumption goods, such financial
services should not be in the base of a consumption tax” (ibid., pp.  f.). While
Chia and Whalley () support the argument, Boadway and Keen () reject
the underlying intuition. ey argue that it is a fallacy to believe that goods
yielding no direct utility should automatically go untaxed (ibid., pp. –). ey
also make a case, though, that financial services payed for by means of a spread
should go untaxed, while fixed fees should be taxed. Jack () obtains a similar
result.
e aforementioned results are of a partial nature. Basically, they check how
various tax schemes affect the household budget or rather the aer-tax price ra-
tios faced by households. ey assume that before-tax fees charged by financial
service providers are, more or less, exogenously fixed, i.e., independent of the tax
schedule. When analyzing effects of taxation they essentially leave out both the
banking and the production sector. Yet, financial services are resource-intensive
intermediation services –matching lenderswith borrowers. To understand the ef-
fects of taxation, a notion of financial sector technology is needed. Some taxation
papers do provide micro-foundations for financial sector technology. Lockwood
() studies payment services in a dynamic Ramsey model. Caminal () con-
siders a model with endogenous tax collection cost.
Jack () does analyze tax treatment of business user, but uses a separate model, leaving
out consumers. Boadway and Keen () verbally argue that businesses should not be taxed
referring to Diamond and Mirrlees ().

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Overall, the literature on VAT treatment is rather small. One reason might
be the famous productive efficiency result. Aer all, financial services are, by
and large, intermediate goods. ose should go untaxed according to Diamond
and Mirrlees (). Typically, the value added tax is collected using an invoice-
credit method. A universal VAT is then equivalent to a sales tax that applies to
final consumers only. If the VAT exempts some businesses, though, the chain of
invoice-credits is broken and not all taxes are passed on to final consumers. (We
detail on this reasoning in Section ..) erefore, when a general VAT is in place,
productive efficiency requires the inclusion of financial transactions rather than
their exemption.
Productive efficiencymeans that different inputs are efficiently allocated among
all production units. Diamond and Mirrlees (ibid.) model production in a rather
abstract way. eir result affects financial intermediation only insofar as finan-
cial services can be interpreted as a ‘standard’ input good. In our seing, we ex-
plicitly model financial intermediation as a special technology to transform risky
claims. One the other hand, the optimal allocation of different primitive inputs
is less prominent in our model, because ultimately labor is the only input avail-
able in our economy. Another difference to Diamond and Mirrlees (ibid.) is the
treatment of profits. e productive efficiency result requires constant returns to
scale technologies or a % profit tax; positive aer-tax profits can imply pro-
ductive inefficiency (Mirrlees, ). We do allow for positive aer-tax profits but
abstract from incentive considerations; i.e., firms do provide output even if their
financial compensation is exactly zero.
Policy proposals e exemption of financial services from the value added tax
has led to a discussion on reforming the VAT system. Authors like Poddar and
English (), Huizinga (), and Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard () have
put forward proposals to include the financial sector into the VAT scheme. Lost
revenues and efficiency concerns are the major motivations for these proposals.
Most of the arguments supporting them are based on partial equilibrium insights,
basic tax principles or general economic intuition. Yet, few theoretical insights
exist on the general equilibrium effects of these proposals, notably the induced
tax burden.
We use our model to examine three potential tax reforms. We analyze their
effects on economic outcomes and clarify who gains and who looses. Our results
vary with the assumptions made upon intermediation technology. In many (but
not all) instances we can confirm the expected reform effects (Propositions ., .,
and .). But for most cases we cannot confirm the rationales underlying the re-
form proposals. In particular, when financial intermediation is a constant-return-

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to-scale technology, none of the reforms is necessary; adjusting existing tax rates
could induce the very same effects on economic outcomes (Proposition .).
e chapter is organized as follows. In Section . we present the model. In
Section ., we characterize the competitive equilibrium. In Section ., we detail
on taxation. In Section ., we evaluate the effects of reforming the VAT system.
Section . concludes. Omied proofs are relegated to Appendix .A.
. M
e economy consists of households, food producers, input producers, and banks.
ere are two periods: the first one is dedicated to production; in the second
one, consumption takes place. Food producers employ labor h to produce food
x. Households provide labor and consume food. Banks act as intermediaries and
provide financial services. ey employ labor as well as an input good z, provided
by input producers. Fiscal authorities collect taxes used for public consumption.
e need for financial intermediation is two-sided. Households demand bank-
ing services because there is no use for their wages in period 1. By puing their
earnings into a bank deposit account, they effectively transfer their funds into the
second period. Food producers demand banking services because they have no
funds to start with and earn no revenues until the second period. To pay their
workers in the first period, they must take out loans. In principle, food produc-
ers could promise their workers some share of future revenues instead of paying
wages. Yet, food production is uncertain (as detailed below). Workers demand
a non-random immediate paycheck rather than a risky claim on revenues. e
major merit of financial intermediation is thus a transformation of risk. By con-
tracting with many different producers, banks can diversify the production risk
and offer depositors a safe return.
We address two sets of questions: First, what are the Pareto-efficient allocations
given an exogenous revenue requirement? Second, how do changes in the tax
system affect equilibrium outcomes such as fiscal revenue and economic surplus?
We could also allow households to put their earning in some storage technology. We would
then focus on equilibria in which households chose not to use it but rather opt for deposits.
By assuming right away that the deposit account is the best available use for households’
earnings, we remove this layer of complexity.
e underlying idea is that workers are risk-averse and would like to diversify the employer
default risk. Doing the diversification on their own (e.g., by working for many different em-
ployers) comes with prohibitively high transaction cost, though. To save on notation and
reduce complexity, we do not model this decision explicitly. We merely assume that workers
have to be paid in period 1. is creates firms’ loan demand.

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Taxation We consider a set of linear ad valorem taxes. e set contains the ‘tra-
ditional’ taxes on (nonfinancial) commodities, labor, and profits. We also allow
for less-traditional instruments, namely a cash-flow tax tC and a financial activ-
ities tax tF. Under a cash-flow tax, cash inflows from financial transactions, like
receiving a loan or an interest payment, are taxable. Cash outflows, like granting
a loan or paying interest, on the other hand, allow for a tax credit. Under a finan-
cial activities tax, both wages and profits generated by a financial institution are
subject to a tax.
We also address the issue of (non-)deductibility of VAT paid on inputs by means
of a variable tzC, which we consider part of the tax system. Banks can deduct tzC
from the price of inputs goods. Typically, tzC will either be zero (no deductibility)
or will equal the tax on the input good (full deductibility). In practice, exemption
of financial products from VAT typically features no deductibility. e cash-flow
approach proposed in the literature would include cash flows in the VAT scheme
and allow for full deductibility.
Tax revenues are immediately spent on labor or food, depending on the period.
Put differently, the government does not trade on financial markets. For given tax
rates, prices for real goods and financial services emerge at competitive markets
onwhich the households and all firms as well as the government act a price takers.
Financial services ere are two types of financial services, loans l and deposits
d. A loan is a contract between a bank and a producer. e bank hands over
pll units of cash in period 1. e producer promises to pay back pxl in period 2.
is is the value of l units of food. So the food price serves as the numeraire for
financial contracts. A deposit is a contract between a bank and a household. In
period one, the household hands over pdd units of cash to the bank. In period two,
it receives pxd units of cash from the bank. Again this is equivalent to the delivery
of d units of the numeraire good food. e implied interest rates are (px=pd   1)
for deposits and (px=pl   1) for loans.
If used, a cash flow tax tC applies to all cash flows associated with financial
products. Analogous to a value added scheme with tax credits, the each inflow
of cash is subject to taxation but each outflow of cash allows for a tax credit.
Households, however, are not part of the scheme. ey never pay cash flow taxes
nor can they claim a tax credit.
e household problem ere is a continuum of measure one of homogeneous
householdswho enjoy consumption xH and dislikeworking hH. ey chooseAH =
(xH; hH; dH) in order to maximize

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u(xH; hH)
subject to
hHph(1  th)  pddH (.)
pxdH  pxxH (.)
ere is one constraint for each period. In the first period, households can deposit
no more than their net earnings hHph(1  th). In the second period, they receives
px for each unit deposited and purchases xH at the very same price per unit. Utility
u is strictly increasing and concave in xH, and is strictly decreasing and convex
in hH. Furthermore, u is such that the household problem has a unique solution
which is strictly greater than zero and bounded above.
e food producer problem ere is a continuum of measure one of homo-
geneous food producers. Food producers have an intertemporal technology to
transform labor h into food x. In the first period, food producers employ workers
hF at wage rate ph. ey generate no revenues in period 1, though. Also, they
have no initial endowment. To pay their workforce, they have to take out a loan
lF. ey receive pl units of cash for each loan unit. is constitutes a cash inflow
from a financial product and they pay cash-flow taxes amounting to tClF. In ex-
change for loans lF, food producers promise to repay pxlF in period 2. e net cash
flow of food producers in period 1must be nonnegative; the respective constraint
reads
(1  tC)pllF  phhF : (.)
Labor employed in period 1 transforms into food output, available in period 2.
e output level is random. With probability α  1 production is successful. In
that case, each unit of labor input hF from period 1 yields one unit of food output
which is sold at price px in period 2. From the revenues, food producers pay VAT
txpxhF, and refund pxlF to their creditors, while receiving a tax credit tCpxlF for the
cash outflow. With probability (1  α), production is unsuccessful, inducing zero
revenues and a full default on all debt obligations. Food producers maximize the
expected net cash flow of period 2, which is
αpx [(1  tx)hF   (1  tC)lF] : (.)
To sum up, the food producer problem is to choose AH = (hF; lF) in order to maxi-
mize (.) subject to (.).

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e success of individual producers is independent from other producers. By
a law of large numbers, total production is thus nonrandom and equal to αhF.
Notice that the optimal food producer choice does not depend on the price of
food, px. While period-two revenues do depend on px, so do period-two costs
because loans are an obligation to deliver the cash necessary to buy food.
e input producer problem ere is a continuum of measure one of homoge-
neous input producers. ey choose AI = (hI; zI) in order to maximize
(1  tz)pzzI   phhI
subject to
hI  zI
Input producers employ labor hI to produce input good zI. e rate of transfor-
mation equals one. Input producers sell all their production in period one so they
do not face any financing issue. Each z-unit sold is subject to a tax tz.
For many parts of our analysis, the input producers are not necessary. But they
provide a taxable good used by banks. As we detail upon in Section ., in the
context of VAT exemption for banks, this has been associated with problems of
tax cascading as banks pay non-deductible taxes on inputs. e introduction of a
physical input good allows us to analyze tax-cascading.
e banking problem ere is a continuum of measure one of homogeneous
banks. ey choose AB = (dB; lB; hB; zB; xB) in order to maximize
[(1  tC)r(lB)lB   (1  tC)dB] px(1  tF   tπ)
subject to
(1  tC)pddB  (1  tC)pllB + (1 + tF)phhB + (1  tzC)pzzB (.)
hB  κddB + κllB (.)
zB  γddB + γ llB (.)
xB = [r(lB)lB   dB] (1  tC)(1  tF   tπ)
for some parameters κd; κl; γd; γ l  0.
In period one, banks collect deposits dB from households, yielding an aer-tax
cash flow of (1  tC)pddB. Banks use the cash to grant loans lB and pay for further
inputs; in order to run their business, they need workers hB and the input good zB

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in a fixed proportion to the size of loans and deposits. Furthermore, banks have
to pay a FAT tax tF on their wage bill, but can claim tax credits for the other two
inputs. Notice though, that the level of tax credits tzC does not need to equal the
VAT level tz nor the cash-flow tax level tC.
In period two, banks receive a repayment from those food producers that suc-
ceeded. Recall that food producers success probability is exogenous from the pro-
ducers’ perspective. From the banks’ perspective, it is a potentially endogenous
object equal to r(lB), a function of the total number of loans granted by a bank.
We will further discuss this issue in a moment.
Banks grant loans to a continuum of food producers, so they are perfectly in-
sured against individual defaults and receive the expected value of their loan port-
folio. is ensures that banks are certainly able to pay off depositors in the second
period. e cash outflow to depositors allows for a tax credit tCpxdB. e cash in-
flow from debtor is subject to a cash flow tax tCpxr(lB)lB. Finally, banks pay a
financial activities tax, tF, as well as an ordinary profit tax, tπ , on their before-
tax profit (but aer cash flow taxation). Whatever is le for the bank is used to
consume food. We denote their consumption by xB, and refer to it as banking
surplus.
(Very) Boring Banking We analyze two versions of the model: Boring Banking
and Very Boring Banking. ey differ in the assumptions made upon the return
function R(lB) := r(lB)lB. Under Very Boring Banking, financial intermediation
exhibits constant returns to scale and the financial sector equilibrium is charac-
terized by a plain zero-profit condition. Banks cannot bear any tax burden but
pass on all taxes to consumers. In this sense, this version of the model is very
boring. Under Boring Banking, we still have a financial sector without aggregate
risk, and without excessive behavior of any sort. Banks are traditional intermedi-
aries between depositors and borrowers. In this sense, we still talk about boring
banking. Yet, the intermediation technology yields decreasing marginal return.
is induces positive equilibrium profits. Now, banks may bear a tax burden,
depending on supply and demand conditions. e tax incidence is thus more ‘ex-
iting’ than under Very Boring Banking.
Assumption . (Very Boring Banking). e return function R(lB) = r(lB)lB exhibits
constant returns to scale with r(lB)lB  αlB for some exogenous α 2 (0; 1].
Under Assumption ., α is an exogenous parameter equal to the success prob-
ability of food production. As such, it is the success probability as perceived by
both food producers and banks. Assumption . has the implication that banks
make zero profits in equilibrium. is is different under Assumption ., stated

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below, which yields positive profits in equilibrium and allows for banks to bear
some of the tax burden. Under Assumption ., the success probability of food
production is an endogenous object, determined by the level of granted loans, lB,
(which is both the number of loans granted by an individual bank and the aggre-
gate level of loans in the economy.) From the perspective of the food producer,
however, success of production remains exogenous.
Why should the success probability depend on the choices of banks rather than
the food producers? In this very distinctness, this is certainly at odds with reality.
But within our model, it does have economic support. On the one hand, food
producers run fully leveraged production; they do not lose any equity in case of
failure. Furthermore, under equilibrium prices, their profit is zero, independent
of production success. us producers face weak incentives to foster success, if
at all. Banks, on the other hand, fully bear the default risk. eir invested capital
is lost completely when their loans go into default, and they still owe funds to
depositors. us banks have high incentives to make sure loans are paid back.
Assumption . (Boring Banking). e return function R(lB) = r(lB)lB is twice con-
tinuously differentiable, exhibits decreasing returns to scale, and r(lB) 2 [0; 1]. For
all lB, it satisfies
r 0(lB)  0; R0(lB)  0; R00(lB) < 0;
 R0(lB)lBR00(lB)
 > 1 :
Assumption . has three parts. First, r(lB) is limited to be between 0 and 1, mak-
ing sure that it can be interpreted as a probability. Second, the higher the loan
volume, the lower the average rate of repayment. ird, the last three inequali-
ties concern the shape of R(lB): higher loan levels always yield higher return but
marginal returns diminish. e last inequality is an assumption upon the elastic-
ity of loan supply. An example of a return function satisfying Assumption .
would be R(lB) = [β1=(β1 + lB)]β2lB, with β1 2 (0; 1) and β2 2 (0; 1=2].
e reduced-form model of endogenous loan repayment with diminishing re-
turns is quite useful for our analysis; it allows for positive equilibrium profits
while remaining in the domain of competitive markets with price taking behav-
ior. e underlying economic reason for diminishing returns could be a moral
hazard problem in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (): Banks monitor their
debtors in order to induce effort. e more loans banks grant, the less effective
becomes the monitoring. is could be due a hidden factor, fundamental capacity
We argue in Section . that the optimal loan supply maximizes R(lB)   QlB, with Q be-
ing the ‘overall cost of loans’, as defined in equation (.). en, by standard arguments,
jR0(lB)=(lBR00(lB))j is the elasticity of loan supply with respect to ‘cost’ Q.

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constraints or increasing organizational complexity. Another motivation would
be an underlying homogeneity in food producers. When granting the first loan,
banks pick the best producers with the highest success probability. With increas-
ing loan volume, banks have to compromise on quality.
In what follows, we always presume that either Assumption . or Assump-
tion . is true. A large part of the equilibrium analysis in Section . is true
independently of which of the two it is. When a result needs a particular one,
we explicitly state the assumption as a premise. On the other hand, when we
state a result without referring to one of the two Assumptions, the result is true
if Assumption . or Assumption . is true.
Public consumption Fix tax rates. en the tax revenues amount to
T1 := thphhH + tC (pl(lF   lB) + pddB) + pz(tzzI   tzCzB) + tFphhB
in period one, and
T2 := txpxr(lB)hF + tCpx ((lB   lF)r(lB)  dB) + (tF + tπ)(r(lB)lB   dB)px(1  tC)
in period two. All tax revenues are ultimately used for food consumption and
the respective amount is called public consumption. In the second period, food
markets are open, and the government uses all tax revenues from this very period
to buy food, leading to a public food demand of xG = T2=qx.
In the first period, no food has been produced yet. So there is no food mar-
ket. ere is a labor market, though. Just as food producers, the government
can employ labor (in period 1) to produce food (in period 2). e technology is
akin to food producers technology; each unit of labor yields α units of food (non-
randomly). We assume that the government does not engage in financial market,
so it spends all first-period tax revenues on labor, leading to a public labor demand
of hG = T1=ph.
Overall, public consumption cG is thus the sum
cG := xG + αhG :
Public consumption is a measure of public resource use over the two periods. In
some sense, it corresponds to the net present value of inter-temporal tax revenues.
e analogy is not complete, though, as the government does not engage in credit
markets. Notice that public consumption is measured in units of food, rather than
tax revenues which are measured in units of cash and hence vary with the overall
price level. In the positive part of our analysis, we ask how different tax schemes
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affect the level of public consumption. In Section .., we exogenously fix some
public consumption requirement cG and ask which tax schedules (and implied
welfare levels) are compatible with cG  cG :
In the equilibrium analysis of Section ., we take taxes and government be-
havior as given and summarize public demand levels by AG := (hG; xG).
Tax systems roughout the analysis, we consider nonnegative taxes and do
not allow any subsidies. Also, we allow a % tax rate only for profit tax tπ .
Formally, a vector t is a tax system if it holds values (th; tx; tz; tC; tzC; tF; tπ) for all
tax levels and
ti 2 [0; 1) for i 2 fh; x; z;C; zC; Fg ; tzC  tz ;
tπ 2 [0; 1] ; tπ + tF  1 :
e inequalities ensure that the total tax on profits is at most % and that the tax
credit allowed for inputs does not exceed the VAT imposed on the input, which
would be a subsidy.
Equilibrium For any given tax system t, we seek to characterize the competitive
equilibrium. An allocation is a vector A = (AH;AF;AI;AB;AG) holding individual
choice variables as well government demand. A price system p = (ph; pz; pd; pl;
px) holds prices for all markets. A tuple (A; p) is an equilibrium for t if
• AH, AF, AI, and AB are individually optimal given p and t,
• hG = T1=ph and xG = T2=px,
• all markets clear:
αhF = xH + xG + xB; dH = dB
hH = hF + hB + hI + hG; lF = lB
zI = zB
• and α = r(lB).
We also say that A is an equilibrium allocation for t if a p exist such that (A; p) is
an equilibrium for t. Also, p is an equilibrium price system for t if A exist such that
(A; p) is an equilibrium for t.

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. T C E
egoal of this section is to characterize the equilibrium allocation for some given
tax system. We center our analysis on one particular market: the market for
deposits. e reason is that on this market we have the household deposits supply
on the one side, and the banking deposit demand on the other side. ese two
sectors are the main driving forces of the equilibrium allocation, because all other
sectors (food and input good production) are mostly determined by zero-profit
conditions.
In the results, we focus on the equilibrium allocation rather than equilibrium
prices, because the former is (uniquely) determined while the general price level
is undetermined. e crucial step in our characterization is the determination of
the loan volume lB. e loan volume is central for an equilibrium because the
shape of banking returns R is a direct function of the loan volume and determines
the value of banking surplus. We will also show that all economic activity follows
the size of the banking sector as measured by lB.
We begin with the prices for food and input good production. As both sectors
exhibit constant returns to scale, the respective prices must satisfy zero profit
conditions.
Lemma .. If p is an equilibrium price system for t, then
pz(1  tz) = ph; pl(1  tx) = ph :
Now, we derive banks’ loan supply and deposit demand. Consider the banking
problem. It has five choice variables and four constraints. Yet, we can actually
simplify the problem significantly. First, the objective function is equivalent to
R(lB)   lB. Second, the constraints, (.), (.), and (.), must be binding. ird,
using the findings from Lemma ., we can collapse the three constraint into one
single constraint, namely dB = QlB, with
Q :=
(1  tC)
(1  tx) + (1 + tF)κl + γ l
(1  tzC)
(1  tz)
(1  tC)pd
ph   (1 + tF)κd   γd
(1  tzC)
(1  tz)
: (.)
e constraint tells that for each loan a bank wants to lend, it has to collect Q
units of deposits. us, from the banks’ perspective, Q is the overall cost param-
eter for granting credits; a loan volume lB returns R(lB) and, effectively, costs QlB.
Q accounts for all the inputs and taxes banks have to pay in order to grant loans.
Given Q, the banking problem reduces to an unconstrained maximization prob-
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lem over lB. e solution has a standard property: marginal returns must equal
marginal cost.
Lemma .. If (A; p) is an equilibrium for t, then
R0(lB) = Q; dB = lBQ:
To sum up, once we know the equilibrium loan volume, we know that the equi-
librium deposit demand is dB = lBR0(lB).
Next, we derive the households’ deposit supply. We can reduce the household
problem in a fashion similar to the banking problem. Again, the respective con-
straints, (.) and (.), must bind. We combine them and find that hB = PxH,
with
P := pdph(1  th) :
P is a tax-including relative price. It tells households how much they have to
work in order to afford one unit of food. Knowing this relative price is sufficient
to determine household choice. We can thus define the unconstrained household
problem and its solution x H(P ) by
x H(P ) := argmaxxH
u(xH; PxH): (.)
By construction, the solution of the household problem is given by xH = x H(P ),
hH = Px H(P ) and dH = x H(P ). Price ratio P is thus a sufficient statistic for utility.
e lower P, the beer off the households are because, by an envelope argument,
@u(x H(P ); Px H(P ))
@P = x

H(P )
@u
@hH < 0 :
Households and banks interact on the deposit market. For an equilibrium, de-
posit supply dH needs to equal deposit demand dB. Individually, dH is a function
of price ratio P and dB is a function of price Q. But we can express both sides
of the market as functions of the equilibrium loan volume lB. Lemma . below
exploits this fact and characterizes the equilibrium loan volume. e lemma uses
function ~P . e function gives the equilibrium value of P, given the equilibrium
loan supply. It proves crucial for all the remaining analysis, so we present it as a
displayed definition.
Definition .. ~P is a function, mapping from tax systems t and loans volumes lB

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into R, and
~P (lB; t) := 1
(1  th)
1=R0(lB)
1  tx +
(1 + tF)κ(lB)
1  tC +
γ(lB)
1  tC
1  tzC
1  tz

with
κ(lB) := κd + κlR0(lB) γ(lB) := γd +
γ l
R0(lB) :
Under Assumption ., R0(lB)  α is an exogenous constant and we will some-
times simplify notation using κ := κd + κl=α, γ := γd + γ l=α and ~P = ~P (t ).
Lemma .. If (A; p) is an equilibrium for t then p is such that price ratio P satisfies
P = ~P (lB; t) ;
and loan volume lB satisfies
xH(~P (lB; t )) = lBR0(lB) : (.)
Equation (.) implicitly defines the equilibrium level of loans as a function
of taxes t. e equation resembles the market clearing conditions for deposits.
e le-hand side is households’ deposit supply dH, equaling their food demand
xH = x H(P ). e right-hand side is banks’ deposit demand QlB: as marginal cost,
Q, equal marginal revenues, R0(lB), we have lBR0(lB) as deposit demand. e miss-
ing piece in this reasoning, P = ~P (lB; t) is also a consequence of previous con-
siderations. Notice first that P is a sufficient statistic for the household choice,
and Q is a sufficient condition for bank choice. By substituting pd=ph in (.) by
(1 th)P, we find that there is a one-to-one relational betweenQ and P. We already
argued that Q must equal marginal returns R0(lB) and thus there is a one-to-one
relation between R0(lB) and P. When we rearrange this relation, we end up with
P = ~P (lB; t ).
Lemma . is helpful because it provides the equilibrium value for lB and, as it
turns out, we can formulate the whole allocation as a function of lB.
Proposition . (Equilibrium allocation). Allocation A is an equilibrium allocation
for t if and only if
xH(~P (lB; t )) = lBR0(lB) ;
and
xH = dH = dB = R0(lB)lB ; hH = ~P (lB; t )R0(lB)lB ;

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hI = zI = zB = γ(lB)R0(lB)lB ; lF = lB ;
hB = κ(lB)R0(lB)lB ; (1  tx)hF = (1  tC)lB ;
and
xB =
R(lB)  R0(lB)lB (1  tC)(1  tF   tπ) ;
hG =

~P (lB; t )  1  tC1  tx
1
R0(lB)   κ(lB)  γ(lB)

R0(lB)lB ;
xG =
R(lB)  R0(lB)lB (1  tC)(tF + tπ) + tx(1  tC)1  tx R(lB)  tCR0(lB)lB :
Proposition . is a consequence of Lemma .. Equation (.) gives the equi-
librium value of loan supply lB, and we can express the whole allocation as a
function of lB, using binding optimization constraints and market clearing condi-
tions. Proposition . holds for both versions of the model (Assumptions . or
.). Under Very Boring Banking it simplifies. In that case, (.) reads
x H(~P (t )) = lBα:
e le-hand side of the equation is independent of lB but fully determined by
the tax system which induces ~P (t ). Also, α is exogenous under Assumption .,
so the equilibrium level of loans simply is lB = x H(~P (t ))=α. Before-tax banking
surplus then amounts to [R(lB)  R0(lB)lB] = [αlB   αlB] = 0, because constant
returns scale technologies drive profits down to zero. Under Boring Banking, on
the other hand, profits are positive and banking surplus isR(lB)  R0(lB)lB (1  tC)(1  tF   tπ) = [ 2lBr 0(lB)](1  tC)(1  tF   tπ)  0 :
Banking surplus is positive because, by Assumption, r 0 < 0.
Under Assumption ., there is exactly one lB solving equation (.). So there
exist a unique equilibrium allocation for Very Boring Banking. We conclude this
section by providing conditions for existence and uniqueness which also cover
the case of Boring Banking.
Lemma . (Uniqueness). For any given t there is at most one equilibrium allocation
A if one of the following conditions is met:
• Assumption . holds, or
• Assumption . holds and x H(P ) is monotonically decreasing in P.

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Lemma . (Existence). Fix some tax system t and suppose that the following con-
ditions are met:
i) x H is a continuous.
ii) R0(0) is bounded.
iii) ere exists lB > 0 such that x H(~P (lB; t))  R0(lB)lB .
en, there is at least one equilibrium allocation for t.
. T
In this section, we discuss two questions. . Which tax systems are equivalent?
Textbook-style general equilibrium models with households and CRS producers
typically find that a labor tax is equivalent to a uniform commodity tax. Our
model features two crucial differences: in addition to producers and households,
we have financial intermediaries, and we have diminishing returns to scale. .
How to set tax rates in order to raise some given amount of tax revenues? How
can one distribute the required tax burden?
.. E T S
When are two tax systems equivalent? A restrictive answer would require tax
systems to be equivalent when they induce the very same allocation. From a
normative perspective, however, the relevant object is not the allocation as such,
but the surplus induced by the allocation. Given that input good producers and
food producers receive zero surplus in any equilibrium, we can describe payoffs
by the following three values. . household utility u, . banking surplus xB, and
. public consumption cG.
Consequently, we consider two tax systems equivalent if they induce the same
household utility u, the same banking surplus xB, and the same public consump-
tion cG.
Proposition .. . Under Very Boring Banking (Assumption .), two tax systems,
t and t 0, are equivalent if
~P (t ) = ~P (t 0) :
. Under Boring Banking (Assumption .), two tax systems, t and t 0, are equiva-
lent if
(1  tC)(1  tF   tπ) = (1  t 0C)(1  t 0F   t 0π)
and, for all lB, ~P (lB; t ) = ~P (lB; t 0) :

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Proposition . yields some noteworthy insights. Under Very Boring Banking,
the result is particularly strong; two tax systems are equivalent whenever they
induce the same price ratio P. e crucial step in the proof is to realize that once
the equilibrium price ratio P is determined, the equilibrium values of household
utility, banking surplus, and public consumption follow from P, irrespectively of
individual tax rates underlying P. is finding is rather obvious for household
utility given that the solution to the unconstrained household problem is a func-
tion of P, as defined in (.). Banking surplus is straightforward as well, because
it is zero in any case. For public consumption, the finding requires some more
algebraic effort. For details, see Lemma . in the appendix.
e induced price ratio under Very Boring Banking is
~P (t ) = 1
(1  th)
 1=α
1  tx +
(1 + tF)κ
1  tC +
γ
1  tC
1  tzC
1  tz

(.)
with κ = κd + κl=α, γ = γd + γ l=α, for some exogenous parameter α. Hence,
for any given P, there are many tax systems inducing it and thus there are many
equivalent tax systems. For instance, a pure labor tax system is equivalent to a
broad (universal and uniform) value-added-tax system.
Proposition . is reminiscent to the findings of Auerbach and Gordon (),
who also show equivalence of a broad VAT and a labor-income tax. ey con-
clude that therefore the VAT should include all (financial) intermediation. is
conclusion, however, is not confirmed in out model. To see why, suppose there
is a VAT system which includes sales of ‘real’ goods (tx = tz > 0), but exempts
financial transactions (tC = 0). Let all other tax rates be zero as well. en the
induced price ratio is P = 1=((1  tx)α) + κ + γ=(1  tz), while a pure labor tax
would induce P = (1=α + κ + γ) =(1   th). Yet, by fine-tuning tax rates tx and
tz, it is possible to induce a price ratio that equals the price ratio under the pure
labor tax, making the two tax system equivalent. It is thus not necessary to in-
clude financial transactions into the VAT scheme, when the goal is replication of
a labor-income tax.
e case of Boring Banking is more intricate. In contrast to Very Boring Bank-
ing, banks generate a positive surplus in equilibrium due to diminishing returns
to scale. Taxes affect both the pre-tax and the aer-tax profit. e last condition,
~P (lB; t ) = ~P (lB; t0), guarantees that, similar to Very Boring Banking, the equilib-
rium price ratio P is identical, yielding identical household utility. It also guaran-
tees identical loan volumes lB, implying identical before-tax banking profits. e
second-to-last condition, (1   tC)(1   tF   tπ) = (1   t 0C)(1   t 0F   t 0π), ensures
Such a “universal” and “uniform” value added tax systemwould comprise tx = tz = tC = tzC > 0
and tF = th = tπ = 0.
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that aer-tax profits are equal as well. e equivalent tax system must yield both
the same level of economic activity and the same distribution of financial sector
surplus.
erefore, the equivalence results from Auerbach and Gordon (ibid.) and from
the Very Boring Banking case change when returns to scale are diminishing; now,
a pure labor-income tax is not equivalent to a universal and uniform VAT. Such
two tax system do induce the same level of economic activity, i.e., the same lB.
But the broad VAT includes a cash-flow tax that cuts into banks’ profits, while the
labor tax does not.
To retain equivalence, the income tax must be accompanied by a profit tax. is
is the case in the following two systems:
. A uniform tax on labor income and profits: th = tπ > 0, and all other taxes
zero.
. A uniform tax on value added, imposed on all transactions except labor in-
come: tx = tz = tC = tzC > 0, and all other taxes zero.
ese two tax system are equivalent when the respective uniform tax rates are
the same.
.. T   F P B C
Suppose tax authorities have to raise some exogenously fixed amount of tax rev-
enues and seek to find suitable instruments. is classical question of tax theory
is the subject of this section. As mentioned in the model description, the public
budget constraint takes the form
cG  cG ;
where cG  0 is an exogenous public consumption requirement. Recall that public
consumption is the sum cG = xG + αhG. Tax revenues must suffice to cover the
required expenditures. But again we abstract from revenues and focus directly
on public consumption, which is independent of the general price level.
Typically there are many feasible tax systems respecting the public consump-
tion requirement. A feasible tax systems is efficient if any other tax system which
increases either household utility or banking surplus induces a reduction in the
other one or violates the public consumption requirement.
In the case of Very Boring Banking, banking surplus is zero for any tax system,
so taxes are efficient if they maximize household utility subject to the public bud-
get constraint. If we restrict parameters such that household demand is relatively
inelastic, then there is a straightforward result.

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Assumption .. e (absolute) elasticity ϵ of x H, with respect to relative price P, is
at most 1, that is, for all P,
ϵ =
@x H@P Px H
  1 :
Assumption . ensures that higher tax rates always yield higher revenues as
the households’ behavioral response to tax changes is not too large. Under this
assumption, we obtain the following characterization.
Proposition .. Let Assumptions . (Very Boring Banking) and . be true. en t
is an efficient tax system given public consumption requirement cG if and only if
α  ~P (t )  (1=α + γ + κ) x H(~P (t )) = cG :
e crucial step in the proof is to realize that once we know the equilibrium
price ratio P , we know that public consumption is
cG = α (P    (1=α + γ + κ)) x H(P ) ; (.)
irrespectively of the individual tax rates (see Lemma . in the appendix). So in
order to fund public consumption cG, the tax designer first needs to find a respec-
tive price ratio using (.). Under Assumption ., this problem has a unique
solution. Once the desired price ratio is found, the tax designer needs to set tax
rates in order to induce that price ratio. is second task is characterized by equa-
tion (.) and has multiple solutions; all tax systems with ~P (t ) = P  yield the
desired outcome. ere is a high degree of freedom in the choice of the tax base.
More to the point, in this version of the model it virtually makes no difference
whether the financial sector is included or excluded from taxation.
Proposition . is only valid for Very Boring Banking. We now turn to the more
intricate exercise when banking is just boring.
Boring Banking and the Pareto Frontier
In the case of diminishing marginal returns (Boring Banking), positive banking
profits enter the welfare considerations. e question who should fund the state
now becomes a substantial one. Which tax instruments are efficient? Does the tax
designer have a choice between burdening the banks and burdening the house-
holds? Is there an equity-efficiency trade o?
We approach this exercise by posing the following technical question. Which
combinations of banking surplus xB and household utility u are compatible with a
is is true because the RHS of (.) is strictly increasing. For details, see the appendix.
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public consumption requirement of cG and do not involve any waste of resources?
Put differently, which tuples (u; xB) are Pareto-efficient, given some public budget
constraint? When determining these tuples, we account for the fact that there
must exist a tax system able to implement it. e answer is a particular type of a
Pareto frontier, as defined later in the text.
We can simplify the problem by reducing the considered tax systems. An earn-
ings tax system is a tax system where all tax rates are zero except the labor tax
th and the profit tax tπ . With some abuse of notation, we denote an earnings tax
system by (th; tπ). Earnings taxes are useful because its two instruments, th and
tπ , are capable of implementing any possible payoff distribution.
Lemma .. If tax system t induces public consumption cG, household utility u, and
banking surplus xB, then there exist an earnings tax system which induces the very
same values of cG, u, and xB.
Lemma . allows us to restrict the following analysis to earnings tax system
without loss of generality, because considering more tax instruments would not
improve payoffs.
Whenwe assume household demand x H to be strictly decreasing, we can further
simplify the problem: For then there is a one-to-one relation between household
utility u and loan volume lB; the higher lB, the higher is household utility.
Lemma .. Suppose x H is strictly increasing. Let A and A0 be distinct equilibrium
allocations. Let (xH; hH; lB) be part of A, and let (x 0H; h0H; l 0B) be part of A0. en
u(xH; hH) > u(x 0H; h0H) , lB > l 0B :
Different tax systems give rise to different market prices. Households are well-
off when prices are in their favor. Under such prices, households typically con-
sume more and work more. High economic activity by households is only possi-
ble with high economy-wide activity. In particular, high loan volumes are needed
to fund high production levels. Analogously, a high loan volume can only be an
equilibrium value if households are willing to supply many deposits. Typically,
households do so only when prices are in their favor, implying high equilibrium
household utility.
Recall that a tax system is efficient if no other feasible tax system dominates it
in terms of banking surplus and household utility. To illustrate the set of efficient
outcomes, we could draw a picture in the u–xB space depicting all tuples (u; xB)
which correspond to an efficient tax system. But instead we consider the lB–xB
With large income effects, this might not be true, which is why we make the assumption of
increasing food demand x H .

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space and depict all tuples (lB; xB) which correspond to an efficient tax system.
By Lemma ., the two representations are equivalent. Defining the set of effi-
cient outcomes in the lB–xB space rather than the u–xB is both convenient and
appealing. It is convenient because Proposition . already provides values for
both lB and xB, as well as their relation. It is appealing because in practice the
loan volume lB is an observable, measurable item, whereas u is not.
Definition .. (lB; xB) is an element of the Pareto frontier for cG, if
• there exist earnings taxes th 2 [0; 1) and tπ 2 [0; 1] and public consumption
cG such that lB, xB and cG are part of the equilibrium allocation for (th; tπ)
and cG  cG, and
• there exist no triple (l 0B; x 0B; c 0G) such that
– l 0B  lB and x 0B  xB, with at least one strict inequality,
– c 0G  cG, and
– l 0B, x 0B, and c 0G are part of an equilibrium allocation for some th 2 [0; 1)
and tπ 2 [0; 1].
Definition . describes the Pareto frontier. It contains all efficient combina-
tions of loan volume and banking surplus for a fixed public budget constraint
cG. Every point in the set is associated with a particular equilibrium allocation
and a corresponding tax system implementing it. Each of these allocations gives
rise to a particular value of household utility. By Lemma ., the ranking over
household utility levels is equivalent to the ranking over loan volumes. ere-
fore, an earnings tax system is efficient if and only if the induced allocation has a
corresponding element in the Pareto frontier.
As argued, households prefer higher loan volumes; banks prefer higher bank-
ing surplus. Hence, when it is possible to increase both at the same time, the
tuple cannot be efficient. e following proposition formalizes and confirms this
intuition.
Proposition .. Consider Boring Banking (Assumption . is true) and suppose x H
is decreasing. If
• (xB; lB) and (x 0B; l 0B) are elements of the Pareto frontier, with
• xB > x 0B , and
• (th; tπ) and (t 0h; t 0π) are the two corresponding earnings tax systems,

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then
l 0B > lB ; t 0h < th ; t 0π > tπ :
Given Lemma . and the definition of the Pareto frontier, Proposition . is
quite an obvious result. But it highlights a less obvious finding: Banks prefer
lower loan volumes rather than higher ones. Although loan volumes measure the
size of banking activity and the banks’ before-tax profits are indeed increasing
in the loan volume, banking surplus decreases in the loan volume. e reason
is that higher loan volumes require more household deposit supply. To induce
such a supply, the labor tax must be lowered. To compensate for the lower labor
tax revenues, the profit tax needs to increase. While before-tax profits increase,
aer-tax profits decrease, reducing banking surplus.
Proposition . presumes that a Pareto frontier exists and contains at least two
distinct elements. It lacks a full characterization of the frontier. To illustrate
that the Pareto frontier typically does exist and to picture its shape, we employ a
computationally simple example. It allows us to characterize the whole set quite
explicitly. Also, the individual and aggregate effects of tax rates becomemore vis-
ible. e example is based on the following simplifying assumption about utility
function u and technology parameters κd and γd.
Assumption .. κd = γd = 0 and u = ln x  h.
Under Assumption ., utility u is a standard example of quasi-linearity. e
intermediation technology is simplified but not trivialized; Recall that κd and γd
correspond to the required inputs per deposit unit. While theses are zero, κl and γ l
are still positive. So financial intermediation still requires resources proportional
to the loan volume.
Assumption . is useful because it yields a closed-form solution for the equilib-
rium loan volume. In fact, under Boring Banking (Assumption .), Assumption
., and a restriction to earnings taxes, Proposition . simplifies substantially,
and we find
cG = tπ
R(lB)  lBR0(lB) + thr(lB) ; (.)
xB =
R(lB)  lBR0(lB) (1  tπ) ; (.)
lB = 1  th1 + κl + γ l
: (.)
Now we can determine the effects of taxes on cG, xB, lB and on household utility
u. e loan volume is strictly decreasing in th and is unaffected from tπ . Due
to the one-to-one relation, the very same qualitative comparative static holds for

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household utility. is is quite expected; income taxes discourage labor supply
and economic activity as a whole. Profit taxes do not change individual choices.
Banking surplus is obviously strictly decreasing in tπ . It also decreases in th
because lB decreases in th and before-tax profits, [R(lB)  lBR0(lB)], increase in lB.
Public consumption, on the other hand, is increasing in tπ . e effect of th on
public consumption might be ambiguous. ere is a positive direct effect from
higher labor tax revenues, and there is an indirect negative effect: more labor
taxes reduce economic activity and reduce before-tax profits. us they reduce
the tax base of the profit tax which reduces profit-tax revenues. Some algebraic
effort shows that Assumption . ensures that the direct effect dominates and
public consumption is indeed increasing in th.
To describe the Pareto frontier, we need to know the effects of a simultaneous
change in taxes conducted in a way to keep public consumption constant. As a
first step, we derive a function lB 7! xB, which maps from loan volumes to the
highest possible banking surplus. e public budget requirement cG enters the
function as a parameter. In a second step, we find the feasible domain of the
function. Figure . illustrates this function and the Pareto frontier.
To derive the function, suppose lB is part of the Pareto frontier and fix its value.
en, by (.), the labor tax is th = 1 φlB, with φ := (1+κl+γ l). e public bud-
get constraint, cG  cG, need to hold with equality. Using (.) and substituting
for th, we find
cG = tπ
R(lB)  lBR0(lB) + (1  φlB)r(lB) :
We combine this equation with (.) to obtain
xB =
R(lB)  lBR0(lB)  cG + (1  φlB)r(lB) : (.)
Suppose that the banking surplus determined in this way is feasible. en equa-
tion (.) gives the equilibrium value of banking surplus xB for any given lB under
the condition cG = cG. If (lB; xB) is indeed part of the Pareto frontier then xB must
be decreasing at that lB. Otherwise a Pareto-improvement is possible by increas-
ing lB. So, how does xB change in lB? Some straightforward algebra, combined
To see why take the first derivatives to obtain  lBR00(lB), which is positive under Assumption
..
In (.), take the derivative with respect to th, accounting for (.). is results in @cG=@th =
lBR00tπ=φ + r   thr 0=φ. the last term is positive as r 0  0. e second term, r, is positive and
greater than R0. e first term is negative and lBR00tπ=φ =  jlBR00jtπ=φ >  jlBR00j. Hence we
also know lBR00tπ=φ+r >  jlBR00j+R. Finally, from Assumption ., we know R0 jlBR00j > 0.
To see why, suppose there was slack in the public budget. If tπ > 0, then a small reduction in
tπ could increase xG without violating the public budget or changing lB. If tπ = 0, we cannot
reduce it further. en, however, a small reduction in th would increase both lB and xB without
violating the public budget. (For th = tπ = 0 the public budget cannot be slack.)
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. lB, household utility
banking surplus xB
1=φ
[R(lB)  lBR0(lB)]
xB(lB)
l 0B
l^ 0B l^ 1B
cG "
Figure .: e grey area illustrates the feasible combinations of loan volume lB and
banking surplus xG, for given public budget requirement cG. Banking surplus xB must
be between zero and before-tax profits [R(lB)   lBR0(lB)]; loan volume lB must be below
1=φ. Otherwise, positive taxes cannot implement the allocation. e thick lines depict
the Pareto frontier for different values of cG. If cG is low, the efficient loan levels range
from l 0B to 1=φ. If cG is high, they range from l^ 0B to l^ 1B . Notice that the actual functions
typically are not linear.
with Assumption ., shows that
@xB
@lB =  lBR
00   φr + r 0   φr 0lB = r 0   φR0   lBR00 <  R0   lBR00 < 0 :
Banking surplus is indeed decreasing in the loan volume. is is good news for
our analysis but is also surprising; typically, onewould expect that banks are well-
off when the financial sector is large. But the opposite is true. A large financial
sector comes with low banking surplus.
A higher loan volume is equivalent to a lower labor tax rate. With our assump-
tions on elasticities, a lower labor tax rate unambiguously leads to lower labor tax
revenues. is means that profit taxes have to be increased to balance the pub-
lic budget. Although higher loan volumes induce higher before-tax profits, the
aer-tax profits (i.e., the banking surplus) decreases due to the increase in profit
taxes. Consequently, there is a trade-off between banking surplus and household
utility; one can either have a regime with low labor taxes, a large financial sector,
and high profit taxes, or a regime with high labor taxes, a small financial sector,
and low profit taxes. e former benefits the households; the laer benefits the
banks.

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So far, we know that if (lB; xB) is on the Pareto frontier, then it satisfies (.).
To complete the characterization of the Pareto frontier, we need to check which
of these tuples (lB; xB) are implementable with an earnings tax system, taking
account of the fact that we restrict aention to positive tax rates.
First, as th = 1   φlB and th 2 [0; 1), we need lB 2 (0; 1=φ]. Second, banking
surplusmust be nonnegative. Let l 1B be the loan volume such that banking surplus,
as determined in (.), is zero, i.e.,R(l 1B)  l 1BR0(l 1B)  cG + (1  φl 1B)r(l 1B) = 0 :
For lB  1=φ, such an l 1B exist whenever cG > [R(1=φ)  (1=φ)R0(1=φ)]. As bank-
ing surplus is decreasing in lB, l 1B is an upper bound for the loan volume.
Next, if
lim
lB!0
 R(lB)  lBR0(lB)  cG + (1  φlB)r(lB) < 0 ;
implying limlB!0 r(lB) < cG, then there is no loan volume such that the public
budget requirement is compatible with positive banking surplus. In this case, cG
is simply too high to be feasible.
As we restrict tπ to be nonnegative, there cannot be a subsidy to banks. is
restriction becomes binding when the revenues from labor taxation suffice to
cover the public consumption requirement. Labor taxes contribute an amount
of (1 φlB)r(lB) towards public consumption. It is straightforward to show that
this value decreases in lB. us we have a lower bound on loan volumes, l 0B , de-
fined by
(1  l 0Bφ)r(l 0B) = cG :
We can now summarize:
Proposition .. Consider Boring Banking and let Assumption . be true. en
(lB; xB) is an element of the Pareto frontier for cG, if
lB 2
 l 0B ;lB
xB =
R(lB)  lBR0(lB)  cG + (1  φlB)r(lB) ;
Labor tax revenues are thphhh and amount to thphPR0(lB)lB in equilibrium. ese revenues allow
the government to employ thPR0(lB)lB units of labor in period one, producing r(lB)  thPR0(lB)lB
units of food toward the public budget in period two. Next, equilibrium condition (.) reads
1=P = lBR0(lB). So the food produced through labor taxation is thr(lB) = (1  φlB)r(lB).
Notice that such an l 0B does indeed exist. We have already argued that we require cG <
limlB!0 r(lB) = limlB!0(1  lBφ)r(lB). Also, limlB!1=φ(1  lBφ)r(lB) = 0.
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where the boundaries, l 0B and lB, are (implicitly) defined by
cG = (1  l 0Bφ)r(l 0B);
lB = minfl 1B ; 1=φg; cG =
R(l 1B)  l 1BR0(l 1B) + (1  φl 1B)r(l 1B) :
Proof. See main text.
Tax Rates at the Pareto frontier
What does Proposition . imply for tax rates? If we move along the Pareto fron-
tier, outlined in Figure ., profit and labor taxes move simultaneously: one de-
creases, the other increases. But what happens in the extreme cases, in which the
tax designer maximizes either household utility or banking?
First, let household utility be the objective function. en we need to pick the
largest possible loan volume. If cG is low, the maximal loan volume equals 1=φ.
is corresponds to a labor tax rate of zero; all revenues are raised through profit
taxation. Typically, profit taxes are less than % (and banks enjoy a positive
surplus), because the public budget only needs a certain amount of revenues. If
the public budget requirement increases, the profit tax rate increases accordingly.
is is feasible up to a profit tax of %. To further sustain public budget balance,
labor taxes have to be raised in addition to a % profit tax. In this case, the
optimal labor tax rate induces a loan volume of l 1B as defined above. e following
corollary summarizes these considerations:
Corollary .. Consider the case of Boring Banking and let Assumption . be true.
Let (th; tπ) be the earnings tax system that maximizes household utility for a given
level cG < r(0) of public consumption. en the following holds:
• If cG  [R(1=φ)  R0(1=φ)=φ], then
tπ = cG=[R(1=φ)  R0(1=φ)=φ]
th = 0 :
• If cG > [R(1=φ)  R0(1=φ)=φ], then
tπ = 1
th = (1  φl 1B) ;
with R(l 1B)  l 1BR0(l 1B) + (1  φl 1B)r(l 1B) = cG.
Proof. is is a corollary to Proposition ., as detailed in the main text.
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Second, we consider the other extreme: maximizing banking surplus. Now we
need to pick the highest xB from the Pareto frontier. is is equivalent to pick-
ing the lowest possible loan volume. Again, that is counter-intuitive: the best
possible outcome for banks is an allocation where the level of banking activity
(measured by the loan volume) is lowest. Naive intuition would suggest the con-
trary, namely that banks prefer tax systems which lead to high trade volumes.
Proposition . states that the lower bound of loan volumes is l 0B . So we have the
following corollary.
Corollary .. Consider the case of Boring Banking and let Assumption . be true.
Let (th; tπ) be the earnings tax system that maximizes banking surplus for a given
level cG < r(0) of public consumption. en the following holds:
th = (1  φl 0B); where cG = (1  l 0Bφ)r(l 0B)
tπ = 0
Proof. is is a corollary to Proposition ., as detailed in the main text.
e optimal tax rates are quite intuitive: when we want banks to be well-off,
the profit tax is zero and the labor tax is at a rate such that its revenues exactly
cover the public budget. When we want households to be well-off, banks are
taxed heavily and labor is taxed only if banking profits alone cannot fund public
consumption. When we want banks and household to share the tax burden, both
profit and labor taxes are in between the extremes.
Profit and labor taxes not only differ in their distributive impact, though. Some-
thing else sets them apart. e labor tax is distortive. It changes individual deci-
sionmaking and reduces total economic activity. e profit tax, on the other hand,
is not distortive, as it does not change individual decision making. When the tax
designer wants to maximize economic output, the profit tax has an edge over the
labor tax. But when the banks’ well-being enters the consideration, the potential
of the non-distortive tax is not fully exploited. Instead, a distortive instrument –
the labor tax – is used to satisfy distributive goals. is result is reminiscent to
the classical equity-efficiency trade off (Mirrlees, ), where distorting income-
taxesmight dominate non-distorting lump-sum taxes due to equity concerns. As a
further remark, our findings are at odds with conventional claims that a ‘business-
friendly’ policy fosters growth. In our model, a ‘business-friendly’ policy requires
lessening output through distortive taxation.
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.. D
In Section ., we have performed a classical tax exercise. For a set of linear tax
instruments, we have provided conditions for the equivalence of tax systems and
we have outlined the efficient possibilities of funding state expenditures.
With respect to equivalence, our results are twofold. On the one hand, a la-
bor tax is equivalent to a uniform VAT including financial transactions. (When
banks make positive profits, the labor tax must be accompanied by a profit tax.)
In principle, this confirms the findings of Auerbach and Gordon (). On the
other hand, we cannot conclude that financial transactions should or should not
be included in a VAT scheme. In particular, when banks make zero profits in equi-
librium, the optimal tax base is indeterminate; any desired allocation (of payoffs)
can be implemented with many different tax bases, as long as rates are fine-tuned
appropriately. is is in contrast to some previous contribution with partial equi-
librium analyses, which call for or against particular tax bases (e.g., Auerbach and
Gordon, ; Boadway and Keen, ; Grubert and Mackie, ; Jack, ).
With respect to efficient tax systems, we have shown that it is sufficient (but not
necessary) to use direct taxes (labor and profits) and leave all other commodities
untaxed. is result is reminiscent of the classical results of direct vs. indirect
taxation by Atkinson and Stiglitz (). Furthermore, when banks make posi-
tive profits, fiscal authorities face a trade off between burdening the banks and
burdening the households. Tax systems favoring the banks induce lower loan
volumes, i.e., lower banking activity.
Given our findings, there is a two-step procedure of designing a ‘good’ tax sys-
tem for some exogenous public consumption requirement. First, pick some effi-
cient combination of loan volume and banking surplus. e choice depends on the
welfare function and determines the equilibrium payoffs of banks and households.
It also yields the corresponding earnings tax system. Under Boring Banking the
choice is degenerated because only the household can carry the tax burden. Sec-
ond, choose a particular tax system implementing the chosen allocation. e
second choice comprises some degree of freedom. Oen, one can choose among
different tax systems which are equivalent in terms of economic outcomes.
So far, our analysis has been driven by an interest in the fundamental properties
of linear taxes in a model of financial intermediation. But our model is also suited
to contribute to the more applied policy discussion on how to reform the VAT
system. e discussion is based on presumed shortcomings of current real-world
systems and considers various reform proposals. In the next section, we use our
framework to analyze the general equilibrium effects of these proposals.
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. VAT R R
e value added tax treatment is a major topic in both the political and academic
discussion of financial sector taxation. While the VAT is one of the largest sources
of fiscal revenues, financial services are exempt fromVAT inmore or less all coun-
tries that otherwise employ a VAT (Honohan, , p. ). e exempt treatment
typically is such that banks do not have to collect values added taxes on their
services, but in turn are not allowed to recover taxes paid on input goods.
e classical argument for exemption is of a technical nature and based on the
lack of a proper tax base. By design, the value added tax applies to the difference
of input and output prices. But this difference is not easily observable for financial
transactions which typically use margin-based-pricing. e ‘buyer’ of financial
products, be it a household opening a checking account or a firm taking out a loan,
‘pays’ by accepting some interest rate spread rather than paying a distinct fee.
e supply side is similar. Deposits are the main input of financial services, and
again, they do not come with a simple price tag. is makes it difficult to identify
the actual value added embedded in the transaction. It is particularly difficult
when returns are uncertain, because is is hard for fiscal authorities to observe
and verify the risk of an individual transaction (Huizinga, ). Furthermore,
margin-based pricing makes it difficult to properly aribute value added between
the two sides of a transaction, namely the lender/depositor who provides fund to
the intermediary and the borrower who receives funds from the intermediary. An
appropriate allocation of the tax burden is necessary because registered business
should receive a tax credit while finals consumers should not. (e.g., de la Feria
and Lockwood, ; Honohan, ; Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard, )
But despite the widespread use of exemption and the technical challenges, the
exempt treatment has many critics and there is an ongoing discussion on how
to overcome the technical issues. Honohan (, p. ), for instance, describes
the exemption as a “historical inheritance without much political or economical
rational.” In the European Union, it has been a returning subject on the policy
agenda since themid- (de la Feria and Lockwood, ). At the G- level, it is
part of a broader discussion on how to make the financial sector contribute to the
cost of public interventions during and aer the  financial crisis (International
Montary Fund, ).
Most concerns fall in one of three groups. First, the exemption might reduce
tax revenues. Genser and Winker () estimate that the German fiscal revenue
In practice, some services, like safety box rentals do require VAT collection and do allow for VAT
credits on input (Huizinga, ). e appropriate devision of overhead cost into recoverable
and non-recoverable input is an obvious problem for tax collection in practice. We abstract
from this issue.
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loss of VAT exemption was  billion DM (. billion euro) in , using an
approach based on aggregate balance sheet and interest rate data. For the UK,
the HM Treasury () reports an estimated loss of £. billion in -. For
the European Union as a whole, Huizinga (, Table ) estimates the revenue
potential of including financial services into VAT to be in the range of . to 
billion euro, depending on demand elasticity assumptions.
A second concern is about a loss in competitiveness due to the unrecoverable
VAT on input goods. In a report for the European Commission, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (, p. /) states that “embedded VAT costs continue to have a clear
bearing on the cost efficiency of the EU financial services sector.” Along these
lines, Borselli () writes that the Italian banking industry had to pay . billion
euro in non-recoverable VAT in . Mitigating such tax burdens was among
the goals of a  EU directive (Borselli, ; de la Feria and Lockwood, ).
ird, and most importantly from an economist’s perspective, many authors
doubt the economic efficiency of the exemption. Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard
(, p. ), for instance, consider it a “reasonably benchmark” that “‘ideal’ pol-
icy would comprise a uniform rate of tax on final consumption of all commodities,
including financial services”.
e most articulated reasoning for inefficiency argues that exemption of finan-
cial products makes private use less expensive and business use more expensive
as compared to a VAT that includes the financial sector. e argument is as fol-
lows: A universal VAT with deductibility would effectively tax the value added at
each stage of production. Similar to a sales tax, the final consumer should bear a
tax on the total value of the product. e production sector, in contrast, should
go untaxed, following the logic of productive efficiency (Diamond and Mirrlees,
). But when financial products are exempt, the value which is added in the
financial sector goes untaxed. is reduces the consumer price of financial prod-
ucts. Compared to a universal VAT, household products are ‘under-priced’.
In the case of business use, the invoice-credit mechanism allows businesses to
deduct all VAT paid on its inputs. us VAT typically does not enter as a cost in
the price calculation. A bank exempted from VAT, however, cannot reclaim VAT
paid on inputs and considers it a cost which likely increases the banks output
Council Directive //EC of  November  on the common system of value added tax.
Zee (, p. ), writes: “Needless to say, this paper takes as given the more conventional
view that financial intermediation services are no different from other consumable goods and
services, and as such should not be excluded from the base of a broad-based consumption tax
like the VAT.” Similarly, de la Feria and Lockwood (, p. ) state: “But, nevertheless, the
lesson that has been drawn from this academic literature is that inclusion of financial services
in VAT is desirable.” Some papers conclude differently, though, claiming that at least some
finanical services should be excluded for efficiency reasons. Among them are Grubert and
Mackie (), and Jack ().
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price. As the bank charges no VAT, a business using bank products cannot deduct
any VAT from the respective invoice. e effective business price for financial
products is thus higher as compared to an all-including VAT. What is more, the
higher price for financial inputs might be reflected in the business’s own output
price which is fully taxable. Insofar as it includes the unrecoverable VAT paid by
the bank, tax-cascading can occur. So, overall, the exemption effectively leads to
an ‘over-taxation’ of businesses and an ‘under-taxation’ of households.
ere are at least three prominent reform proposals: the financial activities
tax, the cash-flow approach, and zero rating. e three proposals roughly follow
the three major complaints against exemption. e financial activities tax (FAT)
proposal, put forward by Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard (), is part of the
IMF report to the G- on how to raise a ‘fair and substantial contribution’ from
the financial sector (International Montary Fund, ). Zero-rating would allow
banks to fully deduct VAT paid on inputs. e cash-flow approach is the most
comprehensive reform, aiming to make value added in the financial sector fully
taxable, while sustaining compatibility with existing VAT schemes and avoiding
the technical difficulties of a financial VAT.
Practical and administrative challenges of these proposals have been discussed
extensively (e.g., by Borselli, ; de la Feria and Lockwood, ; Edgar, ;
Huizinga, ; Poddar and English, ; Zee, ). But lile theoretical in-
sights exist on their general equilibrium implications. With our framework, we
contribute to fill this gap. ough our model is simple in many respects and the
banking sector is ‘boring’, we do provide a seing that allows to analyze the ef-
fects in terms of real economic payoffs. We consider variations of the following
exercise: . Start with a tax system that exempts financial transaction. . Imple-
ment a reform proposal. . Compare tax revenues, household utility, and banking
surplus before and aer the tax reform.
First, we need to define the benchmark (or status quo) tax system. Within our
model, exempt treatment means a zero cash-flow tax tC = 0 paired with non-
deductibility of input-VAT, i.e., tzC = 0. In the simplest version, the value added
tax is otherwise uniform and all other taxes are zero. Let tVATex be a uniform VAT
rate outside the financial system. en a tax system t is a VATex tax system if
tx = tz = tVATex > 0 and tC = tzC = tF = tπ = 0 :
In the following, we compare the proposed reforms to this benchmark.
e over-/under-taxation line of though can be found in the contributions by Huizinga (,
Box ), Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard (, pp. ), Borselli (), Keen () and others.
See Huizinga () or Edgar ().
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.. C T
e idea behind the cash-flow approach is to treat financial transactions in a way
analogous to non-financial transactions. Cash-inflows from financial transac-
tions, like receiving a loan or an interest payment, are treated like a sales revenue
and are subject to a tax. Cash-outflows, like granting a loan or paying interest, are
treated like a cost and allow for a tax credit. e cash flow tax is paired with full
deductibility of VAT paid on inputs. e cash-flow approach is fully compatible to
the invoice credit method of the usual VAT system. e plain cash-flow approach
is oen quoted as a method which, despite some practical complications, is able
fully to include the financial transactions in the VAT while avoiding the technical
difficulties associated with the standard VAT.
In terms of our model, the simplest version of the cash-flow approach consists
of a uniform tax, say tVATcf, imposed on all transaction, including financial ones
(but excluding labor). Tax credits are generally granted. Formally, a tax system t
is a VATcf tax system if
tx = tz = tzC = tC = tVATcf > 0 and th = tF = tπ = 0:
Within our formal framework the VATcf system is closest to the notion of a uni-
form commodity taxation including financial transactions. us, a comparison of
a VATcf system with a VATex system is the best way to track down the effects of
exempting financial transactions from the VAT system. e following does such
a comparison, holding constant the non-zero tax rates across regimes. So on top
of a VATex system with, say, a % tax rate, we introduce cash flow taxes (and
universal deductibility) with the very same rate of %.
Proposition .. Suppose that x H is strictly increasing. Consider a switch from a
VATex tax system with tax rate tVATex > 0 to a VATcf tax system with the same rate
tVATcf = tVATex. en:
. Household utility u decreases if κl+κd > 0. It remains constant if κl+κd = 0.
. Banking surplus xB decreases under Boring Banking (Assumption .) and re-
mains constant (equal to zero) under Very Boring Banking (Assumption .).
. Public consumption cG increases under Boring Banking if κl + κd = 0. Under
Very Boring Banking, it remains constant if κl + κd = 0, and it increases if
Assumption . is true and κl + κd > 0.
 For the plain cash-flow approach, see, e.g., de la Feria and Lockwood (), Huizinga (),
or International Montary Fund (). Poddar and English () propose an extension, the
“Truncated Cash-Flow Method with Tax Calculation Account”, to deal with some practical
complications.
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. e price for deposits, pd, increases if κl + κd > 0, (that is, household earn less
interest on their savings). If κl + κd = 0, the price remains constant.
. e price of business loans, pl, remains constant.
Proposition . implies a couple of noteworthy findings. First, the intuition that
exemption and the non-deductibility of inputs leads to ‘overpricing’ of business
loans and ‘underpricing’ of consumer products does not apply in our seing. e
price of business loans is not affected at all by the exemption. e price of deposits
does change under some conditions. But when banks need no labor (κl = κd = 0)
it does not. Yet, the original intuition does not refer to labor input but to input
goods which are subject to VAT. If the intuition was true, it would need to hold
in particular for κl = κd = 0.
Second, our theory confirms the intuition that a cash flow taxation creates rev-
enues or, equivalently, that the exemption reduces tax revenues. Notice that rev-
enues may be created even if banking operates with a CRS technology implying
zero profits; in contrast to a profit tax, a cash flow tax generates revenues even if
banking revenues equal costs.
ird, the change in payoffs typically does follow intuition. Banks and house-
holds suffer from additional taxationwhile the government (typically) gains. (is
statement is, of course, abstracting from any economy-wide gains of spending tax
revenues.)
Proposition . is valuable mostly from a policy perspective. It answers the
question ‘what happens when we add cash flow taxation to the VAT system?’.
From a normative perspective, it is less valuable. For it gives no indication of the
systems’ relative efficiency (one generates more tax revenues, one generates more
utility). A normatively more relevant question would be ‘what happens if we add
cash flow taxation to the VAT system in a revenue-neutral way?’. For the case of
CRS technology we can provide a straightforward answer.
Lemma .. Let Assumptions . and . be true. Consider a VATcf tax system and a
VATex tax system. If both yield the same public consumption cG, then they give rise
to the same utility level u and the same banking surplus xG = 0.
When Assumptions . and . are true, it does not really maer whether or
not financial transactions are exempt from VAT or included via a cash flow tax.
e introduction of cash flow taxes raises revenues under certain conditions. But
simply increasing existing tax rates to raise the additional revenues has the very
same effect on economic surplus. So if technical or administrative reasons make
it difficult to include financial transaction into the VAT scheme, this version of
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our model suggest that there is no fundamental problem to dispense with VAT in
the financial sector.
Under Boring Banking, it is typically not possible to find a VATex system which
would be equivalent to a VATcf system. To see why, suppose the two systems
induce the same utility level u. is implies that they also induce the same loan
volume lB. When the loan volume is the same, the before-tax banking profit
is also identical. But then the aer-tax profits differ; the cash-flow tax cuts into
banks’ profits, whereas a VATex system does not burden banking surplus (c.f.
Proposition .).
.. Z
e HM Revenue and Customs of the UK names four types of VAT rates: stan-
dard, reduced, exempt, and zero. Goods that are zero-rated are taxable, but their
rate is zero per cent. In contrast to exempted goods, the producer of a zero-rated
good can reclaim VAT on its inputs. e proposal to zero-rate financial transac-
tions is thus a suggestion to make VAT paid on inputs fully deductible. e main
motivation is avoidance of tax cascading.
To evaluate the effects of zero-rating, we consider a tax system with a uniform
value added tax excluding financial transactions but allowing full deductibility.
More precisely, a tax system t is a VATzero tax system if
tx = tz = tzC > 0 and tC = tF = tπ = 0 :
Proposition .. Suppose γ l + γd > 0. Consider a switch from a VATex tax system
with VAT rate tVATex > 0 to a VATzero system with the same VAT rate, i.e., with
tx = tz = tzC = tVATex. If Assumptions . (Very Boring Banking) and . are
true, household utility increases and public consumption decreases. If Assumption
. (Boring Banking) is true and x H is decreasing, household utility increases and
banking surplus increases as well.
Zero-rating only has any effects if banks use real inputs (which are subject to
Notice, though, that the technical/administrative difficulties mentioned are not addressed in
our model. Including them could possibly change our result with respect to the effects of cash
flow taxation.
See Section .. and Lemma . in the Appendix for details on the one-to-one relation of u and
lB.
See www.hmrc.gov.uk/vat/forms-rates/rates/rates.htm, retrieved on August th, .
Huizinga () puts forward a reform that zero-rates business use of financial services but
makes household use fully taxable. is would require banks to verify their clients’ status.
Huizinga (ibid.) argues that this has become feasible. Nevertheless, we analyze ‘pure’ zero-
rating in order to isolate its very effects.
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VAT), so γ l + γd > 0 is the relevant case. Zero-rating then effectively reduces
the tax burden by broadening deductibility. If banking technology is CRS, so
that banks make zero profits in any equilibrium, the effects are unambiguous:
households gain, fiscal authorities lose. Under diminishing returns to scale, both
households and banks gain from the lower tax burden. Typically, this comes at the
expense of tax revenues. Under certain demand condition, however, pre-reform
taxes could be ‘on the right-hand side of the Laffer curve’, such that reducing taxes
would increase tax revenues. Under these circumstances, zero-rating could even
raise tax revenues. Yet, if this was the case, the pre-reform VAT rate would be in-
efficient in the set of VATex tax system. us, overall, the effects are in line with
naive intuition and confirm the expected effects of the reform. Yet again, this tells
nothing about whether such a reform is actually desirable from the perspective
of economic efficiency. e following proposition does.
Proposition .. For any VATzero tax system, there exist a VATex system such that
the two systems are equivalent.
Proposition . shows that zero-rating cannot induce allocations that would be
superior to the exempt treatment. is also means that if there are distortions
induced by exemption, zero-rating is not able to remove them. We conclude that
zero-rating typically affects households, banks, and tax revenues, in a particular
and expected way. ese effects might be desirable. Efficiency alone, however,
does not provide any reason to zero-rate financial transactions.
.. T F A T
In its report to the G- on financial sector taxation, the IMF addresses the issue
of value added tax exemption. Among other concerns, the report notes the risk
that the financial sector becomes “unduly large because of its favorable treatment
under existing VATs” (International Montary Fund, , p. ). e report sug-
gests an alternative way to treat value added in the financial sector. e idea is
that values added is just the sum of profits and wages. Taxing this sum should
thus principally be equivalent to a VAT. Such a tax is called Financial Activities
Tax or just FAT.
While the basic principle – taxing the sum of profits andwages – is quite simple,
it becomes less straightforward in an intertemporal seing like ours. Both profits
and wage payments are well defined in our frameworks but accrue in different
For CRS technology, we exclude this possibility by means of Assumption ..
For an extensive discussion of the FAT, see Keen, Krelove, and Norregaard (). ey consider
various versions of a FAT with different goals. We only discuss the version which they call
FAT. e aim of FAT is to replicate a VAT.

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periods, so it is not obvious how to take the sum and when to tax it. In our model,
we opt for the approach to tax twice, i.e., in both periods. is makes our analysis
more clear-cut.
In order to determine the effects of a FAT, we consider the introduction of a FAT
on top of an existing value added tax scheme with exemption. A tax system t is a
FAT tax system if
tx = tz > 0 ; tF > 0 and tC = tzC = tπ = 0 :
Proposition .. Consider a switch from a VATex tax system with some tax rate
tVATex > 0 to a FAT tax system with the same value added tax rates tx = tz = tVATex.
en
. Household utility u decreases if κl+κd > 0. It remains constant if κl+κd = 0.
. Banking surplus xB decreases under Boring Banking and remains constant
(equal to zero) under Very Boring Banking.
. Public consumption cG increases under Boring Banking if κl + κd = 0. Under
Very Boring Banking, it remains constant if κl + κd = 0, and it increases if
Assumption . is true and κl + κd > 0.
When financial intermediation does not require labor input, i.e., κl+κd = 0, the
FAT is effectively the same as a pure profit tax. en it can only have any effect
if equilibrium profits are positive. If so, public revenues increase at the expense
of banks.
When financial intermediation does require labor input, i.e., κl+κd > 0, the FAT
induces a wedge on the labor market and creates a distortive burden on house-
holds. As a consequence, households reduce labor supply and reach a lower utility
level. Banks are only affected if they make positive profits. If they do, the FAT
reduces the before-tax profits. Furthermore, banks must now pay a tax on their
profits. So banking surplus certainly declines. Public revenues typically increase,
but sometimes they may decrease; while the FAT is an additional source of rev-
enues, it also reduces economic activity, thereby reducing the tax base of the value
added tax. Under Very Boring Banking, Assumption . is a sufficient condition
for increasing public revenues.
Overall, the comparative static effects are qualitatively identical to the effects
following a cash flow tax reform (cf. Proposition .). Hence, our model confirms
the intuition that the FAT is an alternative way to target the value added of fi-
nancial intermediation. FAT and cash flow taxation are not exactly equivalent,
though; while they have the same effect on profits, their quantitative impact on
equilibrium price ratio P and on individual decisions differ.

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. C
is chapter develops a framework to study the general equilibrium effects of
taxation in the financial sectors. It allows for a comprehensive incidence analysis
while remaining quite tractable. e banking sector in our seing is a ‘boring’
one, in the sense that there are no market imperfections or aggregate risks. For
instance, neither liquidity nor solvency is ever an issue on the aggregate level.
e study of a ‘boring’ banking sector is a useful first step to enhance our under-
standing of how financial taxes take effect and who gains and loses from them.
With respect to the tax burden, our model identifies a trade-off. When the
state needs to collect a fixed amount of revenues, it can shi the tax burden from
households to banks and vice versa. (is result holds for the version of the model
in which equilibrium banking profits are positive.) e existence of this trade-off
is not very surprising. But it is accompanied with a less intuitive effect: when
the tax system makes banks beer off, the financial sector shrinks; when it makes
households beer off, the financial sector expands.
Real-world tax systems typically exempt financial services from value added
taxes. Many authors consider this an imperfection and have proposed reforms
aimed at including financial services in the VAT scheme. Our framework con-
tributes to this debate by providing general equilibrium insights concerning the
reform proposals. On the one hand, we by and large confirm the expected effects.
On the other hand, our findings question the necessity of any such reform. In
many instanced the reform effects could also be achieved by tweaking the rates
of existing tax systems. Our model is too simple to provide for straight policy
advice. But it highlights the fact the tax reforms should be based on thorough
general equilibrium analysis, because partial insights or plain intuition might be
misleading.
e framework proposed in this chapter suggests further research, most no-
tably ‘the case of exciting banking’. As banking is ‘boring’ in the current version
of the model, there is no scope for regulation; taxes only serve the goal of collect-
ing revenues. A more ‘exciting’ version of the financial sector would introduce
market imperfections that call for regulatory measures. As our framework allows
for a tax incidence, one could analyze the distributional effects of corrective taxes.
e financial sector size might be another object of study. It is sometimes argued
that the financial sector is too large. If theory supports this claim, there could be
an interesting trade-off as the insight from ‘boring banking’ suggests to enlarge
the financial sector in order to make banks contribute more to the public budget.

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.A. P  S .
Proof of Lemma .. Food producers and input good producers use CRS tech-
nologies. By standard arguments, equilibrium prices must imply zero profits.
Otherwise supply/demand of these producers would be unbounded or zero. Ac-
counting for the fact that the optimization constraints must bind, we find the
stated price relations.
Proof of Lemma .. Claim : lB > 0. lB  0 cannot be an equilibrium because it
would imply zero production and zero household consumption. Yet, by assump-
tion on u, some consumption is always optimal for the household, even if prices
are high. Claim . lB < 1. lB = 1 cannot be an equilibrium as it would require
unbounded deposit supply. at is never optimal for the household, again by as-
sumption on u. Claims  and  imply that under equilibrium prices there must be
an interior optimum for the banking problem. We know from Lemma . how pz
and pl must be relative to ph. Given these pieces of information and the definition
of Q in the main text, dB = lBQ follows from the binding constraints of the bank-
ing problem. Next, we can reduce the banking problem to maxlB [R(lB)  QlB)].
Any interior solution to this reduced problem satisfies Q = R0(lB). Consequently,
also dB = R0(lB)lB.
Proof of Lemma .. By Lemma ., Q = R0(lB). In (.) we substitute for Q and
for pd=ph = (1   th)P. Rearranging yields the first claim: P = ~P (lB; t ). Next, if
(A; p) is an equilibrium for t, then dH = dB (deposit market clears), and dH = xH
(binding household budget), so dB = xH. We know from (.) that xH = x H(P );
from Lemma . we know dB = lBR0(lB). Hence, x H(P ) = lBR0(lB).
Proof of Proposition .. First, we know from Lemma . that if A is an equilib-
rium then x H(~P (lB; t )) = lBR0(lB). It is then straightforward to show that market
clearing conditions and binding maximization constraints imply the remaining
entries of the allocation as stated in the Proposition.
Second, to show that the stated allocation is an equilibrium, we have to find
an appropriate price system and check all equilibrium conditions. Let prices p be
such that they satisfy the (zero-profit) requirement of Lemma . and that relative
price P equals ~P (lB; t ). en:
. Choices are individually optimal: Household choices are optimal as xH =
x H(P ) is optimal by definition, and so are dH = x H(P ) and hH = Px H(P ). Input
producer choices are optimal as hI = zI is feasible and yields zero profits given
prices p. Food producer choices are optimal as hF(1  tx)=(1  tC) = lF is feasible
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and yields zero profits given prices p. Bank choices are optimal as P = ~P (lB; t )
impliesQ = R0(lB) and the laer is the optimality condition for banks’ loan supply
under the prices of Lemma .. By construction of Q, dB = QlB is optimal and
hence, dB = R0(lB)lB. It is straightforward to check that zB, dB, and xB then satisfy
the respective constraints with equality and thus are optimal as well.
. To show that government demand (hG; xG) corresponds to tax revenues, we
use the definitions of T1 and T2, plug in the values for prices and the allocation,
simplify the expressions, and end up with the stated values.
. Finally, we need to show that all markets clear. is is trivially true for the
deposit, loans and input good markets. Next consider the labor market. Supply
is hH = ~P (lB; t )R0(lB)lB. Demand is
hF + hB + hI + hG = 1  tC1  tx lB + κ(lB)R
0lB + γ(lB)R0lB
+

~P (lB; t )  1  tC1  tx
1
R0   κ(lB)  γ(lB)

R0lB = ~P (lB; t )R0lB = hH :
Now, consider the food market. Food producers employ hF units of labor, yielding
an aggregate food supply of αhF. Given α = r(lB) and the stated value of hF, supply
is r(lB)lB(1  tC)=(1  tx) = R(lB)(1  tC)=(1  tx). Demand is
xH + xB + xG = R0lB +
R  R0lB (1  tC)(1  tF   tπ)
+
R  R0lB (1  tC)(tF + tπ) + tx(1  tC)1  tx R  tCR0lB
= R0lB  (1  (1  tC)  tC) + R 

(1  tC) + tx(1  tC)1  tx

= R  1  tC1  tx ;
so it does equal supply.
Proof of Lemma .. Proposition . implies that any two equilibrium alloca-
tions with the same lB are actually identical (for any given t). Also, if A is an
equilibrium allocation for t then it satisfies condition (.), x H(~P (lB; t )) = lBR0(lB),
by Lemma .. us it suffices to show that this equation has at least one solution.
First, suppose Assumption . holds. en ~P (lB; t) = ~P (t ). e le-hand side
of (.) is x H(~P (t )) and is constant in lB. e right-hand side is αlB, with α ex-
ogenous. Hence, there is indeed exactly one lB such that (.) holds.
Second, suppose Assumption . holds. e Assumption ensures that the RHS
of (.) is strictly increasing in lB because
@lBR0(lB)
@lB = R
0 + lBR00 = jR0j   jlBR00j = jlBR00j
 R0lBR00
  1 > 0 :
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e LHS of (.) decreases in lB: increasing lB decreases R0(lB) which increases
~P (lB; t ). is, by premise, decreases x H(~P (lB; t )). Consequently, LHS and RHS of
(.) can intersect at most once.
Proof of Lemma .. e proof consists of two steps.
Claim : If (.) has a solution l B > 0, then there exists an equilibrium alloca-
tion. Claim  follows from Proposition ., which explicitly states an equilibrium
allocation conditional on an lB satisfying (.).
Claim : ere exist l B > 0, such that l B is a solution to (.), i.e.,
x H(~P (l B ; t )) = l BR0(l B ):
Claim  is true because (a) for lB = 0 the RHS is R0(0)  0 = 0 if R0(0) is bounded,
whereas the LHS is strictly positive due to the assumption that the household
problem always has an interior solution. So the RHS is below the LHS for lB = 0.
(b) By premise iii), there exist lB > 0 so that x H(~P (lB; t))  R0(lB)lB, i.e., for some
lB > 0 the RHS exceeds the LHS. By continuity, there must exist l B > 0 such that
LHS and RHS are equal.
.A. P  S .
Before proving the results of Section ., we establish two helpful lemmas.
Lemma .. If (A; p) is an equilibrium for t then the sum of banking surplus and
public consumption is
xB + cG = R0(lB)R(lB)

P 
 1
r(lB) + γ(lB) + κ(lB)

with P = ~P (lB; t ).
Proof. Lemma . builds on Proposition ., which states the equilibrium values
for xB, xG, and hG. We seek the sum xB + cG = xB + xG + r(lB)hG. To simplify
notation, we drop some dependencies on lB. e first part of the sum is
xB + xG =
R  R0lB (1  tC) + tx(1  tC)1  tx R  tCR0lB
=
1  tC
1  tx R  R
0lB :
e second part is
rhG =
 
~P (lB; t )  (1  tC)=[(1  tx)R0]  κ(lB)  γ(lB)
 R0R ;
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given that rlB = R. We sum up the two parts and rearrange the terms to obtain
xB + cG = 1  tC1  tx R  R
0lB + ~P (lB; t )R0R  1  tC1  tx R  (κ(lB) + γ(lB)) R
0R
=

~P (lB; t )  1r   κ(lB)  γ(lB)

R0R :
Finally, we substitute P for ~P (lB; t ) (by Lemma .).
Lemma .. Let Assumption . be true. If A is an equilibrium allocation for t then
public consumption cG = αhG + xG is given by
cG = α (P  (1=α + γ + κ)) x H(P )
with P = ~P (t ). If Assumption . is true as well, then cG is strictly increasing in P.
Proof. Notice first that (P   (1=α + γ + κ)) is positive for P = ~P (t ) as given in
(.), because it is straightforward to show that ~P (t )  (1=α + γ + κ) when the
tax system does not allow for subsidies, which we do require. Now, we check the
two claims of Lemma ..
Claim : In any equilibrium cG = α (P  (1=α + γ + κ)) x H(P ).
From Lemma . we know the equilibrium value of the sum xB + cG. Under Very
Boring Banking, banking surplus is zero, i.e., xB = 0. Also, xH = R0(lB)lB =
x H(~P (t )), as ~P depends on t only. Hence, in the equation stated in Lemma . we
can substitute xB = 0, R0(lB)lB = x H(~P (t )), and P = ~P (t ). is yield the first claim
of Lemma ..
Claim : cG is strictly increasing in P.
With some abuse of notation, let x 0H(P ) := @x H(P )=@P.
(a) For any P such that x 0H(P ) is positive, the claim is trivial.
(b) Now, suppose x 0H(P ) < 0 and take the derivative of the expression in question.
@ (P  (1=α + γ + κ)) x H(P )
@P = (P  (1=α + γ + κ)) x
0
H(P ) + x H(P )
= x H(P )

1 + Px
0H(P )
x H(P )

  (1=α + γ + κ)x 0H(P ) > 0
e inequality is true because, as x 0H(P ) < 0, the second term is positive, and,
under Assumption .,
1 + Px 0H(P )=x H(P ) = 1  jPx 0H(P )=x H(P )j  0;
so the first term is positive as well.
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Proof of Proposition .. Let (xB; lB; xH; hH; cG) and (x 0B; l 0B; x 0H; h0H; c 0G) be the re-
spective parts of the equilibrium allocations given t and t0, resp. We need to show
that xB = x 0B, u(xH; hH) = u(x 0H; h0H), and cG = c 0G.
First, let Assumption . be true. From Proposition ., in equilibrium, xB =
x 0B = 0. Also, u(xH; hH) = u(x H(P ); Px H(P )), so u(xH; hH) = u(x 0H; h0H) if P =
~P (t ) = ~P (t0) = P 0. By Lemma ., cG =
 α(P  γ   κ)  1 x H(P ) so, again,
cG = c 0G for P = ~P (t ) = ~P (t0) = P 0.
Second, suppose Assumption . is true. Loan supply under tmust satisfy equi-
librium condition (.) given t. If ~P (lB; t )  ~P (lB; t0), then, under t0, condition
(.) is identical to the condition under t. As (.) does not have multiple so-
lutions (Lemma .), lB = l 0B. By Proposition ., this implies identical household
utility levels, as well as identical before-tax banking profit [R(lB)   R0(lB)lB]; By
Lemma ., it implies that the sum (xB + cG) is identical. Banking surplus xB is
(1  tC)(1  tF   tπ) times the before-tax banking profit. Hence, banking surplus
is identical given the premise. Finally, public consumption cG must be identical
as both xB and the sum (xG + cG) are identical.
Proof of Proposition .. A tax system is efficient if it maximizes household util-
ity subject to cG  cG. By Lemma ., cG = α (P  (1=α + γ + κ)) x H(P )), and
P = ~P (t ). us, any solution must satisfy
α  ~P (t )  (1=α + γ + κ) x H(~P (t ))  cG :
Because household utility is strictly decreasing in P, the constraint must be bind-
ing (if it was not binding, a change in taxes inducing a small decrease in P would
be feasible and would enhance utility.) Hence, t is a solution only if it satisfies the
equation in Proposition ..
It remains to show that every t satisfying the equation, is a solution. As argued
above, any such t is feasible. By contradiction, suppose t is not a solution to the
maximization. en there is some feasible t0 such that u(t0) > u(t ), where u(t ) and
u(t0) are the respective utility levels induces by the tax system. en ~P (t0) < ~P (t ).
But then cG(t0) < cG(t ) = cG, because, by Lemma ., cG is an increasing function
of P. So t0 is not feasible, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma .. By construction. Fix some t. Let A be the allocation imple-
mented by t. en lB satisfies x H(~P (lB; t )) = lBR0(lB) (Lemma .). Let (t 0h; t 0π) be
an earnings tax system such that
~P (lB; t )
1=R0(lB) + κ(lB) + γ(lB) =
1
1  t 0h
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is way, x H(~P (lB; (t 0h; t 0π))) = lBR0(lB), so (t 0h; t 0π) induces the very same lB and P
as the original tax system t. Given Proposition . this implies identical xH and
hH, hence identical utility u. Furthermore the sum xB + cG is the same under
the original system and the earnings tax system (see Lemma .). Now, again by
Proposition ., xB = [R(lB)  R0(lB)lB] (1   tC)(1   tF   tπ). Pick t 0π such that
(1   tC)(1   tF   tπ) = (1   t 0π) then xB = x 0B where x 0B is the banking surplus
under the earnings tax system. Finally, cG = c 0G because x 0B + c 0G = xB + cG and
xB = x 0B.
Proof of Lemma .. Let P and P 0 be the equilibrium price ratios for A and A0,
resp. en, by Lemma .,
x H(P ) = lBR0(lB) ; x H(P 0) = l 0BR0(l 0B) :
e Lemma follows from an examination of the relation of these two equations.
First we show that a greater loan volume implies higher utility. If lB > l 0B,
then lBR0(lB) > l 0BR0(l 0B). Under Very Boring Banking this is obvious because
R0  α. Under Boring Banking, it follows from the assumption made upon the
elasticity of loan supply (for details see the proof of Lemma .). Consequently,
x H(P ) > x H(P 0). As x H is strictly increasing, P < P 0. As argued in the main
text, equilibrium household utility is a function of price ratio P and decreases in
P (cf. equation (.)). us, u(xH; hH) > u(x 0H; h0H). Now we show that higher
utility imply a higher loan volume. If u(xH; hH) > u(x 0H; h0H), then P < P 0 because,
again, household utility is strictly decreasing in P. en x H(P ) > x H(P 0), hence
lBR0(lB) > l 0BR0(l 0B). Finally, lB > l 0B as lBR0(lB) is strictly increasing in lB.
Proof of Proposition .. We proof the three claims sequentially.
. If the claim is false, then l 0B  lB. en (xB; lB) Pareto-dominates (x 0B; l 0B), then
(x 0B; l 0B) cannot be on the Pareto-frontier, a contradiction.
. If the claim is false, then t 0h  th. en 1=(1   t 0h)  1=(1   th). We know
from Claim  that l 0B > lB, implying 1=R0(l 0B) > 1=R0(lB), given Assumption ..
Using Definition ., we find that
1
(1  th)
" 1 + κl + γ l
R0(lB) + κd + γd
#
= ~P (lB; (th; tπ)) < ~P (l 0B; (t 0h; t 0π)) :
As we require x H to be decreasing, we have x H(~P (lB; (th; tπ))) > x H(~P (l 0B; (t 0h; t 0π))).
In any equilibrium, x H = lBR0(lB) (Lemma .). e LHS of this equation is in-
creasing given Assumption . (see the proof of Lemma .). Hence, lB > l 0B. is
contradicts Claim .
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. We know from Claim  that l 0B > lB, implying [R(l 0B)   R0(l 0B)l 0B] > [R(lB)  
R0(lB)lB] (to see why take the first derivatives to obtain lBR00(lB), which is positive
under Assumption .). Hence, before-tax profits are higher under tax system
(t 0h; t 0π). Yet, by premise, banking surplus is higher under system (th; tπ). is
implies t 0π > tπ because xB = (1  tπ)[R(lB)  R0(lB)lB].
.A. P  S .
Proof of Proposition .. e proof relies on the function ~P (lB; t ) and equation
(.). Let tVATcf be the VATcf tax system, let tVATex be the VATex tax system, and
let tV = tVATcf = tVATex > 0 be the respective value added or cash flow tax rate.
en, for all lB,
~P  lB; tVATcf = κ(lB) + γ(lB) + 1=R0(lB)1  tV
 (1  tV)κ(lB) + γ(lB) + 1=R
0(lB)
1  tV =
~P  lB; tVATex ;
with a strict inequality if κ(lB) > 0 or κd + κl > 0. On the other hand, we have
equality, i.e., ~P  lB; tVATex = ~P  lB; tVATcf if κ(lB) = 0 or κd = κl = 0. Let PVATcf
and PVATex be the respective equilibrium values of price ratio P, and let lVATcfB , lVATexB
be the loan supplies in the two tax regimes. Using Lemma . and Lemma .
(uniqueness), we find
κd = κl = 0) PVATcf = PVATex; lVATcfB = lVATexB
κd + κl > 0) PVATcf > PVATex
e former implication is rather obvious; equation (.), which determines lB is
identical for both tax systems under the premise, thus lVATcfB = lVATexB . As a con-
sequence, also PVATcf = PVATex. e laer implication is trivial under Assumption
.. Under Assumption ., we need to make an argument. Suppose, by contra-
diction, PVATcf  PVATex, then x H(PVATcf)  x H(PVATex), then lVATcfB  lVATexB (using
the fact that the LHS of (.) is increasing.). en R0(lVATcfB )  R0(lVATexB ), implying
PVATcf > PVATex, a contradiction. When P is lower under VATex, the loan volume
must be higher (again, see (.)). Hence we also have
κd + κl > 0) lVATcfB < lVATexB :
Now we can check the claims sequentially:
. By an envelope argument, equilibrium household utility is a strictly decreas-

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ing function of price ratio P.
. Under Very Boring Banking, the intermediation technology exhibits CRS,
thus banking surplus is zero under any tax system. Under Boring Banking,
banks’ before-tax profit, [R(lB)   R0(lB)lB], is lower with cash flow taxation.
is is because lVATcfB  lVATexB and before-tax profit are increasing in lB (as is
easy to show for R00 < 0). e aer-tax profit, i.e, banking surplus xB, equals
(1   tC) times the before-tax profit. As the tax factor is (1   tC) = 1 under
VATex but (1   tC) = (1   tV) < 1 under VATcf, banking surplus is strictly
lower with cash flow taxation.
. First, consider Boring Banking and κl = κd = 0, then lB and P remain un-
changed. So does the sum xB + cG (by Lemma .). Banking surplus xG,
however, decreases, as already argued. Hence, cG must increase. Second,
for Very Boring Banking we can refer to Lemma ., which states that the
direction of change of cG equals the direction of change in P.
. To make a valid price comparison we normalize the general price level by
fixing ph. en pd = Pph(1   th) by the definition of P. As th = 0 in both
regimes, pd simply follows the change in P.
. Again, we fix ph to normalize the price system. en, by Lemma ., pl =
ph=(1  tx), which equals ph=(1  tV) under both tax regimes.
Proof of Lemma .. Let PVATcf and PVATex be the equilibrium values of price ratio
P induced by the respective tax regimes. By Lemma ., public consumption is
strictly increasing in P, so the premise implies PVATcf = PVATex. en utility must
be the same as well. Banking surplus is always zero under Assumption ..
Proof of Proposition .. e proof relies on the function ~P (lB; t ) and equation
(.). Let tVATzero be the VATzero tax system, let tVATex be the VATex tax system,
and, to save on notation, let tV = tVATex > 0 be the value added tax rate. en, for
all lB,
~P  lB; tVATzero = (1  tV)κ(lB) + (1  tV)γ(lB) + 1=R0(lB)1  tV
<
(1  tV)κ(lB) + γ(lB) + 1=R0(lB)
1  tV =
~P  lB; tVATex ;
Let PVATzero and PVATex be the respective equilibrium values of price ratio P, and
let lVATzeroB , lVATexB be the loan supplies in the two tax regimes.

.A Proofs
Under Assumption ., PVATzero is strictly less than PVATex, independent of lB.
us household utility increases due to a more favorable price ratio, and public
consumption decreases by Lemma ..
To check the statement for Assumption ., we consider equilibrium condi-
tion (.). By contradiction, suppose PVATzero  PVATex, then x H(PVATzero) 
x H(PVATex), so the LHS of (.) decreases. en the RHS must also decrease, im-
plying lVATzeroB  lVATexB , because lBR0(lB) is increasing in lB under Assumption .
(see the proof of Lemma .). When we plug in lVATzeroB  lVATexB into ~P , we find
~P (lVATzeroB ; tVATzero) < ~P (lVATexB ; tVATex), a contradiction.
Hence, PVATzero < PVATex, and, again using (.), lVATzeroB > lVATexB . e former
inequality implies increasing household utility. e laer inequality implies that
banks’ before-tax profit, [R(lB) R0(lB)lB], increases (as is easy to show given R00 
0). To complete the argument, note that neither VATex nor VATzero imposes taxes
on banking profits, so banking surplus increases.
Proof of Proposition .. Let lVATzeroB , PVATzero be the VATzero equilibrium values.
Choose VAT rate tVATex of the VATex system such that
~P  lVATzeroB ; tVATex = (1  tVATex)κ(lVATzeroB ) + γ(lVATzeroB ) + 1=R0(lVATzeroB )1  tVATex
!
= PVATzero
As lVATzeroB , PVATzero satisfy equilibrium condition x H(PVATzero) = lVATzeroB R0(lVATzeroB ),
it is then also true that
x H
 
~P  lVATzeroB ; tVATex = lVATzeroB R0(lVATzeroB ):
Consequently, lVATzeroB solves equilibrium condition (.) for the VATex tax system
and hence, lVATzeroB , PVATzero are equilibrium values not only for the VATzero system
but also for the VATex system. en the corresponding surplus allocations are the
same: . utility is the same as P is the same. . Before-tax banking profits are the
same as lB is the same, then banking surplus xB is the same because neither tax
system imposes taxes on banking profits. . e sum cG+xB is the same by Lemma
.. en public consumption must be identical because banking surplus is the
same.
Proof of Proposition .. e proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition .
and relies on the function ~P (lB; t ) and equation (.). Let t FAT be the FAT tax
Given the expression for ~P  lVATzeroB ; tVATzero, it is straightforward to check that a suitable tVATex
exists.
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system, let tVATex be the VATex tax system, and let tV = tz = tx > 0 be the
respective value added tax rate under both regimes. en, for all lB,
~P  lB; t FAT = 1=R0(lB)1  tV + (1 + tF)κ(lB) + γ(lB)1  tV
 1=R
0(lB)
1  tV + κ(lB) +
γ(lB)
1  tV =
~P  lB; tVATex ;
with a strict inequality if κ(lB) > 0 or κd + κl > 0. On the other hand, we have
equality, i.e., ~P  lB; t FAT = ~P  lB; tVATex if κ(lB) = 0 or κd = κl = 0. Let P FAT and
PVATex be the respective equilibrium values of price ratio P, and let l FATB , lVATexB be
the loan supplies in the two tax regimes.
Analogous to in the proof of Proposition ., we find that
κd = κl = 0) P FAT = PVATex; l FATB = lVATexB
κd + κl > 0) P FAT > PVATex; l FATB < lVATexB :
For the concrete proofs of claims , , and , we can now invoke the very same
arguments we made for claims , , and  in the proof of the Proposition .. Only
for claim  we do need a slight a modification; the aer-tax profit, i.e., banking
surplus, is 1 times before-tax profits under VATex, while it is (1   tF) < 1 times
before-tax profits under a FAT.

As spanish hauliers and French fishermen have shouted out for all
the world to hear, higher fuel prices are not popular. is is
uncomfortable for those – including this newspaper – who see
increased taxation as a way of fighting global warming. Green
taxes tend to fall hardest on the poor.
e Economist, June 
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Environmental Taxation and
Redistribution Concerns
. I
In June , e Economist published an article discussing the pros and cons of
a preceding oil price boost. On the one hand, the rise might be considered as
“a gigantic carbon tax” that helped fighting global warming. On the other hand,
it particularly hurt the poor who spent a considerably higher proportion of their
income on fuel than the rich. Financial compensations for the core energy demand
could help to solve the issue. However “it seems odd to try to prevent energy
use with higher taxes … and then to subsidise it” (e Economist, ). e
article raised the question how to design green taxes optimally while accounting
for distributive concerns. Rising awareness for global environmental problems
under persisting inequality has increased the salience of that question. I propose
an answer with a focus on the optimal level of green taxes and the relation to
redistribution. Despite a huge theoretical literature on environmental taxation
and quite some empirical interest on its impact on poor households, the normative
question of the optimal response to inequality concerns in the environmental tax
design has not had that much of aention.
I employ a simple Mirrlees () income taxation framework which I extend
by consumption externalities as proposed by Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux ().
Within this framework, a welfare-optimising government uses non-linear income
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taxes to redistribute as well as Pigouvian taxation to reduce negative externali-
ties (Pigou, ). I show that the two tax design problems are interconnected. In
particular, the higher the level of redistribution, the lower the optimal level of en-
vironmental taxation. e optimal level has two determinants. First, the marginal
social damage caused by the externality. Second, the cost of public funds, defined
as the immediate marginal welfare losses associated with income tax collection.
If the government puts more weight on redistribution, it will have to accept a
higher cost of public funds. Marginal revenues from the environmental tax are
then more valuable from the government’s point of view. Contrary to naive in-
tuition, this calls for a lower environmental tax rate. e reason is that the tax
rate is at its efficient level if the marginal revenues exactly compensate society
for the marginal external harm. e more valuable the marginal revenues are,
the less one needs to compensate for the marginal externality. To put it another
way, consider the Pigouvian tax as a bribe that consumers pay the authorities in
order to get allowance for pollution. e government is willing to accept a lower
bribe if its utility per dollar is higher. Exactly this is the case if the cost of public
funds is higher.
I measure the level of redistribution by a parameter that corresponds to the
weight of less productive agents in a social-welfare function. As explained, Pigou-
vian taxation needs to decrease if the parameter increases. When first-best in-
struments are available, however, the result reverses. Without distortions, the
cost of public funds actually decreases in the parameter, as the disutility of the
hard working high productive agents receives less weight in the welfare func-
tion. Hence the first-best level of Pigouvian taxation increases with the level of
redistribution.
Mymain contribution with respect to the existing literature is to draw aention
to the level of Pigouvian taxation. Most of the respective literature focuses on tax
rules and concludes that the distortions caused by second-best instruments do not
alter these rules compared to first best. I show that, despite the first-best shape
of these rules, the second-best level of Pigouvian taxation in fact depends on the
distortions and the available income tax instruments.
is chapter also contributes to a branch of the literature that uses linear tax
schemes to analyse the double-dividend hypothesis. Major insights from the lin-
ear model carry over to my seing with incentive constraints and optimal taxes.
In particular, the optimal environmental tax is lower in second- than in first-best.
e remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section . discusses
related literature. Section . presents the model. Section . states the rule for
optimal internalisation. Section . introduces tax systems. Section . analyses
In formal terms, the cost of public funds is the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint.
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optimal environmental taxes and provides themain results. Section . concludes.
e appendices hold proofs and formal results. ey also characterise optimal
allocations and discusse corner solutions.
. R L
is chapter is part of a literature in which Pigouvian taxation meets non-linear
income taxes under asymmetric information (Mirrlees, ). Cremer, Gahvari,
and Ladoux () show that under the separability assumptions from Atkinson
and Stiglitz () the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is uniform, i.e., it does not dis-
criminate between agents. Gauthier and Laroque () generalise the insight: a
certain part of the second-best problem can be separated such that first-best rules
apply for that part of the problem. Examples include Pigouvian taxation and the
Samuelson Rule. Hellwig () presents a similar result.
Kopczuk (), Pirilä and Tuomala (), Jacobs and de Mooij (), and
Kaplow () explicitly centre on externality taxation within a general (income)
taxation problem. In terms of questions posed their contributions are close to
mine. eir answers have a different focus, though.
Kopczuk () proposes to decompose the general taxation problem with ex-
ternalities into two parts: “First, calculate the appropriate Pigouvian tax neces-
sary to correct the externality. en, with the externality accounted for, the usual
second-best problem can be solved using standard formulae.” (p. ) His result
holds for a variety of specifications (including the model presented here) and gen-
eralises the ‘principle of targeting’ (Dixit, ). Kopczuk () also points out,
though, that actually the two parts are interrelated: the Pigouvian tax rate might
only be known aer the whole problem is solved. My comparative statics analysis
characterises this interrelation.
Kaplow () summarises his findings by stating “that simple first-best rules –
unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution – are correct in the model
examined.” My analysis highlights that distribution and distortions have a signif-
icant influence on environmental policy with respect to tax levels, though.
Jacobs and de Mooij (, p. ) find that the “optimal second-best tax on an
externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of pub-
lic funds”. However, they use a non-standard definition for the cost of public
funds. Our formal analyses are consistent but focus on different interpretations.
An earlier branch of the literature, dating back to Sandmo (), examines en-
vironmental taxation as part of linear tax systems. Starting with Bovenberg and
de Mooij (), the linear-taxation model was a primer workhorse model in the
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discussion of the double-dividend hypothesis. By a central result of this liter-
ature, the second-best environmental tax is below the first-best one (e.g. Orosel
and Schöb, ). As I show, these insights carry over to the case of optimal/non-
linear income taxation. Metcalf () uses the linear model to carry out a com-
parative static analysis with a focus on environmental quality.
My analysis also relates to the literature on comparative static properties of
non-linear taxation, with and without public goods (Bierbrauer and Boyer, ;
Bre andWeymark, ;Weymark, ), and to applied analyses of the question
how to overcome negative distributional effects of environmental taxes (like Ekins
and Dresner, ; Metcalf, ; West, ). Rausch, Metcalf, and Reilly ()
recently studied the U.S. economy, Kosonen () did so for the European Union.
e empirical papers investigate the relationship between household income and
emission-heavy consumption like driving or heating in order to check whether
environmental taxes are regressive. ey also discuss distributional impacts of
environmental taxes and policies to support the poorest household. I add insights
from normative theory to the discussion. In particular, I show that (a) emission-
heavy consumption should not be subsidised for poor households and (b) whether
or not environmental taxes are regressive is not per se relevant for their optimal
level.
. M
e model is based on work by Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux (). ere are
three different goods. First, an intermediate good called output, denoted by Y.
It serves as the numéraire and may be interpreted as money. Second, a clean,
completely private consumption good, C, and third, a dirty consumption good, D.
e intermediate good can be transformed into the consumption goods at fixed
rates of transformation equal to pC and pD, respectively. Parameters pC and pD
may be interpreted as the producer prices of C and D. e intermediate good
itself can be produced with a linear technology using labour as the single input
good (but labour is not modelled explicitly). e rate of transformation between
labour and the intermediate good mirrors productivity and is denoted by w. It
may be interpreted as the wage rate.
Households and Allocations ere is a continuum of measure one of agents.
ey differ in exactly one dimension, namely their productivity, which can be
either low or high. An agent’s type is denoted by θ 2 fL;Hg. eir respective
See Goulder (), Schöb (, ), Bovenberg () or Bovenberg and Goulder () for
more details and surveys on the double-dividend discussion.
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productivity is wθ 2 fwL;wHg. e fraction of low-type agents is denoted by
γ 2 (0; 1). An allocation A specifies levels of (C;D; Y) for both generic types, i.e.,
A  (CL;DL; YL;CH;DH; YH). For a given allocation the utility of an agent of type
θ is
Uθ(A) = u(Cθ;Dθ)  Yθwθ   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e: (.)
Function u is continuously differentiable three times, strictly increasing, strictly
concave, has nonnegative cross derivatives, and satisfies the Inada conditions.
It represents private consumption utility. e function satisfies standard Inada-
conditions. In order to produce Yθ units of output, an agent has to provide Yθ=wθ
units of labour. is provision is associated with a linear disutility. e last term
in the utility function reflects the externality. Independently of his type, every
agent suffers from the overall consumption of dirty goods, γDL + (1  γ)DH. e
social harm is proportional to total dirty good consumption, and e > 0. From an
agent’s point of view, own consumption has no negative effect on own utility as a
single contribution is negligible in comparison to the large contribution of others.
Individual contributions are in fact zero due to the assumption of a continuum of
agents.
Notice that all agents in society have quite similar preferences. In particular,
their consumption choice for a given budget is identical. Also, they suffer from
the externality in exactly the same way. is is not only a simplification but
rather a design choice. If agents had different tastes for environmental protection,
then the optimal policy would obviously depend on distributional considerations.
e homogeneity in agents’ preference allows to isolate the more subtle relations
between equity and environmental policy.
Social Welfare is chapter takes a normative perspective by examining what
a social planner (SP) would do in order to maximise the social welfare function
W, defined as
W(A) = αUL(A) + (1  α)UH(A); α 2 (0; 1);
where A is the allocation. e welfare function is a weighted sum of the generic
Formally, uCD  0 as well as uK ! 1 as K ! 0, and uK ! 0 as K ! 1; for K 2 fC;Dg.
e Inada-conditions are imposed in order to guarantee strictly positive optimal consumption
levels. Strict concavity guarantees unique solutions.
Externalities of this type were termed “atmospheric” by Meade (). A different way to inter-
pret the mechanism is to consider a public good that is provided by nature (like “fresh air” or
“nice atmosphere”). Dirty good consumption reduces the level or quality of the public good,
whereat only total consumption maers. e presented model wold fit this interpretation,
with the initial amount of this public good normalised to zero.
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types’ utilities. e parameter α measures the weight SP puts on a generic low-
type agent. If α = γ , then W is the utilitarian welfare function. For α = 1, W
would be the Rawlsian welfare function.
Overall, the economy cannot consume more than it produces in terms of out-
put. Furthermore, an exogenous revenue requirement r has to be met. e social
planner thus faces a resource constraint given by
γ(YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1  γ)(YH   pCCH   pDDH)  r  0: (.)
If (.) holds andA  0, thenA is feasible. An allocation that maximisesW among
all feasible allocations is a first-best allocation.
If the social planner does not observe an agent’s type, not all feasible alloca-
tions are implementable. If, for instance, an allocation disadvantages the high-
type agents, they might have an incentive to pretend to be low-types, making
it impossible to implement this allocation. As a consequence, under asymmetric
information, SP has to ensure that agents do not want to misrepresent their type.
is is the case if the following incentive-compatibility constraints hold.
u(CL;DL)  YLwL  u(CH;DH) 
YH
wL ; (.)
u(CH;DH)  YHwH  u(CL;DL) 
YL
wH : (.)
An allocation that maximises welfare among all feasible, incentive-compatible
allocations is a second-best allocation. e underlying idea about the relation
between incentive compatibility and decentral implementation, i.e. taxation, is
known as the ‘Taxation Principle’ (Guesnerie, ; Hammond, ).
By means of the following assumption, I restrict the analysis to the cases in
which SP likes to redistribute from high-type agents to low-type agents.
Assumption .. α(1  γ)wH > (1  α)γwL.
e assumption generally holds if SP puts a sufficiently high welfare weight on
low-type agents. e lower wL is relative to wH, the lower α may be, because a
large difference in productivity provides an efficiency argument for making high-
types work more than low-types. A low population share γ of low-types makes
redistribution in their favour very cheap, hence it also allows for a low α.
Given the shape of u, it is efficient to produce strictly positive amounts of the
consumption goods rather than abstain from economic activity. In turn, agents
have to provide output. A look at Assumption . and the definition of W shows
For a formal argument see Appendix .A.
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that, in terms of welfare, it is always beer to let the high- rather than the low-
type agents produce an output unit. Consequently, high-type agents should pro-
duce all output. In first-best, this is indeed the case. In second-best, this might
be out of reach, as incentive constraints have to be satisfied. It is then ambigu-
ous whether low-type agents work. My main analysis focuses on the cases in
which they do work, i.e. YL > 0. In these cases a reallocation of output provision
from low- to high-type agents improves welfare, but is possible only if high-types’
incentive constraint (.) is slack. Consequently, at an interior second best allo-
cation, (.) needs to bind. As Assumption . favours the low-type agents, their
incentive constraint (.) is always slack.
For a discussion of existence of second-best corner solutions and it properties,
see Appendix .B.
. O I
is section provides a general property of Pareto-optimal allocations, with re-
spect to the externality. At first sight, the presented rule is identical for first- and
second-best allocations. is is a reason why redistribution and distortions are
sometimes considered to have no structural influence on Pigouvian taxation. In
the next step, I show, however, in what way the first- and second-best rules are
in fact different.
To shorten exposition, I use the following notation for J;K 2 fC;Dg. uL :=
u(CL;DL), uLJ := @u(CL;DL)=@JL, uLKJ := @2u(CL;DL)=(@KL@JL). Analogous defi-
nitions apply to uH := u(CH;DH). e Lagrangian multiplier of the resource con-
straint is denoted by λ. All results in the current section are derived in Appendix
.A.
A Rule for Optimal Internalisation Both first- and second-best allocation fea-
ture the property that the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between the two
consumption goods are the same for both types of agents. Rather than being equal
to the rate of transformation (namely, producer-price ratio), as would be the case
in an unregulated market, the MRS is equal to
MRS = u
LD
uLC
=
uHD
uHC
=
pD
pC +
e
λpC : (.)
If YH could be negative, (first-best) welfare would be unbounded. Obviously, that is not an
option. Accordingly, the nonnegativity constraint for YL binds at the first-best allocation.See Lemmas ., ., . in Appendix .A for the formal arguments.
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is is a standard result in the literature. It follows, for instance, from the more
general analysis by Hellwig (). It is driven by the separability feature of the
utility functions. Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux () point out the relation to
the famous result in Atkinson and Stiglitz (), namely that, under the given
assumptions, commodity prices should not be distorted, and all redistribution can
be done within the labour market. e intuition of the Atkinson/Stiglitz result
is as follows. By assumption, all agents have the same consumption paern.
erefore the commodity demand cannot be used to screen types and commodity
taxation cannot contribute to relax the equity-efficiency trade-off. Hence there is
no point in distorting them.
e intuition carries over partially to the case where an externality is intro-
duced. In fact, as agents are equal in terms of their consumption preferences and
their exposure to the externality, there is no point in treating them differently in
this respect. Yet, it is no longer true that optimal redistribution only affects the
labour market. Optimal consumption now depends on multiplier λ. e multi-
plier is crucially related to redistribution. Also, while at first sight the above for-
mula is the same for both first- and second best allocation, λ is different in first-
and second-best. is has significant consequences for the relation between the
degree of redistribution and the degree of intervention in the commodity market.
.. T C  P F
ere is no universal definition for the (marginal) cost of public funds in the liter-
ature. Jacobs (), for instance, recently suggested a definition which implies a
marginal cost of  for typical optimal taxation schedules. In this chapter I stick to
the classical definition, also used in the textbook by Dahlby (); the (marginal)
cost of public funds measures the loss in welfare associated with raising tax rev-
enues. Being a cost, the concept does not account for potential benefits from the
revenues. It just tells how (welfare-)costly it is to raise a (marginal) tax dollar.
As is well known, the so defined (marginal) cost of public funds is equal to λ, the
Lagrangian multiplier for the resource constraint (.). Formally, λ =  @W^=@r,
where W^ is the optimised value of the welfare function. roughout the chapter
I normally drop the explicit “marginal” when referring to the cost of public funds
– relying on the fact that the concept is per se a marginal one. Also, “multiplier”
interchangeably refers to λ, i.e., the cost of public funds.
e quasi-linearity in labour allows for closed-form solutions for the multiplier
and plainly reveals the dissimilarity between first- and second-best. It also shows
the dependency on the underlying parameters α and γ .
More precisely, for a given amount of total consumption spending, all agents consume the same
commodity bundle.

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Second-best e value of the multiplier at an interior second-best allocation is
λ := αwL +
1  α
wH : (.)
To grasp the intuition, note that agents do not benefit from r, so an increase is
pure burden. A way to finance the additional requirement is to increase output.
As the incentive constraint for the high-type agents is binding, their output may
only be increased if the low-type’s output is increased as well. e weighted
welfare loss of such an increase is equal to α=wL for the generic low-type and
(1  α)=wH for the generic high-type. Notice that the multiplier does not depend
on the population shares. e reason is that a higher revenue requirement has
to be produced by all agents (independently of their type) in order to sustain
incentive compatibility.
First-best e multiplier at the first-best allocation is
λF := 1  αwH(1  γ) : (.)
Because only high-types work in first-best, only parameters related to them mat-
ter for λF. If SP needs an additional unit of revenue, he will make high-type agents
work more. As there are only 1   γ high-type agents, the generic high type has
to provide 1=(1  γ) (marginal) units of output and needs to work 1=(wH(1  γ))
additional hours. e incurred marginal disutility is weighted by 1  α.
e multipliers are not only different in size, but also with respect to their di-
rections of change in the parameters α and γ . e welfare weight has an impact
on the optimal tax design with respect to the externality. If interpreted naively,
the optimal rule (.) itself hides this fact.
. T
e current section adapts the interpretation of output being money. In this inter-
pretation, Y denotes gross income, w corresponds to the wage rate, and pC; pD are
producer prices. A tax system τ = (tC; tD; T ) consists of an income tax function T
and specific commodity taxes tC; tD 2 R. Consumer prices are qk := pk + tk for
k 2 fC;Dg. Consumption may be subsidised through negative commodity taxes.
T may be negative as well, in which case it is a transfer to the agent.
For any type θ, let (Cθ(τ);Dθ(τ); Yθ(τ)) be the maximisers of individual utility,
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given τ :
(Cθ(τ);Dθ(τ); Yθ(τ)) 2 argmax
(C;D;Y)

u(C;D)  Ywθ   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e
subject to qCC + qDD  Y  T()

:
(.)
Households take DL and DH as given, so the externality is not relevant for their
decision.
When choosing a tax system, the social planner takes individual optimisation
into account and needs to respect the following fiscal budget constraint, which is
equivalent to resource constraint (.).
γ

TL(τ) + tCCL(τ) + tDDL(τ)

+ (1  γ)

TH(τ) + tCCH(τ) + tDDH(τ)

 r (.)
Here, TL(τ) and TH(τ) amount to the respective total income tax payments of low-
and high-type agents.
If (.) is satisfied for some tax system τ , then τ is said to implement allocationA
with A = (CL(τ);DL(τ); YL(τ);CH(τ);DH(τ); YH(τ)) as defined by (.). e set of
available tax systems to choose from depends on the informational constraints.
When the social planner can observe an agent’s type, the income tax may be
contingent on the type. Under asymmetric information it can only be contingent
on observed gross income. In fact, with T : (w; Y ) 7! T (w; Y ), it is possible to
find a system τ that implements the first-best allocation. With T : Y 7! T (Y ),
it is possible to find a system τ that implements the second-best allocation. is
insight allows to restrict aention to the chosen tax structure albeit the linearity
in commodity taxation.
.. N
As usual in these type of models, there is a degree of freedom in the taxation
choice. A common way to deal with this is to normalise the tax system and oen
it is innocuous to do so. Yet, when properties of the tax system, like a particular
tax level, are the object of interest rather than the real allocation, one has to be
careful with normalisations.
is was a major issue in the double-dividend discussion between Bovenberg
and de Mooij (, ), Fullerton () and others. e discussion centres
on the comparison of the second-best pollution tax and the first-best Pigouvian
e underlying arguments are standard. For details, see Appendix .A.
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tax (the marginal social harm). e actual tax level obviously depends on the
chosen normalisation and a priori it is unclear which normalisation is “correct”.
In a related contribution, Schöb () focuses on the normalisation choice and
shows that also “the difference of the first-best and second-best optimal tax on
the polluting good depends on the normalization chosen.” (p. ) He concludes
that “such a comparison provides an inappropriate indicator for the existence of
a second dividend.” (ibid.)
To obtain valid results on comparative static properties of environmental taxa-
tion and the relation between first- and second-best level, it is important to avoid
the “normalization trap” (ibid.). Orosel and Schöb () propose to study an ob-
ject called the second-best internalization tax. Unlike an actual tax rate, it is a “real”
variable, derived directly from the underlying allocation, and independent of the
normalisation. Using their concept, the authors find a particular normalisation
to be correct for doing the comparison of actual first- vs. second-best tax rates.
e aforementioned contributions feature linear labour and commodity tax-
ation, and do not model distributive issues. eir insights on normalisations
carry over to my model, though. Here the “real” object of interest is the so called
greenness g. For any tax system τ = (tC; tD; T ), the greenness is defined by
g := tD   tCqDqC :
Similar to the second-best internalisation tax as proposed by Orosel and Schöb
(ibid.), the greenness is a real variable independent of the normalisation. More
precisely, g is unique in the sense that it is the same for any tax system which
implements the second-best allocation. e same is true with respect to the first-
best allocation.
For an intuitive understanding of the greenness consider an agent who faces
some tax system τ and decides to purchase an additional (marginal) unit of D,
while keeping total spending constant. en the greenness is the change in the
agent’s total tax payment. ereby it quantifies the tax system’s inherent in-
centives to shi consumption from D to C. Plainly put, it tells how “green” the
system is. Notice that the a tax system could be green due to high tD or due to
low (potentially negative) tC. e greenness covers both cases.
It turns out that the greenness equals the tax rate tD on the dirty good iff the
tax rate tC on the clean good is normalised to zero: precisely the normalisation
e definition of the second-best internalisation tax uses the observation that private marginal
utility should equal social marginal welfare – a property of an allocation rather than a tax
system.
epapers on the double dividend normally have identical/representative consumers. Distribu-
tional concerns appear only indirectly as a motive for the unavailability of lump sum taxation.
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identified as “correct” by Orosel and Schöb () for the respective purpose. For
this reason it is save to proceed the analysis with tC  0. For further reference, I
call such a tax system normalised.
. T O P T
Given tC  0, how high should tD be? An optimum is characterised by the fact
that a marginal reallocation does not change welfare. In particular, keeping pri-
vate spending constant, amarginal change in consumption levelsmust not change
welfare. Consider a marginal shi from C to D (for all agents, taking account of
differences in prices). is has three effects: . Consumption utility u is un-
changed as agents are at their individual optimum. . External harm increases at
rate e. . Tax revenues increase at rate tD and relax the budget constraint of the
social planner. Multiplier λ tells how welfare is affected from relaxing the public
budget. us the marginal effect of tax revenues on welfare amounts to tDλ. e
overall marginal change in welfare is  e + tDλ. For this change to be zero, tD
needs to be
tD = eλ : (.)
.. T C S  P T
e following Propositions essentially combine equation (.) with the findings
from section ... ey state the main result of the chapter: comparative static
properties of those tax systems that implement the first- and second-best alloca-
tion, respectively.
Proposition . (First-best Pigouvian taxation). If a normalised tax system τF = 0; t FD; T F implements the first-best allocation AF, then
t FD =
e
λF :
Furthermore,
@t FD
@α > 0;
@t FD
@γ < 0:
Despite the lack of distortions, distributive concerns influence the environmen-
tal tax; more redistribution calls for a higher first-best Pigouvian tax t FD. e rela-
A detailed discussion of the greenness and the respective proofs is contained in an earlier work-
ing paper version of Aigner (forthcoming), which is available upon request.
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tion reverses completely if first-best instruments are not available and the labour
market is distorted.
Proposition . (Second-best Pigouvian taxation). If normalised tax system τ =
(0; t D; T ) implements an interior second-best allocation A, then
t D =
e
λ :
Furthermore,
@t D
@α < 0;
@t D
@γ = 0:
In a nutshell, higher labour market distortions coming from increased redistri-
bution imply a lower optimal Pigouvian tax level. To develop a detailed intuition
for the results, decompose the comparative statics into two aspects. () In first-
as well as in second-best tD is inversely proportional to λ. () e reaction of λ
differs for first- and second-best. e first aspect is not new. It is already well
established for models of linear labour/commodity taxation. As shown, it carries
over to a world with incentive constraints. e second aspect has not drawn that
much of aention in the literature but is crucial as it drives the reversed results.
I discuss the two aspects in turn.
e inverse relation of environmental taxes and the cost of public funds
To grasp the intuition behind the inverse relation, consider the purpose of Pigou-
vian taxation: its (only) goal is to restore the efficient level of dirty-good consump-
tion. From a welfare perspective, a unit of the dirty-good should be consumed if
and only if consumption is not only individually optimal, but private benefits
also outweigh social harm. Consequently, dirty-good consumption is at its so-
cially optimal level only if marginal private (net) benefits exactly equal marginal
social harm. To measure and compare these two objects, it is useful to quantify
them in terms of money.
() e optimising agent is willing to pay tD units of additional taxes for the
right to consume her last unit of D rather than spending the respective money
on C. So tD is a good measure of (net) private benefits of the marginal unit of
dirty-good consumption.
() Now consider the social planner. If D increases by one unit, welfare de-
creases by e. If SP receives exactly e=λ units of money to relax the budget con-
straint, welfare increases by (e=λ)λ = e. us the marginal social harm measured
in money is equal to e=λ. It is the exact amount of money that society needs as a
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compensation for additional dirty-good consumption. e amount is lower if the
received money is more useful in the sense that the cost of public funds is higher.
Puing together () and () shows that if tD = e=λ, then individual maximisation
leads to an allocation in which, at the margin, private (net) benefits equal social
harm.
A more naive view, which evaluates Pigouvian taxes in a partial or isolated
manner rather than viewing it as part of a whole tax system, could reason that
‘Pigouvian taxes do two things: reduce pollution and create revenue. So they
should be high if pollution is severe or if revenues are very valuable to the state.’
Naive intuition would thus suggest that higher cost of public funds (associated
with marginal tax revenue being more valuable) should lead to higher Pigouvian
tax rates. In fact, this ‘rationale’ would provide a straightforward argument for
the double dividend hypothesis, which by now has been mostly falsified (e.g.,
Fullerton and Metcalf, ). e strong form of the double-dividend hypothesis
states that a revenue-neutral introduction of green taxes is desirable even if envi-
ronmental benefits are not taken into account (Goulder, ). In the model that
I propose this fails clearly: Pigouvian taxation, namely tD > 0, is optimal only if
an externality is present, i.e., if e > 0. Among others, Bovenberg () gives the
same argument, albeit for a model with linear taxation. Empirical investigations
by Goulder () tend to reject the hypothesis as well.
e intuition that rejects the double dividend hypothesis is also central to the
comparative static analysis. e more valuable the marginal tax revenues, the
less is needed to compensate for the marginal externality, and — because the one
and only purpose of Pigouvian taxation is to induce alignment of private benefits
and social harm at the margin — a lower Pigouvian tax rate is asked for. Various
authors have noticed the underlying rationale in their respective seings, so it
applies quite universally (e.g., Schöb, ). As Bovenberg and de Mooij ()
put it, “each unit of pollution does not have to yield as much public revenue to
offset the environmental damage if this revenue becomes more valuable” (p. ).
In a recent contribution, Jacobs and deMooij () make the seemingly contra-
dictory statement that the optimal second-best environmental tax is not sensitive
to the cost of public funds at all. eir conclusion follows from a their newly pro-
posed definition of the cost of public funds. So the difference in conclusion is one
of interpretations rather than formal results. eir interpretation suggests that
tax distortions do not play a role for optimal environmental taxes, which clearly
is at odds with my analysis. Indeed, Jacobs and de Mooij (ibid., p. ) qualify their
interpretation themselves: “e optimal second-best environmental tax does re-
quire a correction for distributional concerns and interactions with labor supply,
but not for pre-existing tax distortions.” e comparative statics results fill the
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gap of specifying the “correction for distributional concerns” but also broaden
the existing insights by highlighting that even without distortions, distribution
concerns influence the optimal environmental tax level.
I should highlight that the preceding discussion is about marginal rather than
total revenues. e difference is crucial: total revenues from Pigouvian taxation
do not compensate for the overall external harm. Although the two figures coin-
cide in the linear specification, they generally differ. More to the point, Pigouvian
revenues should not be used to compensate the harmed people; it is not its pur-
pose, and it might reduce incentives to avoid exposure to an externality in the
first place (W. Oates, ).
How the cost of public funds anges in parameters
e changes of t FD and t D with respect to welfare weight α have different signs.
is point is worth stressing again as previous contributions with non-linear in-
come taxes tend to highlight the similarities rather than the differences of first-
and second-best Pigouvian taxes. is focus comes naturally when examining the
optimal rules, which are – almost – identical for first- and second-best.
For the version of their model that resembles the one of this chapter, Cremer,
Gahvari, and Ladoux () conclude that “the optimal tax on the externality gen-
erating good is strictly Pigouvian” (p. ; Proposition ), where the term ‘Pigou-
vian’ is based on the first-best tax on the dirty good (Definition ). Likewise
Gauthier and Laroque () show that first-best rules quite oen hold also at
second-best allocations if utility is separable. With respect to externalities they
find that “a non-satiated second best allocation can be supported with a first best
Pigovian tax” (Remark ). Kopczuk () and Kaplow () make similar ob-
servations.
While all of these findings are correct, they suggest (quite explicitly in some
cases) that distortions are not that relevant for the second-best tax. Proposition .
highlights the opposite. Also, these results might distract from the considerable
differences between first- and second-best when it comes to tax levels rather than
tax rules. In fact, the optimal rule for the model at hand is given in (.) – for both
first- and second best. Only an inspection of the respective multipliers reveals the
differences between them.
First-best multiplier Recall that only high types work at a first-best allocation
and that λF is derived from an output increase of high-types. Now, if α increases,
Gauthier and Laroque () do point out, though, that the whole second-best problem must
be solved to obtain the actual Pigouvian tax.
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SP cares less about high-type agentsworkingmore, thus the cost of public fund de-
crease. Tax revenues generated by tD are less valuable per unit so more (marginal)
revenues need to be collected at the optimum. If γ is increased, the generic high-
type has to work more for an higher overall output requirement and the cost of
public funds increases. Marginal revenues generated by tD now have higher value
per unit and less is needed to satisfy optimality condition (.).
Second-best multiplier From (.) the cost of public funds at a second-best al-
location is λ = α=wL + (1   α)=wH. As λ does not depend on γ , neither does
t D. e higher the welfare weight of low-type agents, the more redistribution is
asked for and the more distortions are accepted. Higher distortions imply higher
excess burden of taxation and thereby higher cost of public funds. Marginal rev-
enues from Pigouvian taxation are then more valuable and less marginal revenue
is needed to satisfy optimality condition (.).
First vs. second best As argued, the different directions of change of the Pigou-
vian tax with respect to the welfare weight derive from the different reactions of
the cost of public funds. In the one case, the social planer cares less about those
who work, i.e., environmental revenues decrease in value, in the other case, in-
come tax distortion increase and environmental revenues increase in value.
Distribution and taxes Summing up, this section highlights a link between
Pigouvian taxation and the degree of redistribution, measured by welfare weight
α. Welfare optimising societies with different opinions about equity need to have
different levels of Pigouvian taxation, even if first-best instruments are feasible.
is is not entirely obvious, because in partial equilibrium models, the level of
Pigouvian taxation is typically pinned down solely by Pareto efficiency. Asym-
metric information proofs to be a crucial determinant of the link between envi-
ronmental taxation and redistribution: the sign of the dependence changes when
going from first- to second-best.
Corner solutions So far, the second-best comparative statics assumed an in-
terior solution. Corollary . in Appendix .B shows that for corner solution
@tD=@α = 0. In fact, if YL = 0 for some α, then a further increase in α cannot
change the optimal allocation at all: it is neither possible to decrease YL nor to
increase low-type agents’ consumption without violating incentive constraints.
Consequently, the optimal tax remains constant as well.
e result is shown to hold for α  γ . I expect it to hold for a broader range of parameters,
though.
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.. F  S P T L
Bovenberg and de Mooij () examine the double dividend hypothesis by com-
paring first- and second-best environmental tax. eir contribution led to quite
some follow-up papers on the subject. e workhorse model of this literature
is a representative household model with linear income and commodity taxes
(e.g., Bovenberg, ). Lump sum taxes are allowed or disallowed for exogenous
reasons. In these seings, the second-best environmental tax falls short of the
first-best one. e result carries over to my seing with incentive-constraint
redistribution.
Proposition .. Fix parameters and consider two normalised tax systems, τF and
τ, which implement the first- and second-best allocations, respectively. en
t D < t FD:
Proof. (.) and (.) imply λ   λF > 0 due to Assumption .. t D < t FD follows
from (.).
Following the discussion of the comparative statics, the intuition for the result
should be clear. e second-best tax system distorts the labour market which
increases the cost of public funds compared to a first-best system. e difference
in the cost of public funds causes the difference in the tax levels.
.. T R  R
Environmental taxes are regressive if total tax payments in proportion to total
consumption spending decrease in income levels. If so, these taxes impose a dis-
proportionate burden on low-income households. Energy-intensive goods like
electricity and heating are oen considered to feature regressive consumption
paern. Taxes on these goods might then indeed be regressive. e Economist
(), for instance, is concerned about this possibility in the article I cited in the
Introduction. e presumption also gave rise to applied studies on the impact
of green tax reforms on low-income households (e.g., Ekins and Dresner, ;
Metcalf, ; West, ). In a recent empirical study focusing on the European
Union, Kosonen () finds that electricity and heating tend to be regressive. For
transport fuel and vehicles it is the other way around, though; they seem to be
progressive. Also, there are considerable differences between countries. Overall,
the evidence for regressive spending paerns is quite mixed.
See also Schöb (). As detailed in section .. and the references mentioned there, the
comparison hinges on the “correct” normalisation choice, which by now is well-understood
(Orosel and Schöb, ).
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e analysis in this chapter contributes to these considerations by showing that
the question of regressivity might not be that important aer all. To make this
point, compare two examplary utility functions, U 1θ and U 2θ . In line with (.), let
U 1θ (A) = u1(Cθ;Dθ) 
Yθ
wθ   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e;
U 2θ (A) = u2(Cθ;Dθ) 
Yθ
wθ   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e:
e utility functions differ only in consumption utility u, which is u1 or u2, resp.,
but are identical with respect to disutility of labour and with respect to the exter-
nality. To be concrete, suppose
u1(C;D) = 2(CD)1=2; u2(C;D) = 2(2D1=2 + C)1=2:
As defined in (.), households maximise utility facing consumer prices qD and qC.
Let m be the individually optimal amount of aer-tax income. en dirty good
demand is D 1 = m=(2qD) under utility U 1θ , and is D 2 = (qC=qD)2 under utility
U 2θ (provided m not too small). Hence in the former case, dirty good taxation is
not regressive at all, because dirty good consumption is proportional to aer-tax
income. In the laer case, though, it is highly regressive: rich and poor house-
holds typically spend the exact same amount on dirty good taxes, irrespective of
aer-tax income.
How do these different degrees of regressivity translate into differences in op-
timal environmental taxation? e respective analyses show that the optimal tax
on the dirty good is either t 1D = e=λ1 or t 2D = e=λ2. Yet, multiplier λ is independent
of consumption utility u, as discussed in section ... So λ1 = λ2, because the
two version of overall utility U are identical except for u. Hence,
t 1D = t 2D:
is example shows that two economies can actually have the very same op-
timal level of environmental taxation, despite the fact that the dirty good tax is
regressive in one of them and is not regressive in the other one. Of course, this
neutrality observation would be diluted without quasilinear utility U. However,
Consumption utility u1 is a standard Cobb-Douglas utility and as such satisfies the conditions
imposed upon u in the model description. Consumption utility u2, on the other hand, does not
satisfy all these condition. Nevertheless, I use it in this example because the quasi-linear struc-
ture is a familiar form, which is well-known to induce regressive demand paerns. ough
some parts of the formal analysis in the Appendix do not (necessarily) apply to U 2, the first-
orders condition relevant for the example are not affected.
e income tax T generally differs, though. If marginal income taxes were different as well, the

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regressivity apparently is not relevant for the Pigouvian tax per se – otherwise
this should appear in the example, which isolates a pure regressivity effect.
. C
is chapter looks at the interdependence of distributive and environmental poli-
cies from a normative perspective. It reveals a qualitative difference between first-
and second-best. Distributive goals and environmental policies are linked by the
cost of public funds. On the one hand they influence the optimal environmental
tax level, on the other hand they are a function of distribution policies. I find that
if society wants more redistribution, the second-best environmental tax is lower,
whereas the first-best environmental tax is higher.
e results also clarify some aspects of the literature on Pigouvian taxation.
First, it is important to distinguish optimal rules from optimal levels. Former con-
tributions on second-best environmental taxation with non-linear income taxes
tend to focus on the optimal tax rule and point out their “first best flavor”, em-
phasising the similarity of first- and second-best with respect to environmental
taxes. My focus on tax level shows significant differences in the level and the pa-
rameter dependence. Income tax distortions do play a substantial role for optimal
environmental taxes.
Second, insights gained from models with linear income/commodity taxation
carry over to seings with non-linear income taxation and incentive constraints.
is holds true for the role of distortions as well as the result that the second-best
environmental tax falls short of the first-best one.
What can be learned in terms of policy implications? First, the view that the
two goals of redistribution and environmental protection can be addressed in-
dependently by means of two different instruments (income tax and Pigouvian
taxation) needs to be reconsidered. In particular, the designer of environmental
taxes has to account for the value in terms of welfare that is created by the tax
revenues. is value is a function of the income tax schedule and depends on the
set of available instruments as well as on informational constraints. e optimal
tax level then derives from the trade off between external harm and useful tax
revenues. Importantly, it is the marginal effect that counts. Total revenues are
irrelevant for the optimal level of Pigouvian taxation. So are the total environ-
mental taxes paid by the households.
incentive to pollute would change despite constant tD. An analysis of the optimal allocation
shows, however, that this is not the case; the distortions induced by redistribution do not hinge
on the particularities of u (see Appendix .A, Proposition .).
Gauthier and Laroque (, p. )

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Second, the intricate empirical question of regressivity is not too relevant for
tax designers. In fact, whether or not environmental taxes are regressive should
not influence their level. In particular, tax rates should not be reduced for poor
households in an aempt to compensate for any disproportionate burden from en-
vironmental taxes. is would reduce incentives and provide an inefficient means
of redistribution. Instead, one might raise the transfers to those households.

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A .A O A  P
In this appendix, I characterise the first- and second-best allocation and give the
proofs of the results on optimal taxation.
Lemma .. If AF is a first-best allocation under Assumption ., then Y FL = 0 and
Y FH > 0.
Proof. Suppose Y FL > 0. If the total output of all low-type agents is lowered by
Δ 2 (0; γY FL ), every low-type individual may reduce his own output by Δ=γ . e
immediate welfare gain is αΔ=(γwL). To finance the output reduction high types
have to increase their total output by Δ, resp. their individual output by Δ=(1 γ).
e immediate welfare loss is (1 α)Δ=((1 γ)wH). e net effect of the alteration
is strictly positive given Assumption ., a contradiction.
Hence Y FL = 0. Y FH > 0 needs to holds given the Inada-conditions on u.
Lemma .. If A is a second-best allocation, then
. At most one incentive compatibility constraint is binding.
. YH > YL and uH > uL.
Proof. . Suppose the contrary. Summation of both ICs yields YL = YH and
u(CL;DL) = u(CH;DH). Given the shape of u, this can be optimal only if (CL;DL) =
(CH;DH). To complete the argument, it suffices to show that such a bunching
allocation is dominated by a constrained laissez-faire allocation. Fix any feasi-
ble bunching allocation Ab = (Cb; Db; Yb, Cb, Db, Yb) and define for any type θ,
(C lfθ ; Y lfθ ) := argmax C;Yfu(C;Db)  Y=wθ s.t. Y  pCC+ pDDb + rg. en, in par-
ticular, u(C lfθ ;Db)   Y lf=wθ  u(Cb;Db)   Yb=wθ . Furthermore, maximisers are
unique and (C lfL ; Y lfL ) 6= (C lfH ; Y lfH). us there exist θ such that u(C lfθ ;Db) Y lf=wθ >
u(Cb;Db)   Yb=wθ . e constraint laissez-faire allocation Alf thereby Pareto-
dominates the bunching allocation Ab. Alf is also incentive compatible and feasi-
ble. Hence, Ab cannot be a solution to the second-best problem and the contradic-
tion is completed. (e argument builds on Bierbrauer and Boyer, , Lemma
)
. Add both ICs to obtain YH  YL. Equality would imply a bunching allocation
which is not optimal as shown above. Hence YH > YL. High types’ incentive
constraint then implies uH > uL.
Lemma .. If A is an interior second-best allocation under Assumption ., then
high types’ incentive constraint (.) is binding, low types’ incentive constraint (.)
is slack.

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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (.) was slack, i.e., uH   YH=wH > uL  
YL=wH. en there exits an ε > 0 such that also uH   (YH + ε)=wH > uL   (YL  
ε(1  γ)=γ)=wH. e ε-perturbed allocation is constructed in a way to keep total
output constant. Incentive compatibility is sustained, too. e welfare effect of
the perturbation is
dW = α 1  γγwL ε  
(1  α)ε
wH > 0,
α
γwL >
(1  α)
(1  γ)wH
dW is strictly positive precisely under Assumption ., hence a contradiction.
If ICH is binding then ICL must be slack by Lemma ..
First-order conditions Considering the lemmas, an appropriate Lagrangian for
an optimal allocation is
L = α [u(CL;DL)  YL=wL   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e]
+ (1  α) [u(CH;DH)  YH=wH   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e]
+ λ(γ(YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1  γ)(YH   pCCH   pDDH)  r)
+ μ(u(CH;DH)  YH=wH   u(CL;DL) + YL=wH)
+ δYL:
(.)
Next, set the partial derivatives to zero:
αuLC   γλpC   μuLC = 0) (α   μ)uLC = λγpC (.)
αuLD   γλpD   μuLD   γe = 0) (α   μ)uLD = λγpD + γe (.)
 α=wL + γλ + μ=wH + δ = 0) γλ = α=wL   μ=wH   δ (.)
and
(1  α)uHC   (1  γ)λpC + μuHC = 0
) (1  α + μ)uHC = (1  γ)λpC (.)
(1  α)uHD   (1  γ)λpD + μuHD   (1  γ)e = 0
) (1  α + μ)uHD = (1  γ)(λpD + e) (.)
 (1  α)=wH + (1  γ)λ   μ=wH = 0
) (1  α + μ)=wH = (1  γ)λ (.)
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It follows that
μ = wH

(1  γ)α
wL  
γ(1  α)
wH

  wH(1  γ)δ (.)
λ = αwL +
1  α
wH   δ
For a first-best allocation, set μ = 0, for an interior second-best allocation, set
δ = 0.
Proposition . (First-best allocation). Given Assumption ., allocation AF is a
first-best allocation if and only if it satisfies the following system of equations.
uLC =
pC
wH
1  α
α
γ
1  γ ; u
L
D =
pD + e=λF
wH
1  α
α
γ
1  γ ; (.)
uHC =
pC
wH ; u
H
D =
pD + e=λF
wH ; (.)
Y FL = 0; Y FH =
γ
1  γ
 pCC FL + pDD FL + pCC FH + pDD FH + r1  γ ;
λF = 1  αwH(1  γ) :
Proof. With μ = 0, the Lagrange function (.) is concave and the first order
conditions are necessary and sufficient for a solution. Consider conditions (.)
and (.) with μ = 0. en
λF = 1  αwH(1  γ) ; δ
F =
α
wL   γλ > 0) Y
F
L = 0:
Notice that the inequality is satisfied if and only if Assumption . holds. e
statement of the Proposition now follows from conditions (.), (.), (.),
(.), and the binding resource constraint (.).
According to Proposition ., low-type agents do not work at all. Due to linear
disutility from working, Assumption . implies that any given amount of output
requirement fosters lower aggregated disutility if it is provided solely by high
types rather than low types. If YL could be negative, welfare would be unbounded.
For a moment, ignore the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint λF.
en consumption of high types is independent of the welfare weight and the
population shares, and is just determined by efficiency considerations. It departs
from standard results only through a corrective element that takes care of the

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external effects of dirty-good consumption. e consumption levels of the low-
type agents, though, heavily depend on welfare weights as well as the population
shares. e underlying trade-off lies between consumption utility of low-types
and disutility of high types, who have to work for the provision of low-type con-
sumption. Low-type productivity wL is irrelevant for the allocation given that
they do not work.
Lemma .. Let u(C;D) be strictly concave and continuously differentiable and let
kC; kD be two constants such that the system uC(C;D) = kC; uD(C;D) = kD has a
solution. en the solution is unique.
Proof. Consider the three-dimensional space. Let s = (sC; sD) be a solution. e
tangential plane at S = (sC; sD; u(s )) is spanned by the directions of the two partial
derivatives at S. As u is strictly concave, the whole range of u – except u(s) – lies
below that plane. Now consider a point s0 that also solves the above system but is
different from s. e tangential plane at s0 is parallel to the one at s, yet one of the
planes is higher than the other. But than it is no longer possible that the whole
range of u lies below the lower plane. is creates a contradiction.
Proposition . (Interior second-best allocation). If A is an interior second-best
allocation under Assumption ., then it is unique and solves the following system
of equations with d = μ(1  wL=wH)=(α   μ).
uLC =
pC
wL (1 + d) u
L
D =
pD + e=λ
wL (1 + d)
uHC =
pC
wH u
H
D =
pD + e=λ
wH
Y L = r + γ(pCC L + pDD L ) + (1  γ)(pCC H + pDD H)  wH(uH   uL)(1  γ)
Y H = r + γ(pCC L + pDD L ) + (1  γ)(pCC H + pDD H) + wH(uH   uL)γ
λ = αwL +
1  α
wH ; μ
 = α(1  γ)wHwL   (1  α)γ: (.)
Proof. If A is an interior second-best allocation, then it satisfies conditions (.)
and (.) with δ set to zero. en λ and μ are uniquely determined and strictly
positive. For given values of λ and μ, (.), (.), (.), and (.) uniquely
determine the consumption levels (uniqueness is established by Lemma .). Out-
put requirements follow from the binding resource constraint (.) combined with
the binding incentive constraint (.).
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e conditions for high-type consumption levels are almost identical to the cor-
responding first-best conditions (.) and (.). e subtle but important differ-
ence lies in the Lagrangianmultiplier λ, which is different in first- and second-best
and, most importantly, features different comparative statics properties.
e consumption levels of low types are distorted downwards, i.e., the labour
choice is distorted in favour of leisure. e distortion is captured by d and is
higher if μ is higher or the difference in productivities is larger.
Taxation
Recall that a tax system τ = (tC; tD; T ) consists of an income tax function T and a
linear commodity tax rates, tC and tD. Tax system τ implements allocation A if
. For any θ, (Cθ;Dθ; Yθ) 2 argmax (C;D;Y)fu(C;D)   Y=wθ s.t. qCC + qDD 
Y  Tg
. γ(YL   pCCL   pDDL) + (1  γ)(YH   pCCH   pDDH)  r  0.
It is straightforward to see that a tax system with linear commodity taxes can
only implement allocations in which the marginal rates of substitution between
the two consumption good are equal across all agents.
Lemma .. If tax system τ implements allocation A, then
qD
qC = MRS =
uD(CL;DL)
uC(CL;DL) =
uD(CH;DH)
uC(CH;DH)
Proof. Individual choices, as defined in (.), need to satisfy uθD=uθC = qD=qC.
e linearity of commodity taxation is generally restrictive. But the following
two lemmas show that, in the model at hand, more general commodity tax system
could not improve upon the linear systems; both the first- and the second-best
allocation are implementable with tax systems as defined above.
Lemma .. ere exists a tax system τ = (tC; tD; T ) with T : (w; Y ) 7! T(w; Y )
that implements the first-best allocation AF = (C FL ;D FL ; Y FL ;C FH;D FH; Y FH).
Proof. Fix some tC; tD such that qD=qC = (pD + e=λF)=pC. Define the income tax
function for w 2 fwL;wHg to be
T(w; Y) =
8>>>><>>>>:
Y; w = wL and Y 6= 0
 (qCC FL + qDD FL ); w = wL and Y = 0
Y; w = wH and Y 6= Y FH
Y FH   (qCC FH + qDD FH); w = wH and Y = Y FH

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It remains to show that an agent who solves the individual maximisation prob-
lem (.) chooses exactly the bundle that is intended for her type.
(a) Low types. For low-type agents it is never optimal to choose Y 6= 0. So their
problem reduces to maxC;D u(C;D) s.t qCC + qDD  qCC FL + qDD FL . Necessary
and sufficient conditions for a solution are uD=uC = qD=qC and qCC + qDD =
qCC FL + qDD FL . By construction, the first-best consumption levels (C FL ;D FL ) satisfy
these conditions.
(b) High types. For high-type agents, it is never optimal to choose Y 6= Y FH. So
their problem reduces tomaxC;D u(C;D) s.t qCC+qDD  qCC FH+qDD FH. Necessary
and sufficient conditions for a solution are uD=uC = qD=qC and qCC + qDD =
qCC FH + qDD FH. By construction the first best consumption levels (C FH;D FH) satisfy
these conditions.
Lemma .. ere exists a tax system with T : Y 7! T(Y ) that implements the
second-best allocation A = (C L ;D L ; Y L ;C H;D H; Y H).
Proof. Fix some tC; tD such that qD=qC = (pD + e=λ)=pC. Let Tθ := Yθ   qCC θ  
qDD θ ; θ 2 fL;Hg. Define the income tax function T(Y ) as
T(Y ) =
8><>:
TL; Y = Y L
TH; Y = Y H
Y; otherwise:
An agent who faces the individual maximisation problem defined in (.) will
never choose Y 62 fY L ; Y Hg. us the agents’ problem can be decomposed into
two steps: Step  is to solve for u^(B) := maxC;D u(C;D) s.t. qCC+ qDD = B. Step 
is to solve for maxY u^(B)   Y=w subject to B = (Y L   TL) if Y = Y L ;B = (Y H  
TH) if Y = Y H; and B = 0 otherwise.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution of step  are uD=uC = qD=qC
and qCC + qDD = B. By construction the conditions are met by (C L ;D L ) if B =
Y L   TL and by (C H;D H) if B = Y H   TH. Consequently, step  is equivalent to
choosing between (C L ;D L ; Y L ) and (C H;D H; Y H). As the second-best allocation
satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints (.) and (.), each agent does
indeed choose the bundle intended for her type.
Proof of Proposition .. Under a normalised tax system, qD = pD + tD and qC =
pC. Combining Proposition . and Lemma . shows thatMRS = (pD+e=λF)=pC =
qD=qC = (pD+ t FD)=pC. It follows that t FD = e=λF. From (.), λF = (1 α)=(wH(1 
γ)). e comparative statics results follow from first derivatives.
Proof of Proposition .. Under a normalised tax system, qD = pD + tD and
qC = pC. Combining Proposition . and Lemma . shows that MRS = (pD +
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e=λ)=pC = qD=qC = (pD + t D)=pC. It follows that t D = e=λ. From (.),
λ = α=wL+(1 α)=wH. e comparative statics results follow from first deriva-
tives.
A .B SB C S
A second-best corner solution is a second-best allocation with YL = 0. In this sec-
tion I show that for some parameters this is the relevant case. I then claim that a
corner solution does not change at all if α is increased (Proposition .). ereby
I extend the comparative statics properties of Pigouvian taxation to instances of
corner solutions (Corollary .). Proposition . builds on a conjecture that gen-
eralises Lemma .. Unfortunately, I can only partially verify that conjecture
(Lemma .).
Lemma .. If A is a second-best allocation and
α  γ1  γ
1
wH
wL   1
; (.)
then A is a corner solution, i.e. YL = 0.
Proof. By contradiction, assume A is an interior solution. en it satisfies condi-
tions (.) to (.) with δ = 0. Hence μ = (1  γ)αwH=wL   γ(1  α) by (.).
But then the condition on parameters stated in the Lemma implies α   μ  0.
is, however, contradicts (.).
Remark .. Bierbrauer and Boyer () exclude corner solutions in their com-
parative statics analysis by assuming 1 > (1  γ)wH=wL. eir inequality always
holds if (.) is not satisfied, but the converse is not true. Hence, I do not expect
(.) to be a necessary condition for a corner solution.
To proceed, let me introduce some convenient notation.
Definition .. Define A(α) to be a second-best allocation, in which the welfare
weight is given by α and all other parameters are fixed. For α 0 < α 00 and θ 2
fL;Hg define U 0θ := Uθ(A(α 0)), U 00θ := Uθ(A(α 00)), and dUθ := U 00θ   U 0θ .
ite intuitively, if the taste for redistribution increases, low-type agents re-
ceive higher utility. At the same time, high-type agents have to receive lower
utility because someone has to pay for the increase in UL. e following lemma
formalises this intuition. Notice that also a zero-change in utility is possible.
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Lemma .. If α increases from α 0 to α 00, then
dUL  0  dUH:
Proof. From Definition . it follows, in particular,
α 0U 0L + (1  α 0)U 0H  α 0U 00L + (1  α 0)U 00H ) 0  α 0dUL + (1  α 0)dUH (.)
α 00U 00L + (1  α 00)U 00H  α 00U 0L + (1  α 00)U 0H ) α 00dUL + (1  α 00)dUH  0
Summing up the two implied inequalities yields dUL  dUH. Next, suppose by
contradiction that dUH > 0, then dUL > 0, but that contradicts (.). e proof
of dUL  0 is analogous.
Lemma . shows that the incentive constraint of high-type agents binds at
interior second-best allocations, given Assumption .. Its proof does not work
for corner solutions, though. By contrast, the following lemma does hold for
corner solutions, albeit under more restrictive conditions on parameters.
Lemma .. Suppose α  γ . If A is a second-best allocation, then the incentive
constraint (.) for the high-type agents is binding at A.
Proof. I first show thatmarginal utility is lower for high- than for low-type agents.
en I show that a marginal redistribution of C from high- to low-type agents in-
creases welfare and hence needs to be ruled out by a binding incentive constraint.
Otherwise the allocation cannot be second-best. In term of notation, recall that
uθ = u(Cθ;Dθ).
Claim: uC(CL;DL) > uC(CH;DH)
Case , DH  DL: then CH > CL, because, by Lemma ., u(CL;DL) < u(CH;DH).
Decreasing marginal utility and a positive cross derivative uCD  0 then imply
uC(CL;DL) > uC(CH;DL)  uC(CH;DH), hence the claim holds.
Case A,DH > DL;CH  CL: then, similar to Case , uD(CL;DL) > uD(CL;DH) 
uD(CH;DH). At an optimal allocation, uLD=uLC = uHD=uHC , hence uLD > uHD implies
uLC > uHC , as claimed.
Case B, DH > DL;CH > CL: as u is strictly concave,
uH   uL < (CH   CL)uLC + (DH   DL)uLD; and
uL   uH < (CL   CH)uHC + (DL   DH)uHD
need to hold. Rearranging the second inequality gives, in combination with the
In general, if a continuously differentiable function f is strictly concave over an open, convex
subset ofRn, then f(x) f(x0) <Pi fxi(x0)(xi x0i ), for all x; x0 from that subset. See Sydsaeter
et al. (, eorem ..) for a textbook reference.
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first,
uHD(DH   DL) + uHC(CH   CL) < uH   uL < (CH   CL)uLC + (CH   CL)uLD:
(CH CL); (DH DL) > 0, thus uHD < uLD or uHC < uLC. If one of these two inequalities
holds, the other one must hold as well, otherwise uLD=uLC = uHD=uHC cannot be true.
is completes the proof of the claim.
Now, suppose that the lemma is false, then u(CH;DH)   YH=wH > u(CL;DL)  
YL=wH at a second-best allocation. en there exist dCH; dCL satisfying dDH =
 dCLγ=(1  γ) < 0, such that the incentive constraint still holds, i.e. that u(CH +
dCH;DH)   YH=wH > u(CL + dCL;DL)   YL=wH. e modified allocation (CL +
dCL;DL; YL;CH + dCH;DH; YH) is also feasible by construction (and still satisfies
low-type agents’ incentive constraint). For dDL ! 0, the change in welfare is
approximately
dW  αuLCdCL   (1  α)uHCdCLγ=(1  γ) = dCL
 α(1  γ)uLC   (1  α)γuHC :
(.)
If α  γ , and uLC > uHC as claimed, then α(1  γ)uLC   (1  α)γuHC > 0 and welfare
increases. Hence, a contradiction.
If the welfare function is utilitarian (α = γ) or exhibits an even stronger ten-
dency to redistribute in favour of the low-type agents, high-type agents incentive
constraint must be binding. is is not a necessary condition, though. Equation
(.) shows that even with α < γ a slack incentive constraint would be impos-
sible, provided that uLC is sufficiently greater than uHC . In fact, I believe that the
constraint is binding whenever Assumption . is satisfied.
Conjecture .. If A is a second-best allocation under Assumption ., then high
types’ incentive constraint is binding at A.
e following proposition is the main result of the current section. If conjec-
ture . holds, the proposition and its two corollaries extend to all parameters
satisfying Assumption ..
Proposition .. Suppose α 0  γ . Let A(α 0) be a second-best corner solution. en
A(α 00) = A(α 0) for all α 00 > α 0.
Proof. Claim : At a corner solution all agents have the same utility level.
By Lemma ., high-type agents incentive constraint is binding. Adding (γDL+
(1   γ)DH)e to the binding incentive constraint gives UH(A(α 0)) = u(CH;DH)  
YH=wH   (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e = u(CL;DL)  (γDL + (1  γ)DH)e = UL(A(α 0)).
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Claim : UL(A(α 00)) = UH(A(α 00)).
From Lemma ., UL(A(α 00)) UL(A(α 0))  UH(A(α 00)) UH(A(α 0)). Given Claim
 this reduces to UL(A(α 00))  UH(A(α 00)). e incentive constraint of high types
implies, though, that UH(A(α 00))  UL(A(α 00)). Hence UL(A(α 00)) = UH(A(α 00)).
Claim : A(α 00) = A(α 0).
Suppose the opposite, then UL(A(α 00)) > UL(A(α 0)) by Lemma . and the fact
that solutions are unique (if they exist). But then Claims  and  imply that also
UH(A(α 00)) > UH(A(α 0)). is contradicts Lemma ..
Increasing the welfare weight of low-type agents does not change the allocation
if low-type agents already provide zero output. e only way to increase their
utility is to increase their consumption. But then high-types incentive constraint
can no longer be satisfied. us the limits of redistribution (under information
constraint) are met, once all output is produced by high-type agents:
Corollary .. Suppose α 0  γ . Let A(α 0) be a second-best corner solution. en
the Rawlsian allocation AR = limα!1 A(α) is equal to A(α 0). Also, the second-best
Pareto-frontier has a kink at [UL(AR);UH(AR)] if α 0 < 1.
Notice that it is possible that the Rawlsian allocation is not a corner solution.
Put differently, (second-best) redistribution can hit its very limit well before low-
type agents provide zero output.
Yet, if for some α < 1, low-type agents’ output does equal zero, then, conse-
quently, the comparative statics of Pigouvian taxation are also zero:
Corollary .. Suppose α  γ . Let A(α) be a second best allocation with YL = 0.
Let tD(α) be the dirty good tax of a normalised tax system that implements A(α).
en tD(α 0) = tD(α) for all α 0  α.
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A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit
him most; then he tries to estimate whether this party has any
chance of winning.
Anthony Downs, An Economic eory of Democracy, 
Proportional representation is usually not free from important
restrictions – most notably a minimum vote threshold that a party
must pass to become eligible for seats in parliament. Falling short
of such a threshold means that a vote for a party is ‘wasted’ or
‘lost’ because it does not count toward the distribution of seats in
parliament.
Meffert & Gschwend,  3
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. I
In parliamentary systems with proportional representation, the seat share of par-
ties in parliament is approximately proportional to their vote share. But to enter
parliament in the first place, a party has to receive someminimal amount of votes,
called the election threshold. An implicit threshold is present in any system and
amounts to the minimum vote share necessary to get a single seat. e implicit
threshold generally depends on the number of seats in parliament, but also on
institutional details and the distribution of votes. Beyond that, many countries
have a more restrictive explicit threshold. It typically ranges from % of votes in
Israel and Denmark to % in countries like Belgium or Germany. Russia (%) and
Turkey (%) have particularly high thresholds.
Rational voters supposedly cast their ballot only for parties that they antici-
pate to enter parliament. With respect to a majoritarian system, Duverger (,
) was the first to point out that votes are oen concentrated on two domi-
nant parties. Downs (, p. ) notes that a rational voter needs to estimates
a party’s chances of winning before voting for it. e same reasoning applies to
proportional systems with election thresholds. However, in that case, the rele-
vant question is whether a party enters parliament and, if so, whether it joins a
See Da Silva () for the recent discussion of Duverger’s Law in the political literature.
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governing coalition. Following this logic, a vote for a party that fails the threshold
is a wasted vote (Meffert and Gschwend, , p. ).
Despite this reasoning, small parties oen do get a considerable amount of votes
while failing the threshold. Extreme examples include the Russian legislative elec-
tion in , in which almost half of all votes were split among parties falling short
of the threshold. Similarly, in the  election in Turkey, about % of votes were
unrepresented in parliament.
Existing models of political competition typically neglect this issue. To fill this
gap, we consider the following seing: Two incumbent parties split the majority
of votes between themselves. A new party tries to enter parliament, but is ex-
pected to fall short of the threshold. Given this expectation, why should anyone
vote for the new party?
Using a game-theoretic approach, we show that for some voters it is in fact
strategically optimal to vote for a party that does not enter parliament at the cur-
rent election. But rather than wasted, their vote is invested – trading off influence
at the current election against future policy returns. On the other hand, some vot-
ers strategically vote for an incumbent party despite preferring the new party’s
platform.
Voters’ preferences over policies depend on their type and there is aggregate
uncertainty about the type distribution. Given their priors, citizens vote strate-
gically to maximize their expected utility. Voting takes place in two consecutive
periods. In the second period, voters update their beliefs about the type distribu-
tion, based on the first election result. is gives rise to (at least) two additional
motives to vote for a party in period one. First, these votesmay be a signal to other
supporters of the small party to vote for the party in the next election, because
its probability of entering parliament is higher under the revised prior than un-
der the initial prior. Second, these votes may induce incumbent parties to change
their platform due to updated beliefs about the number of voters that could be
aracted by a given platform. In a related work, Castanheira () focuses on
the second motive. In our analysis, we explore the first one and take party posi-
tions as exogenously given. Notice that these twomotives predict different voting
paerns over time. In particular, adapting their platforms allows incumbent par-
ties to keep entrant parties out of power; in the last period no voter supports the
entrant parties. If the entrant party is successful in our model, its vote share is
increasing over time and it might become part of the government.
We characterize an equilibrium inwhich supporters of the newpartymake their
second-period ballot decision conditional on the results of the first election. In
See www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/secim/election_results_en.shtml (retrieved March ) and
White, Wyman, and S. Oates (, Table ), respectively.
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particular, they coordinate on the new party if the party’s vote share has exceeded
some endogenous threshold. Otherwise, the entrant party will receive no votes
in the second period. Figure . outlines this investing equilibrium. Our findings
rationalize a voting behavior that looks wasteful upon first sight, but turns out to
be strategically optimal. Hence, there is no coordination failure in the sense of
inconsistent beliefs about equilibrium play.
.Election

Election

Entrant
enters
Coalition between
Le and Entrant
Pr = 1  r
Coalition between
Right and EntrantPr = r
more votesfor Entrant
Election

Entrant
disap-
pears
Le party forms
government
Pr = 1
few vo
tes
for En
trant
Period  Period 
Figure .:ree parties, Le, Right, and Entrant, compete in two consecutive elections.
In period , the Entrant party fails the election threshold. Yet, if the Entrant’s result in
the first election is sufficiently strong, the party enters parliament in period . r denotes
the fraction of supporters of the right party.
In the investing equilibrium, the first period serves as a costly coordination
stage for supporters of the entrant party. Passionate voters reveal their type by
voting for the entrant knowing that it will fail the election threshold. e costs
arise from giving up influence on parliament’s current composition.
Polls could offer a possibility to reveal types without these cost. Yet, the absence
of such a cost is also a major drawback, as the signal becomes less credible. If
polls were able to serve the signaling purpose nonetheless, the electoral paerns
motivating our model are unlikely to occur. e costs of using the vote as a signal
seem necessary in order to make the signal credible.
Our model is consistent with the paradigm of instrumental voting; voters care
exclusively about the policy impact of their vote. is is in line with empiri-
cal findings summarized in Section . suggesting that voters do use their votes
strategically. An alternative explanation goes under the heading of ‘expressive
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voting’: by voting for a particular party, a voter might want to express certain
opinions regardless of the effects on election outcomes and gain utility just from
the act of doing so. Our model suggests that voting behavior that looks expres-
sive at first sight could well be instrumental in the long run.
e rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section . provides empirical
motivation. Section . discusses related literature. en, Section . sets up the
model and Section . details on coalition formation and policy choice. Section .
gives the main results of the chapter. Section . discusses sincere voting. We
conclude in Section .. All proofs are relegated to Appendix .A.
. E M
In a survey two months before the  German national elections, % of the
respondents considered voting for the Pirate Party, which ran for the first time
for national parliament. In addition, % reported not knowing the party. e
expected vote share for the Pirate Party was % according to polls, i.e., well below
the German threshold of %. In the election, the Pirate Party received in fact %
of the votes. Hence % of the electorate voted for the Pirate Party despite its low
chance to enter parliament. On the other hand, the Pirate Party voters had reasons
to believe that the number of supporters of the Pirate Party is in fact higher than
%, namely % plus a potential fraction of people who did not know the party
yet. We offer an explanation for why these % indeed had a strategic incentive to
vote for the Pirate Party. Our model suggests that the early Pirate Party voters
played an important role for the subsequent success of the Pirate Party in recent
elections at state level.
In Austria, a new right-wing party, the BZÖ, was founded in April  by
former members of the FPÖ, another right-wing party. According to polls for the
general election , the BZÖwas expected to receive a vote share of just around
%, which is the election threshold in Austria. So there was high uncertainty on
the party’s probability to enter parliament. With an election result of .%, the
BZÖ did succeed aer all. Two years later, in the general election of , the
Hamlin and Jennings () provide an introduction to this line of thought.
e survey was conducted by TNS Emnid for Cicero, a German magazine, and published on the
rd of July .
e Pirates received .% in the state of Berlin in , and .% in Saarland, another German
state, in . ey entered parliament in both states. For a reference, see www.dw.de/cdu-
holds-its-own-in-saarland/a--, retrieved May .
A party enters parliament in Austria, if it wins more than % of the votes or if it crosses a
particular threshold of the valid votes in one of the  regional electoral districts. See also
Solsten ().
Meffert and Gschwend () provide extended discussion of the  election.
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BZÖ more than doubled its vote share to .%. It seems likely that a significant
fraction of voters preferred the BZÖ already in , but refrained from voting for
the BZÖ for fear of wasting their vote, as the BZÖmight have missed the election
threshold. In , these voters went for the BZÖ, as there was less uncertainty
about the BZÖ entering parliament. Our model can explain such a jump in the
vote share without a change in voters’ preferences.
e German Green Party was founded in  and failed to pass the % thresh-
old in the national election of the same year. ey obtained a significant fraction
of .% of the votes, though. In the  national election, they successfully passed
the threshold. We argue that this success would not have been possible, had they
received insufficiently many votes in . Hence, their  voters did not waste
their votes but effectively invested them.
On the other hand, our model predicts that if a new party falls short of an en-
dogenous threshold in the first election, its support disappears. ere are numer-
ous examples of such developments. Consider, for instance, Proud of the Nether-
lands, a party founded in . Although early polls showed the party to win up
to %, it gained a vote share of only .% or , votes in its first general elec-
tion in . is is slightly below the Dutch election threshold of / to enter
parliament. Although the party merged with another one to compete in the 
general election, its election results decreased significantly to .% or , votes.
Another example is Action for Democratic Progress, a party founded in  in
Germany to protest against the German Emergency Acts. e party participated
in the federal election of , but gained a vote share of only .%, i.e., less than
, votes. e very same year, the party was dissolved.
. R L
We contribute to the literature on communicative voting, in which voting deci-
sions are used as a signaling device. We introduce a model which specifically
captures the uncertainty about the support of a new party. Our seing fits the
multi-party election system with proportional representation which is typical for
continental Europe. Parties have to pass an election threshold to enter parliament.
ese thresholds create non-trivial voting incentives, which are at the heart of our
Notice, though, that our analysis has to be changed slightly to a fit the BZÖ case. We present
a more clear-cut version in which, along the equilibrium path, the small party actually has no
chance of entering parliament in the first period.
See: www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Na/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=,
www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives///new_dpkp_party_marks_a_turning_.php,
www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/fruehere_bundestagswahlen/btw.html;
all retrieved June , .
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analyses. Related contributions differ not only with respect to the relevant set-
ting but also with respect to the modeling of uncertainty and the addressees of
the signal.
Razin () employs a one-period model with common values, in which elec-
tion results are informative for the legislature about some shock affecting the
country. is allows candidates beer to adapt policies to the state of the world.
In our model, the signal is aimed at the electorate rather than the legislature. We
analyze competition between three parties (as opposed to two, as in ibid.). ere-
fore we can address the coordination problem of voters that arises if each party
needs some minimal support to have any effect on policy.
Pikey () allows voters to signal their information about the state of the
world by electing specific candidates. ey want to influence future voting be-
havior. e two-period horizon is similar to our seing. Yet, in Pikey’s model,
voters are uncertain about the optimal policy and the candidate they prefer. In
our model, every voter knows with certainty which party she prefers, but is un-
certain about the preferences of other citizens. e problem of coordination is not
prominent in Pikey’s paper, because only two alternatives are offered in each
of the elections; two candidates compete in the first election and the winner is
challenged by a third candidate in the second election.
In the model proposed by Castanheira (), the position of the median voter
on a one-dimensional policy space is unknown. Four parties compete under ma-
joritarian rule in two consecutive elections. Aer the first election, voters update
their beliefs about the true position of the median voter. Votes for an extreme
party signal that the median voter is at a more extreme position. Given updated
beliefs, parties might reallocate their platforms for the next election. Voting for
“losers” is a rational strategic choice so as to induce parties to change their policy
offers.
In our contribution, voters have incentives to vote for “losers” as well; however,
they do not send a signal to parties but rather to other voters. e question is not
whether parties adjust their platforms, but whether they have sufficient support
to enter parliament. Ex ante there is no clear answer to this question, because
there is uncertainty about voters’ types.
In Meirowitz and Shos (), there is uncertainty about voters’ preferences,
as well. Two candidates compete in two consecutive elections. Aer the first
election beliefs are updated and candidatesmight reallocate their platforms for the
next election. ey show that for large electorates the signaling effect dominates
We take it as given that three parties compete, but presume one to be new and small. e
question whether a new party emerges at all is addressed by Palfrey (). In his model,
incumbent parties may anticipate entry of new parties and adopt their policies in advance in
order to prevent entry.
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any pivot effects. e reason is that the probability of being pivotal converges to
zero very fast while every vote can signal at least some information.
In all of the above papers, voters’ types are independently and identically dis-
tributed. We assume aggregate uncertainty in the sense that the joint distribution
of voters’ types is random. is distribution is drawn according to a commonly
known second-order distribution. In contrast to the first approach, this aggregate
uncertainty does not depend on the number of voters. In particular, our approach
ensures uncertainty even for a large number of voters. For the same reason, Bier-
brauer and Hellwig () use this approach in a public economics seing.
Coalition formation plays a central role in proportional elections. In contrast to
the aforementioned contributions, we include coalitional bargaining in ourmodel.
erefore, sub-majority parties in parliament can also influence policy. We build
upon the proto-coalition bargainingmodel of Baron and Diermeier (). eir
two-dimensional policy space is able to capture a situation that is typical for the
emergence of a new party. Namely, incumbent parties differ with regard to tra-
ditional issues, but have similar views on a new issue such that parliament does
not reflect different opinions on that new issue. A new party emerges for the
very reason to represent this new issue or some hitherto unrepresented opinion.
Examples include green parties which promoted environmental protection or the
Pirate Party with its focus on digital rights.
We adapt the Baron and Diermeier (ibid.) seing in various respects. First, we
assume that the distribution of voters’ preferences is uncertain. Second, we in-
clude an intensity parameter in voters’ preferences. ird, we introduce a second
election period. is gives rise to communicative voting motives that drive our
model. Furthermore, we make specific assumptions about the peaks of the par-
ties and the distribution of voters in order to capture the particular situation that
makes the election threshold interesting. We also slightly adapt the bargaining
procedure.
In terms of empirical literature, we relate to studies that investigate strategic
voting. Bargsted and Kedar () examine elections in Israel in . ey
Further prominent contributions on coalitional bargaining with a focus on political economy
include Baron and Ferejohn (), and Austen-Smith and Banks (). ey do not match
our seing as well as Baron and Diermeier (), though. Baron and Ferejohn () concen-
trate on the bargaining between legislators who serve their own district, but do not include
a general election stage. Austen-Smith and Banks () propose a more complete model of
the political process. Similar to our model, they consider three parties, strategic voters, and
endogenous coalition formation. However, they focus on parties’ platform choice, whereas
our main aention is on voters’ decisions. Furthermore, their one-dimensional policy space
is not rich enough for our purposes.
Meffert and Gschwend (, pp. -) provide a long list of evidence for strategic voting in
different countries.
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find that the set of perceived coalition possibilities had a profound influence on
voter ballots in the sense that it induced non-sincere voting, i.e., voting for parties
other than the most preferred one. Baron and Diermeier (, p. ) provide
another example for strategic voting behavior in which supporters of a larger
party vote for a small party to make them enter parliament. Similarly, Shikano,
Herrmann, and urner (, p. ) “show that voters’ preferences, rather than
mapping directly into party choice, are affected by their expectations on small
parties’ re-entry chances.” Meffert and Gschwend () conduct a laboratory
experiment embedded in a state-level election in Germany in . Participants
in their study were able to formmeaningful expectations about election outcomes
and possible coalitions. McCuen and Morton () also show strategic voting
under proportional representation in a laboratory experiment.
Sobbrio and Navarra () explicitly investigate communicative motives in
voting. For a sample of  European countries, they find that voting for a “sure
loser” is associated with higher education. ey see this as evidence that voters
consider more than one election period in their voting decision.
Finally, Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni () propose a model of civil protest
against repressive regimes. In a first period, a small group of protesters take to
the streets to signal their type. If their protest reaches a critical size, it triggers a
mass protest able to overthrow the dictator. Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni (ibid.)
back their theory with an empirical analysis, according to which more repressive
regimes tend to be more stable, but protests that do occur pose a higher threat to
them. e more repressive a regime, the higher the costs of failed protest. Initial
protest is then less likely to occur but constitutes a stronger signal.
. M
Society consists of n citizens and has to make a two-dimensional policy choice
x = (a; b) 2 X = [0; 1] [0; 1]:
ree parties, called Le (L), Right (R), and Entrant (E) compete for proportional
representation in parliament. In the ballot, each citizen casts a vote for one of
the parties. Parties receiving less than τ < n=4 votes do not get any seats in
parliament. e seat share of a party that enters parliament equals its vote share
corrected for votes unrepresented in parliament. e parties entering parlia-
ment bargain to form a government (coalition) which needs to hold at least a
For the sake of tractability, we abstract from non-divisibility issues of seats. Hence, a party’s
seat share equals the number of its votes divided by the sum of votes of those parties that enter
parliament.
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simple majority, i.e., half the seats. Government chooses policy. e model con-
sists of two consecutive election periods. Fundamentals stay constant over time,
but beliefs may change.
Our analysis focuses on voters’ ballot decisions rather than on the question
whether to vote at all. Voters in our model have a strictly positive benefit from
voting, so our results are robust if voting costs are sufficiently small. Alterna-
tively, consider voters who have already made their way to the voting booth.
Now they just need to decide which party to vote for. is is the decision we
analyze.
.. P
Each party J 2 fL; R; Eg is characterized by its peak (aJ; bJ). Each period, parties
gain utility uJ(x) from policy x, and might receive benefits sJ from holding office,
like positions in the cabinet or seats on the boards of public companies. Party
J ’s overall utility in any given period is
U J(x; sJ) = uJ(x) + sJ =  (a  aJ)2   (b  bJ)2 + sJ :
e total spoils of holding office are S > 0. e parties split these spoils among
them such thatPJ sJ = S. In addition, sJ  0 if J is not in government: parties
outside the governing coalition cannot be forced by coalition members to pay the
ruling parties; thus a negative value of sJ is allowed only for coalitions members.
Note that the specification allows for unlimited side payments among members
of the government.
We interpret the first policy dimension as a traditional issue (‘le vs. right’)
over which the incumbent parties L and R struggle. L prefers a = 0, hence aL = 0;
while aR = 1. e second policy dimension, b, is new in the sense that it has not
been much of an issue in the past. is is reflected in identical peaks, namely
bL = bR = 0. e entrant party E disagrees on the new issue and likes to initiate
a change in b by offering a political alternative, thus bE = 1. Let it emerge from
the le spectrum such that aE = 0. To summarize, we have
(aL; bL) = (0; 0); (aR; bR) = (1; 0); (aE; bE) = (0; 1):
e paradox of not voting is the focus of a related signaling-voting model recently proposed by
Aytimur, Boukouras, and Schwager ().
For a detailed discussion of sJ see Baron and Diermeier (, p. ).
Our results would be the same for a symmetric variation of the model in which the new party
emerged from the right spectrum. e new party could also position itself somewhere between
le and right. is would require a richer model in terms of voter preferences, though, and
would complicate the model without enhancing the insights with respect to the investment
equilibrium.
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Parties cannot make binding commitments. Aer each election, a bargaining
process determines the policy in the current period. Only parties represented
in parliament participate in the bargaining. Section . provides details about
bargaining and policy choice.
.. V
Voters have preferences on policies. ey differ, in particular, with respect to the
salience of the two policy dimensions. A voter of type θ i  (ai; bi; α i) 2 Θ has
the per-period utility function
u(x; θ i) =  α i(a  ai)2   (1  α i)(b  bi)2;
where (ai; bi) corresponds to the peak with respect to the two policy dimensions
and α i 2 (0; 1) describes the relative salience of the two dimensions from the
perspective of the voter. ere is a common discount factor δ > 0. e second
period can alternatively be interpreted as some long-run steady state spanning
multiple periods. In that case, δ serves as a weighting factor and might be above
1.
To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider only four different types
of voters: le (θL), right (θR), passionate (θP) and moderate (θM), with
θL = (0; 0; 1=2); θR = (1; 0; 1=2); θP = (0; 1; αP); θM = (0; 1; αM):
Le and right types mirror the preferences of the respective parties. Traditional
and new issues are of equal importance to them. e supporters of the entrant
party share its peak, but differ in their assessment of the importance of the new
policy dimension b. Some of them are more passionate for the new issue, while
others have a stronger aachment to the traditional issue and are hence more
moderate in their support for the entrant. Formally, we have αP < αM. Figure .
depicts the preferences of the four types.
e distribution of voter types is unknown. In contrast to previous literature,
in which voters’ types are determined by iid draws, the whole distribution of
voters’ types is drawn at once from a joint distribution. is creates aggregate
uncertainty, even for large electorates. Let Nj be the random number of voters of
type θ j. We denote a distribution of voters’ types by N = (NR;NL;NM;NP) with
NR + NL + NM + NP = n. N is randomly drawn according to a common prior
P. rough the following assumption concerning the support of P, we restrict
aention to the specific scenarios addressed in the introduction.
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Figure .: Black dots depict the peaks of the four types. Circles and ellipses indicate
typical indifference curves. Notice that passionates and moderates share the same peak,
but differ with respect to the relative importance of the two issues.
Assumption .. e prior P is such that there are constants nR 2 (τ; n=2) and
nM  3, and
Pr(NR = nR) = 1; Pr(NL = y)
(
> 0 if τ < y < n=2  1
= 0 otherwise
Pr(NM = y)
(
> 0 if nM  y < τ
= 0 otherwise ; Pr(NP = y)
(
> 0 if y < τ   2
= 0 otherwise
Assumption . is illustrated in Figure .. It guarantees that the number of
voters on the right wing, NR = nr, and on the le wing, NL + NM + NP = n  nR,
are known, e.g., due to previous (non-modeled) elections. e distribution within
the le wing is uncertain, though. None of the two groups of entrant supporters
.
0 nM τ nR n=2
NR
NLNP
NM
Figure .:e figure illustrates Assumption .. e number of right types, NR, is know
to equal nR, strictly between the election threshold τ and an outright majority. e num-
bers of passionates, NP, moderates, NM, and le types, NL, are random variables. eir
support is known to be in the depicted intervals.
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is able to meet the election threshold on its own. Jointly they have a chance to
do so. e specification allows for a correlation of NP and NM, but we do not
require it. e number of moderate types has a commonly known lower limit of
nM. Finally, both L and R have more than τ supporters but less than the absolute
majority of voters. Notice that Assumption . restricts the support, but not the
probabilities.
.. T E G
ere are two consecutive elections. Each consists of a ballot, in which all voters
cast their vote, and a subsequent bargaining stage, in which parties determine
policy. e exact timing is a follows:
t = 0 N is drawn according to prior P, voters learn their own type θ i.
t = 1 Voting takes place.
– Parties above the election threshold enter parliament.
– Coalition bargaining determines the governing coalition.
– e governing coalition implements policy, payoffs are realized.
t = 1:5 Voters observe the result of the first election and update their beliefs.
t = 2 Repetition of t = 1.
Notice that nature only turns once, at the beginning of the game; the preference
distribution remains constant during the whole game but is not public informa-
tion. erefore, voters will want to update their beliefs using the first election
result in order to make beer-informed decisions in period two.
We detail on the coalitional bargaining stage in Section .. For now, suppose
that policy in period t is given by some random variable X t. At each election,
voters (correctly) anticipate the bargaining outcome. We consider the follow-
ing election game: Let v tJ be the number of votes for party J in period t, and
let V t := f(v tR; v tL; v tE) 2 N30j
P
J v tJ = ng be the set of all possible results in
period t. Recall that Θ is the type set. Behavior of voter i is given by a pure
strategy σ i = (σ1i ; σ2i ), which specifies voting decisions σ1i : Θ ! fR; L; Eg for
period one, and σ2i : (Θ;V 1) ! fR; L; Eg for period two. Each strategy profile
σ := fσ1; : : : ; σ i; : : : ; σng induces distributions of votes, v1(σ) and v 2(σ), which
are random due to the uncertainty about N. Parties’ vote shares determine their
Notice that our strategy definition is restrictive. In general, the second-period voting decision
could depend not only on voters’ type and the previous election outcome but also on the
parties’ action and first-period policy. Our main results, however, remain valid if we allow for
these general strategies.
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seat shares, accounting for those parties failing the election threshold. Policy is
endogenously derived from parties’ seat shares, as detailed in Section .. us
there is a mapping X t(σ) from strategy profiles into the policy space. e map-
ping is random due to the randomness in types and the nature of the bargaining
process.
Anticipating policy choice X t(σ), voter i chooses strategy σ i in order to maxi-
mize expected utility
U(σ i; σ i; θ i) = E[u(X 1(σ i; σ i); θ i)jθ i] + δE[u(X 2(σ i; σ i); θ i)jθ i];
given the strategy profile σ i of all other voters. We look for a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the election game.
. C B
Aer each election, the parties represented in parliament determine policy. If a
party has a seat share of more than %, this party alone decides about policy and
receives all spoils of office. If no party has such a majority, a coalition is necessary
to form government. en one party is randomly selected to be the proposer. e
selection probability is equal to the seat share. e proposer makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to a subset of parties that (including the proposer) holds at least
% of seats in the parliament. e offer specifies a policy and a distribution of
the spoils of office sJ. All members of the proposed coalition have to accept the
proposal; if at least one of them rejects, a default policy is implemented and no
party gains any spoils of office.
e default policy is linked to the (non-modeled) past. As we model an old
struggle over the traditional issue only, a natural candidate for the default policy
is the one who emerges as a compromise between le and right. We thus assume
e solution concept allows only for uncertainty about the distribution of policy preferences
in the population. ere is no strategic uncertainty, because voters know which strategy is
played by other voters. It is embedded in the equilibrium concept that every voter correctly
anticipates others’ strategies. ere is no coordination failure in the sense that some voters
believe equilibrium A is played, while others play equilibrium B. By using Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, we highlight the effects that arise from the unknown type distribution N.
is modeling of a coalitional bargaining process within a general election model was pro-
posed by Baron and Diermeier (). We make the simplification that coalitional bargaining
only takes place if necessary, i.e., if no party has more than % of seats. In terms of empir-
ical evidence, the Baron-Diermeier model is supported by Diermeier and Merlo (), who
explore data of coalition formation in  European countries spanning the years –.
ey find that a selection probability corresponding to seat shares fits the data quite well and
outperforms selection according to the seat share ranking.
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that the default policy xd is equal to (1=2; 0). e results do not depend on this
specific value, but are robust to some perturbations, as shown in Lemma . below.
Due to the quasi-linearity of parties’ preferences in spoils of office, the policy
implemented by some coalition depends only on the preferences of its members,
not on the default policy nor the relative seat shares within the coalition. e
default policy does determine how the spoils of office are distributed between
coalition members. ose are not relevant for voters, though.
What is important to voters is that for each possible coalition there is a unique
induced policy. erefore, the ballot affects the probability distribution over the
set of possible coalitions. In fact, no more than four policies are possible as out-
comes of the bargaining game when we restrict aention to elections in which
the Entrant misses an outright majority.
Lemma .. Let the seat share of party E be below %. en in any equilibrium
and in any period the coalition resulting from coalitional bargaining is fLg, fL; Eg,
fRg or fR; Eg and the respective policy is xL, xLE, xR or xRE with
xL = (0; 0); xLE =
 0; 1=2 ; xR = (1; 0); xRE =  1=2; 1=2 :
Furthermore, if no party has an outright majority of more than %, it is optimal for
R to propose coalition fR; Eg and for L and E to propose fL; Eg.
With respect to conditional probabilities of equilibrium policies, Lemma .
implies the following. If E fails to enter, xL occurs with probability
Pr[v tL > v tR] + Pr[v tL = v tR]=2
while xR occurs with complementary probability. Neither xLE nor xRE occurs. If
all three parties enter parliament and each receives less than % of votes, then
xLE occurs with probability [v tL(σ)+ v tE(σ)]=n and xRE occurs with complementary
probability v tR(σ)=n.
Figure . illustrates the location of possible equilibrium policies. ese do
not depend on the seat shares. A coalition of, say, Right and Entrant will always
implement xRE, independently of their relative size. e seat share does determine
the likelihood of the respective policies, though. e default policy is relevant for
the proposer’s decision which coalition to opt for. e Right Party, for instance,
is is true also for more complex bargaining structures where parties can make counter-
proposals. In this case, reservation utilities of parties depend on their endogenous contin-
uation values rather than default policies. Party preferences over spoils and policies ensure
that the policy implemented by coalition C does not depend on the particular bargaining pro-
cess. For further discussion, see Baron and Diermeier ().

. e Investing Equilibrium
.
(0; 1)
(0; 0) (1; 0)
(1; 1)
xLE xRE
xL xR
xd
Figure .:e coalitional bargaining process has a limited number of policy outcomes.
ere will either be a single-party government of Le or Right, implementing xL or xR, or
a two-party coalition including the Entrant, implementing xLE or xRE.
proposes to the Entrant because the default would be very bad for the Entrant
and thus the Entrant is willing to accept a high side payment to Right in order to
prevent the status quo. Right can thus secure a high overall payoff. Its optimal
proposal could change if the default policy was located elsewhere. But, according
to the following result, Lemma . is in fact robust to some perturbation in xd.
Lemma .. Lemma . is valid for all default policies xd = (ad; bd) with
xd 2 f(ad; bd) 2 [0; 1]2 j bd  1=4  ad and a2d + b2d  1=3g:
Having analyzed party behavior aer an election, we now turn to the voting
decision and to the question why a voter should support a small party that is
expected to fail at the election threshold.
. T I E
Put yourself in the situation of a voter in the booth. Le and right types expect
their preferred parties to enter parliament and can vote sincerely. Supporters of
the small party have a harder time. ey like E to enter parliament which requires
voting for E. On the other hand, if the Entrant fails the election threshold, a vote
for the Entrant is wasteful, and voters would be beer off voting for the le party.
If the probability of E failing the threshold is sufficiently high, voting for them is
thus never optimal in a one-shot game. e existence of a second period changes
the game, though. Suppose it is certain that E will make it into parliament in
On the other hand, if the default policy is outside the set given in Lemma ., the parties propose
different coalitions: If bd > 1=4, then R proposes a coalition with L, as the default policy is
very bad for L in this case. If ad < 1=4, then Emakes R an offer, as the default policy puts R at
disadvantage. Finally, if a2d + b2d > 1=3, R proposes a grand coalition of all three parties.
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t = 2 if passionate and moderates coordinate on voting for them. en voting E is
optimal in t = 2 and all supporters of the entrant are quite happy with the policy
outcome. Call this the entrance scenario.
Now suppose voting in period one affects the probability of the entrance sce-
nario. is additional incentive could induce supporters of the entrant to vote for
the entrant even though this is wasteful in the short run. We show that this is
indeed the case: passionate types vote for the entrant in the first period, actually
knowing for sure that E will miss the threshold. By using their vote as a signal,
they change the beliefs about the type distribution and foster the entrance sce-
nario in the second period. Moderate types choose their second-best alternative
in the first period and only jump the entrant bandwagon if it promises success in
period two. To simplify the exposition of the investing equilibrium, we impose
the following assumption on the prior P.
Assumption .. Voters of type θR are rather pivotal in the decision between R and
L than in the decision whether E hits the equilibrium threshold. In particular,
2Pr NL + NM 2 fnR; nR   1gjθR > δPr NP = τ   nMjθR 3nRn   1 :
Assumption . simplifies exposition. But there is an outcome-equivalent equi-
librium which works without Assumption . (see Proposition .). Also, for
nR=n  1=3, the assumption is trivially satisfied.
Proposition .. For every prior P consistent with Assumptions . and ., the fol-
lowing strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if αP is sufficiently small
and αM is sufficiently large, as specified by conditions (.) and (.) in the proof.
• Le and right types vote for their respective party in both periods.
• Passionate types vote for E in the first period, while moderate types vote for L:
In the second period, they both vote for E if the first-period votes of E, v 1E , meet
a threshold e, defined as
e = τ + 1  nM
Otherwise all of them vote for L.
On the equilibrium path, the entrant party gets a positive vote share that is
below the election threshold in the first election. It is common knowledge that
it will not enter parliament. Nevertheless, passionate voters have an incentive
to vote for the entrant in order to increase the probability of entry in the next
election. In the second period, the new party either receives no votes at all or gets
sufficient votes to enter parliament. While the entrant aracts only passionate
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supporters in the first period, once it has established itself its electorate becomes
more moderate.
Corollary .. In the investing equilibrium, the ex-ante probability that the new
party E enters parliament is Pr(NP  τ + 1   nM), the probability of sufficient
passionate supporters.
Aer the first election, voters believe that the number of passionate voters
equals v 1E , the votes for the entrant party. us, the entrant has sufficient support
to meet the threshold τ if v 1E  τ   nM. Yet, the equilibrium threshold e departs
from that value as+1 is added to the threshold. is guarantees entry (conditional
on meeting e) even if a non-passionate voter pretends to be a passionate type by
voting E in t = 1. As a consequence, the in-equilibrium incentives of passionate
and moderate voters have an identical structure. For both types, voting L instead
of E yields a short-term benefit of
Pr[pivotaljθ i]   u(xL; θ i)  u(xR; θ i)
as voting L increases the chances of L rather than R building the first-period gov-
ernment. In the long run, however, voting E rather than L creates an additional
value of
δPr[pivotaljθ i] 
nRu(xRE; θ i) + (n  nR)u(xLE; θ i)
n   u(xL; θ
i)

;
as voting for E in period 1 increases the entrant party’s probability to enter parlia-
ment in period 2. While the probabilities and the gains from changing the election
outcome differ for the two types of entrant supporters, the basic trade-off between
short- and long-run effects is the same. is analogy requires adding +1 to the
endogenous threshold. Otherwise, there is a chance that a moderate voter voting
for E triggers coordination for E in a state in which entrant supporters fall short
of the threshold τ . is results in R having an outright majority and implement-
ing xR, the worst outcome for entrant supporters. e +1 excludes this case for
individual deviations.
We call a voter ‘passionate’ if the long-run incentives outweigh the short-run
benefits, and ‘moderate’ otherwise. While both effects are small, as they depend
on the probability of being pivotal, they are both on the same scale.
To be precise, voting for E has a long-run benefit for entrant supporter i only if α i < 3=(nR=n+
3). Otherwise, this voter cares so much about the traditional dimension that she prefers the
certain alternative xL over the loery with xLE and xRE.We thank Daniel Krämer for bringing that point to our aention.
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Robustness
It is possible to describe the investing equilibrium without Assumption ..
Proposition .. For every prior P consistent with Assumption ., the following
strategies constitute a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if αP is sufficiently small and αM
is sufficiently large, as specified by conditions (.) and (.) in the proof of Proposi-
tion ..
• Le and right types vote for their respective party in both periods.
• Passionate types vote for E in the first period, while moderate types vote for L:
In the second period, they both vote for E if the first period votes of E, v 1E , meet
a threshold e, defined as
e =
(
τ + 1  nM +maxf0; nR   v 1Rg; if nR=n > 1=3
τ + 1  nM; if nR=n  1=3:
Otherwise all of them vote for L.
For nR=n > 1=3, right types favor entry of the entrant party over an absolute
majority of the le party. us, they might want to deviate from the equilibrium
path by voting for E. To guarantee that such a deviation is not profitable, the
endogenous threshold increases if less than nR votes for R are observed in t = 1.
On the other hand, if nR=n  1=3, then right types prefer an absolute le majority
over the entrance of E. If they could raise the threshold by voting L (instead of
R), they might want to do so to decrease chances of entrance of E in t = 2. To
eliminate this incentive, the threshold is independent of v 1R in the case of nR=n 
1=3.
So far, we concentrated on one particular equilibrium. e investing equilib-
rium serves our goal of explaining voting paerns as described in our motivation.
In the following, we discuss another natural equilibrium candidate.
. S V
Voting is sincere if a voter chooses to vote for the party that matches the voter’s
preferences most closely. With two alternatives, sincere voting typically is a
weakly dominant strategy, which makes it a prominent candidate for predicting
behavior. Indeed, many political models take sincere voting for granted. With
more than two alternatives, however, there is typically no dominant strategy, not
even in the weak sense. is is true for our model as well. e question whether
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sincere voting is strategically optimal is far from trivial. We present a negative
result in the following proposition.
Proposition .. For any prior consistent with Assumptions ., sincere voting is not
an equilibrium of the game.
e intuition is that voters learn the distribution of types aer the first elec-
tion. erefore, they can increase their utility by making their voting decision
dependent on this information. In particular, a moderate voter can deviate to L
instead of E in the second period, if she knows that E cannot enter parliament as
the number of moderate and passionate types in the population is too low.
is points to a second equilibrium candidate: In the first period, everyone
votes sincerely. But if voters learn that E cannot enter parliament, moderate and
passionate types vote for L instead of E in the second period. Otherwise, there is
sincere voting in the second period also. We call this strategy conditionally sincere
voting. Notice that this strategy – at least in the second period – is similar to the
strategies used in the investing equilibrium. Yet, we show that conditionally sin-
cere voting is not always optimal, even under a condition in which the investing
equilibrium exists. To see why, consider a moderate voter switching to L in the
first period. Define P L as the change in probabilities of L forming the government
caused by such behavior.
P L :=12Pr [NP + NM < τ ^ NL 2 fnR   1; nRg] + Pr [NP + NM = τ ^ NL  nR] +
+
1
2Pr [NP + NM = τ ^ NL = nR   1] :
ere are three terms. First, the new party does not pass the threshold anyhow
and does not enter parliament. en the voter could be pivotal in the decision
between L and R. e second and third terms capture the case of the new party
missing the threshold exactly for the one voter.
Assumption .. A moderate type is rather pivotal in the decision between R and L
than in the decision whether E enters parliament. In particular,
4P L >

4  nRn (1 + δ)

Pr [NP + NM = τj θM]:
Given this assumption, a voter of type θM has a profitable deviation if she is
sufficiently moderate.
All probabilities are conditional on θ i = θM. e dependence is suppressed for notational
convenience.
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Proposition .. For any prior P consistent with Assumptions . and ., condition-
ally sincere voting is not an equilibrium of the game if αM is sufficiently large, as
specified by equation (.) in the proof.
In the corresponding one-period model, sincere voting is no equilibrium either.
Corollary .. Consider a one-shot version of the model with only one election pe-
riod. Sincere voting is not an equilibrium of the game for any prior consistent with
Assumptions . and . if αM is sufficiently large, as specified by equation (.) with
δ = 0.
Finally, we conclude that the result of Proposition . is consistent with previ-
ous results.
Lemma .. For every prior consistent with Assumptions . and ., there are αP
and αM such that condition (.) in the proof of Proposition . and conditions (.)
and (.) in the proof of Proposition . are satisfied.
erefore, for some parameter values the investing equilibrium exists, while
neither sincere voting nor conditionally sincere voting are equilibria. en the
investing equilibrium can explain the observed voting paern while sincere vot-
ing cannot.
. C
In this chapter, we set up a model in which voters coordinate their voting in-
tentions by using their votes as a signal. is allows others to learn about the
distribution of preferences in the population. If passionate supporters of a new
party are convinced about its importance, they vote for this new party, although
they lose their influence on the composition of parliament in the current election.
However, they might influence the results of future elections by pushing more
moderate supporters to vote for the new party in future elections.
By extending the time horizon of voters’ perceptions, we offer a strategic ex-
planation for a voting behavior that looks wasteful at first sight. e explanation
is also valid in situations when sincere voting is not strategically optimal.
Our results suggest some paths for future research. While we concentrate on
election thresholds in a proportional system, the basic intuition carries over to
majoritarian systems. ere are differences, though, as the effective election
threshold in a majoritarian system is an endogenous object equal to the mini-
mum number of votes to secure a majority. Including the possibility to abstain
from voting might prove interesting as well. In such an extension, the emerging
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new party might get initial support from former non-voters. e idea would be
that non-voters did not vote because they are more or less indifferent between the
incumbent parties. Voting for the new party is thus less costly for them even if
the party fails the threshold. In this respect, such voters mirror the preferences of
the passionates types in our model. Another field in which the basic result of our
model might be applied are the dynamics of civil protests. Starting a civil protest
can involve high personal cost, but yields the prospect of others joining in once a
movement has gained a critical mass. Meirowitz and Tucker () and Kricheli,
Livne, and Magaloni () analyze these kinds of scenarios, albeit with quite a
different modeling approach.
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A .A P
Proof of Lemma .. If either L or R has strictly more than % of seats, this party
implements its peak. If neither has an outright majority, then a coalition of any
two parties holds at least % of seats. Suppose party J is the proposer and pro-
poses coalition C. If it makes an offer that is not accepted, xd is implemented and
no spoils are distributed. Such an outcome is dominated by proposing xd along-
side an equal share of S to all parties. us, we are looking for the best offer that
is accepted. Obviously, party J always proposes sI = 0 to any party I outside the
coalition C. en the optimal proposal of party J for coalition C solves
max
a;b;sJ;s J
uJ(a; b) + sJ
subject to uK(a; b) + sK  uK(xd) 8K 2 C and
X
K2C
sK  S:
Note that the solution of that problem maximizes PK2C uK. We calculate the
optimal proposal for the three possible proposers.
. L as proposer:
In a coalition with R, policy (1=2; 0) will be implemented. As this is equal to xd, L
can grab all spoils of office and gets utility uL(xd) + S =  1=4 + S.
In a coalition with E, policy xLE = (0; 1=2) will be implemented. E likes xLE much
beer than xd and is actually willing to “pay” L for offering a coalition. In fact, E is
willing to accept sE = uE(xd) uE(xLE) =  1. Hence L gets utility uL(xLE)+S+1 =
3=4 + S which is bigger than its utility from a coalition with R.
If L proposes a grand coalition containing all three parties, the value-maximizing
policy is xLRE = (1=3; 1=3). Furthermore, the necessary payments to coalition
members are sR = uR(xd) uR(xLRE) = 11=36 and sE = uE(xd) uE(xLRE) =  25=36.
us, L receives utility uL(xLRE) + S  11=36 + 25=36 = S + 1=6 which is smaller
than its utility from a coalition with E only. If L has exactly % of seats, it could
propose a single-party government and receive 0+ S if L is chosen as proposer. L
prefers, however, to propose a coalition with E and policy xLE = (0; 1=2).
. R proposes a coalition with E and a policy offer xRE = (1=2; 1=2), as
UR =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
uR(xRE) + uE(xRE)  uE(xd) + S = 1=4 + S in a coalition with E
uR(xRL) + uL(xRL)  uL(xd) + S =  1=4 + S in a coalition with L
uR(xRLE) + uL(xRLE)  uL(xd)
+uE(xRLE)  uE(xd) + S = 1=6 + S in a grand coalition
uR(xR) = 0 + S in a single-party gov’t.
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. E proposes a coalition with L and a policy offer xLE = (0; 1=2), as
UE =
8>>>><>>>>:
uE(xLE) + uL(xLE)  uL(xd) + S =  1=4 + S in a coalition with L
uE(xRE) + uR(xRE)  uR(xd) + S =  3=4 + S in a coalition with R
uE(xRLE) + uL(xRLE)  uL(xd)
+uR(xRLE)  uR(xd) + S =  5=6 + S in a grand coalition.
Proof of Lemma .. We only have to consider the case when no party has an
absolute majority. Given a coalition C, the implemented policy just depends on
themembers of the coalitionC and remains unchanged fromLemma .. Differing
the default policy only changes the distribution of the spoils of office. Denote the
default policy xd by (a; b). Again, we go through the cases of the three possible
proposers.
. L proposes LE if b  a and a2 + b2   1=6 + 2a, as
U L =
8><>:
 1=2 + S + a2 + (1  b)2 in a coalition with E
 1=2 + S + (1  a)2 + b2 in a coalition with R
 4=3 + S + a2 + (1  a)2 + b2 + (1  b)2 in a grand coalition.
. R proposes RE if b  1=4 and a2 + b2  1=3, as
U R =
8><>:
 1 + S + a2 + (1  b)2 in a coalition with E
 1=2 + S + a2 + b2 in a coalition with L
 4=3 + S + 2a2 + b2 + (1  b)2 in a grand coalition.
. E proposes LE if a  1=4 and a2 + b2   1=6 + 2a, as
UE =
8><>:
 1 + S + (1  a)2 + b2 in a coalition with R
 1=2 + S + a2 + b2 in a coalition with L
 4=3 + S + a2 + (1  a)2 + 2b2 in a grand coalition.
In summary, all the conditions are satisfied if b  1=4  a and a2+ b2  1=3.
Proof of Proposition .. Using backward induction, we begin with the second
period. First, let party E’s vote share in period one be small, i. e., v 1E < e. Accord-
ing to the equilibrium strategies, v 2 = (v 2R ; v 2L ; v 2E ) = (nr; n   nr; 0). en, given
Assumption ., L has an outright majority, forms a single-party government, and
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implements xL = (0; 0). An individual deviation will make a difference only if L
looses its outright majority. If it does, it will result in either a tie between R and
L or an outright majority for R. Both alternatives are worse for le, moderate,
and passionate types. So these voters cannot profit from a deviation. A right type
would like L to loose its majority, but all right types vote R already, so a devi-
ation would actually reduces R’s prospects. us right types have no profitable
deviation either.
Second, consider v 1E  e. On the equilibrium path, v 2 = (nr; n   nr   NM  
NP;NM + NP). Coalition bargaining yields equilibrium outcomes as described in
Lemma .. Hence, with probability v 2R=n = nR=n =: r party R is chosen to form
a coalition and the policy is xRE, whereas with probability (1   r) the proposer
is either L or E and in both cases the policy is xLE. Note that, by Assumption .
and the definition of e, no party gains an absolute majority. Neither will L or E
gain such a majority if they receive one additional vote. Again, deviation is not
profitable for any type: (a) By deviating (to E or L) a right type voter would reduce
the chances of a fR; Eg-coalition in favor of fL; Eg, thus reducing his payoff. (b) A
le type voter switching to R reduces the chances of a fL; Eg-coalition, and both
alternatives, fR; Eg or even single party government fRg, are less-preferred alter-
natives. Switching to E has no effect at all. (c) Finally, moderate and passionate
voters can not improve for reasons analogous to (b); switching to R reduces the
expected payoff, switching to L does not change it.
In summary, there is no profitable deviation in period two. Before proceeding
to period one, we state the period-two payoffs along the different equilibrium
paths: When the Entrant fails to enter parliament, the period-two payoffs are
E(u(X 2; θ)jv 1E < e; θ) = u(0; 0; θ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 12 for θ = θR
0 for θ = θL
αP   1 for θ = θP
αM   1 for θ = θM :
When the Entrant joins parliament, the payoffs are
E(u(X 2; θ)jv 1E  e; θ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 r14   (1  r)58 = 18(3r  5) for θ = θR
 r14   (1  r)18 =  18(1 + r) for θ = θL
 14(1  αP(1  r)) for θ = θP
 14(1  αM(1  r)) for θ = θM :
Period : Given equilibrium strategies and Assumption ., only L and R enter
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parliament and either xL or xR is implemented depending on the vote shares. E
does not enter parliament, even if an individual voter switches her vote to E.
Voters may have incentives to deviate in order to change the probabilities of
policies xL and xR (short-term incentive) or in order to change voting behavior
in period 2 (long-term incentive). In the following, we rule out any one-stage
deviation.
Incentives of a le type: Switching to R is unprofitable; it has a negative short-term
effect and no long-term effect. Switching to E has a negative short-term effect as
well. Furthermore, it increases the chance of meeting threshold e. Le types,
however, prefer the very opposite with respect to period .
Incentives of a right type: A vote for L has a negative short-term effect (compared
to voting for R) and there is no long-run effect. Voting for E instead of R can be
pivotal in two respects: In the short run, it might lead to a le government rather
than a right one. In the long run, it could induce a coalition government rather
then a le one. e total change in utility is
dU = Pr NM + NL 2 fnR   1; nRgjθ = θR u(xL; θR)  u(xR; θR)2
+ δPr NP + 1 = ejθ = θR  E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E  e; θR)  E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E < e; θR)
=  14Pr
NM + NL 2 fnR   1; nRgjθ = θR + δPr NP + 1 = ejθ = θR 3r  18 :
e deviation is not profitable if dU  0, i.e., if
2Pr NM + NL 2 fnR   1; nRgjθ = θR  δPr NP = τ   nMjθ = θR (3r  1) :
Assumption . ensures this condition.
Incentives of a moderate type: Switching the vote from L to R is clearly not prof-
itable. Switching to E lowers short-term expected utility, but may help E to enter
parliament later, if it triggers coordinated voting for E in period 2:is is unprof-
itable if the short-term losses
 Pr NL + NM = nRjθM + Pr NL + NM = nR + 1jθM u(xR; θM)  u(xL; θM)2
=    Pr NL + NM = nRjθM + Pr NL + NM = nR + 1jθM αM2
are higher than the long-term gains from switching
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δPr NP = τ   nMjθM  E(u(X 2; θM)jv 1E  τ + 1  nM; θM)  u(xL; θM)
= δPr NP = τ   nMjθM 14  3  αM(r + 3) :
is requires
αM  3δPr
NP = τ   nMjθM
2Pr [F1] + δPr
NP = τ   nMjθM (3 + r) (.)
with the event F1 defined by NL + NM 2 fnR; nR + 1g.
Incentives of a passionate type: Passionate types have a short term incentive to
switch their vote to L to increase the probability of L geing the majority. On
the other hand, switching to L reduces the chances that v 1E  τ + 1   nM, thus
decreasing the probability of E entering parliament in period 2. e short-term
benefits from switching are:
 Pr NL + NM = nRjθP + Pr NL + NM + 1 = nRjθP u(xL; θP)  u(xR; θP)2
= Pr F2jθP αP2
with the event F2 defined by NL + NM 2 fnR   1; nRg. e long-term losses from
switching are:
  δPr NP = τ + 1  nMjθP  E(u(X 2; θP)jv 1E  τ + 1  nM; θP)  u(xL; θP)
=  δPr NP = τ + 1  nMjθP 14  3  αP(r + 3)
We find that the deviation is unprofitable if Pr[F2jθP] = 0 or
αP  3δPr
NP = τ + 1  nMjθP
2Pr F2jθP + δPr NP = τ + 1  nMjθP (r + 3) : (.)
Switching the vote from E to R is unprofitable; it has a negative short-term effect,
and the long-term effect is negative if αP  3=(3 + r), which is implied by (.).
Note that conditions (.) and (.) are compatible with 0  αP < αM < 1.
Proof of Corollary .. Corollary . follows immediately from the statement of
Proposition ..
Proof of Proposition .. e proof proceeds analogously to the proof of Propo-
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sition .. Only the incentives of a right type change.
A vote for L has a negative short-term effect (compared to voting for R). It
suffices to show that the long-run effect is non-positive:
r = nR=n > 1=3: Voting for L increases the threshold e and reduces the probability
of E entering parliament. Payoff E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E < e; θR) =  1=2 becomes
more likely, whereas payoff E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E  e; θR) = (3r   5)=8 becomes
less likely. Yet the R type voter does not profit from the deviation, as 1=2 <
(3r  5)=8, r > 1=3.
r  1=3: In this case, switching has no long-run effect, as the threshold e is not
affected.
Voting for E instead of R has a negative short-term effect. It suffices to show
that the long-run effect is non-positive.
r > 1=3: Voting for E not only increases the number of votes E receives, but also
the threshold e. Consequently, the probability of E meeting the threshold
does not change. Hence switching has no long-term effect.
r  1=3: In this case, switching does increase the probability that E meets the
threshold. Payoff E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E < e; θR) =  1=2 becomes less likely,
whereas payoff E(u(X 2; θR)jv 1E  e; θR) = (3r   5)=8 becomes more likely.
Yet the R type voter does not profit from the deviation as  1=2  (3r  
5)=8, r  1=3.
Hence, there is no profitable deviation for a right type.
Proof of Proposition .. Suppose everyone is voting sincerely in both periods.
Now, consider the following deviation. A voter of type θM votes sincerely in the
first period. If the entrant receives less than τ votes in the first period, she votes
for L instead of E in the second period. is deviation could make L win the
election instead of R increasing the voter’s utility by αM.
Aer the first election, voters learn the sum of passionate θP and moderate
types θM. Assumption . guarantees that with positive probability the sum of
passionate θP and moderate types θM is smaller than the election threshold τ: In
addition, with positive probability the number of le types θL equals nR or nR  1.
Finally, both events together occur with positive probability. Hence, the deviation
is profitable in expectation. Consequently, voting sincerely in both periods is not
an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition .. First, notice that the set of priors consistent with As-
sumptions . and . is non-empty.
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Now, consider a voter of type θM in period one. Everyone else votes sincerely.
By deviating from sincere voting, the voter may be pivotal in two respects. First,
switching to Lmay help L towin amajority if E does not enter parliament. Second,
switching may make E fail the threshold τ in period one, changing period-one
government and implying a le government in period two instead of a three-
party parliament. To simplify notation, let uK = u(xK; θM) for K = L; R and let
uE = ru(xRE; θM) + (1   r)u(xLE; θM) (with x() as given in Lemma .). en, by
deviating to L instead of E in the first period, the moderate’s utility changes by
dU = Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 < nRjθM] (uR   uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 = nRjθM] ((uR + uL)=2  uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 > nRjθM] (uL   uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP < τ ^ NL + 1 = nRjθM] ((uR + uL)=2  uR)
+ Pr[NM + NP < τ ^ NL = nRjθM]
 uL   (uR + uL)=2
= Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 < nRjθM] (uR   uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 = nRjθM] ((uR + uL)=2  uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 > nRjθM] (uL   uE + δ(uL   uE))
+ Pr[NM + NP < τ ^ NL 2 fnr   1; nRgjθM]
 
(uL   uR)=2

Further rearrangement yields
dU = Pr[NM + NP = τjθM](δuL   (1 + δ)uE)
+ uR

Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 < nRjθM] +
1
2Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 = nRjθ
M]
  12Pr[NM + NP < τ ^ NL 2 fnr   1; nRgjθ
M]

+ uL
1
2Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 = nRjθ
M] + Pr[NM + NP = τ ^ NL + 1 > nRjθM]
+
1
2Pr[NM + NP < τ ^ NL 2 fnr   1; nRgjθ
M]

= Pr[NM + NP = τjθM](δuL   (1 + δ)uE) + uR
 Pr[NM + NP = τjθM]  P L + uLP L
= P L(uL   uR) + Pr[NM + NP = τjθM](uR   uE + δ(uL   uE)) :
We plug in uL = αM   1, uR =  1 and uE =  (1   αM(1   r))=4 and rearrange
into
dU = αM(Tδ + P L)  αM(1  r)T(1 + δ)=4  3T(1 + δ)=4
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= αM

Tδ(3=4 + r=4) + P L   (1  r)T=4

  3T(1 + δ)=4
with T = Pr[NM + NP = τjθM]. en dU is greater 0 if
αM > 3T(1 + δ)4P L   (1  r)T + δ(3 + r)T (.)
Assumption . ensures that the fraction (.) is smaller than one. To sum up, the
deviation to L is profitable for themoderate type, if inequality (.) is satisfied.
Proof of Corollary .. e statement of Corollary . is a direct consequence of
Proposition . with δ = 0.
Proof of Lemma .. For every prior which is consistent with Assumption .,
condition (.) is feasible. In particular, αM = 1 ensures condition (.). In ad-
dition, for every prior consistent with Assumption ., there are αP and αM with
αP < αM that satisfy conditions (.) and (.). In particular, αP = 0 and αM = 1
guarantee both conditions.
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